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This thesis investigated the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture by examining 
the developmental trajectory of reasoning-based social learning strategies, which have 
been proposed to be what sets human learning apart from non-humans. Specifically, the 
studies reported in this thesis were concerned with differentiating cases in which social 
information use was driven by reasoned understanding and cases which could be 
explained by implicit adaptive heuristics. This was achieved by looking for age-related 
changes in children’s reasoning about, and use of, social information. More effective 
social information use was proposed to reflect learners’ reasoned understanding of its 
relevance and potential value to themselves. Each study examined a particular cognitive 
challenge identified as potentially relevant for social information use in the context of 
real world cases of cumulative culture. Chapter two explored the development of 
children’s ability to account for others’ conflicting goals in their use of the available 
social information as a means to achieve their own goal. Chapters three and four 
investigated children’s ability to seek out appropriate sources of social information. 
Chapter three looked at children’s recognition of what information they required to 
solve a problem and who could provide that information. While chapter four examined 
children’s ability to consider potential informants’ mental states when determining ‘who 
knows’. Overall, the developmental trajectory indicated relatively late childhood 
development of effective social information use driven by reasoned understanding. This 
late development is consistent with proposals suggesting that this may be a cognitive 
mechanism that is only available to humans. The flexibility afforded by the ability to 
recognise the value, to oneself, of others’ potential to provide useful and relevant 
information, on account of their experience or knowledge, appears to offer the 
significant advantage in social information use that may drive human cumulative culture 
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Unquestionably there are striking differences between humans and non-humans. 
To understand our peculiarity and what drives the success of our species, is really to ask 
what it means to be human. Humans’ monopoly of the planet is proposed to be enabled 
by our apparently unique ability to exploit and build on the accomplishments of 
previous generations (cumulative culture; Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003). That is, the resultant technologies, skills, and knowledge of later 
generations offer greater benefits relative to what could be achieved by an individual 
(Tomasello et al., 1993). By contrast, claims of comparable abilities in non-humans are 
rare and usually contentious. Unsurprisingly, questions regarding the origins, 
development, and drivers of human uniqueness fascinate researchers across a wealth of 
disciplines. Indeed, they have been posed as some of the most important and yet 
unanswered scientific questions (“So much more to know,” 2005). 
The stark contrast in the scope of cumulative culture in human adults compared 
to the limited evidence in non-humans has led to proposals of a uniquely human 
cognitive mechanism that is a necessary prerequisite for human-like cumulative culture. 
One way to approach investigation of such cognitive mechanisms is to examine the 
developmental trajectory of cumulative culture in human children. In this thesis I 
investigate the proposal that human cumulative culture relies on the optimisation of 
social information use driven by capacities that enable understanding of the value and 
relevance of social information. Looking at whether age-related changes in social 
information use coincide with advances in cognitive development could offer an insight 
into the underlying mechanisms that are required, and help to explain why cumulative 
culture appears to be restricted to humans. Therefore, this thesis aims to establish the 
cognitive mechanisms that drive the development of distinctively human cumulative 
culture by tackling fundamental questions related to the developmental trajectory of 
cognitive capacities for social information use. 
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In this chapter I will review the background literature that informed the rationale 
for the experimental work undertaken in chapters two, three, and four, outlining the 
specific aims and hypotheses being examined. I begin by outlining the current state of 
the literature on cumulative culture including: a definition, a review of evidence in 
human adults relative to non-humans, and an outline of the potential value of 
developmental research in understanding the discontinuity between these populations 
and establishing prerequisite sociocognitive mechanisms. I will then move onto 
reviewing the sociocognitive mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie this 
seemingly human unique propensity, highlighting capacities that appear to be shared by 
humans and non-humans, and those that appear to differ between species. Specifically, I 
will outline how looking at children’s use of social information, and their awareness of 
doing so, could offer an insight into their understanding of what makes that social 
information valuable. Understanding the value of social information is vital, as it is 
likely important for successful cumulative culture across a broad range of contexts. 
There is little evidence of distinctive adult-like cumulative culture in children and non-
humans. Therefore, examining social information use in these populations could 
provide clues as to their capacity for cumulative culture and the sociocognitive 
mechanisms that might be necessary for it. I will focus in particular on a recent proposal 
that suggests that distinctively human cumulative culture is driven by a particular type 
of strategic social learning that is available only to humans. 
In another section of this chapter I will deviate from the discussion of 
cumulative culture and focus instead on children’s cognitive development. As cognitive 
development significantly informs the aims and hypotheses of this thesis it is pertinent 
to provide sufficient background. Therefore, I will review the ontogeny of cognitive 
development, providing evidence for the continuing advancement of cognitive 
capacities throughout development from infancy to adolescence. In doing so I will 
highlight key milestones in cognitive development. Following this I will set out the 
proposed relationship between children’s cognitive development and the development 
of distinctively human cumulative culture, laying the foundation for the aims and 
hypotheses of this thesis. 
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Distinctively Human Cumulative Culture 
Social transmission can result in an accumulation of beneficial modifications to 
cultural traits over successive generations of learners. Usually referred to as cumulative 
cultural evolution, or cumulative culture (Caldwell & Millen, 2008b), this directional 
pattern of change has also been aptly dubbed the ‘ratchet effect’ (Tomasello et al., 
1993) on account of the preservation of the modifications to cultural traits. The 
consequent advances in knowledge and skills are such that the cultural traits of later 
generations, afforded by their access to social information, are relatively unambiguous 
‘improvements’ in that they would likely have been preferred by their predecessors had 
they been available (Caldwell et al., 2020). Unsurprisingly there have been a variety of 
definitions of such terms and discontinuity in their uses between disciplines and 
researchers. Recently Mesoudi and Thornton (2018) identified four core criteria that are 
widely agreed upon as indicative of cumulative culture: (1) a change in behaviour or 
cultural product, (2) social transmission of the modified trait, (3) improvement in 
performance as a result of the modified trait, and (4) iteration of these steps generating 
improvement over time. Although some researchers include additional constraints for 
traits to be considered as cumulative culture (e.g., Derex et al., 2018; Enquist et al., 
2011; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Mesoudi & Thornton refer to these as ‘extended criteria’) 
the core criteria are common across definitions.  
These criteria clearly distinguish cumulative culture from cultural evolution in 
the broader sense. Cultural evolution refers to the process of change over time in the 
behaviours exhibited by a population as a result of social transmission. Whilst novel 
modifications of existing cultural traits will show differential success in their rates of 
transmission and adoption, group-level changes are not necessarily characterised by a 
cumulative improvement over generations of learners. That is, cultural evolution is akin 
to iteration of the first two steps of Mesoudi & Thornton's core criteria. 
Human populations demonstrate cumulative culture across a breadth of domains 
(Kempe et al., 2014), including technological processes (e.g., the manufacture of stone 
tools, Stout, 2011, and communication systems, Smaldino & Richerson, 2013) and 
abstract conceptual knowledge (e.g., science and mathematics, Arbesman, 2011; May, 
1966). Indeed, its ubiquity, in conjunction with a lack of evidence in non-humans, has 
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prompted some to claim that cumulative culture is unique to humans (e.g., Dean et al., 
2012, 2014; Tennie et al., 2009). Moreover, some researchers have cited cumulative 
culture as being what makes human culture particularly ‘special’ (Boyd & Richerson, 
1996; Heyes, 2012; Tomasello et al., 1993). Certainly, there have been markedly fewer 
claims of cumulative culture in non-humans (noteworthy exceptions include New 
Caledonian crows, Hunt & Gray, 2003; and chimpanzees, Sanz et al., 2009) despite 
widespread evidence of culture and cultural evolution (Allen, 2019; Aplin, 2019; 
Whiten, 2017a). For example, Hobaiter et al. (2014) found that wild chimpanzees’ tool 
use can be interpreted as cultural given that their behavioural diversity was driven by 
social transmission. Other species found to demonstrate culture include: birds (e.g., 
great tits, Aplin et al., 2015), cetaceans (e.g., humpback whales, Allen et al., 2013), and 
insects (e.g., bumblebees, Alem et al., 2016; fruit flies, Danchin et al., 2018). In regard 
to cultural evolution, the most compelling examples come from bird and whale song 
(e.g., yellowhammers, Pipek et al., 2018; humpback whales, Garland et al., 2011; for a 
comparative review see Garland & McGregor, 2020). 
While it is relatively straightforward to identify culture and cultural evolution in 
natural populations, it is significantly more challenging to find evidence for cumulative 
culture. By definition, cumulative culture develops slowly over a long time period 
(multiple generations of transmission, which in naturally occurring traditions may 
equate to multiple biological generations). Thus, historical data are required in order to 
objectively evaluate cultural artefacts and behaviours in terms of their relative value or 
benefits over time. This presents somewhat of a problem for research into non-human 
cumulative culture. While some human artefacts have survived the test of time, the 
same cannot be said for artefacts used by non-humans. Recently however, two cases of 
naturalistic cumulative culture in non-humans have been described, using data drawn 
from large historical datasets. Examining the migratory behaviour of bighorn sheep and 
moose, Jesmer et al. (2018) concluded that translocated populations took multiple 
generations to develop migratory patterns as effective as those of well-established 
historical populations. This suggested that later generations had benefitted from the 
accumulated experience of previous generations. In another example, Schofield et al. 
(2018) proposed that researchers’ field observations of Japanese macaques reflected 
improvements in novel food processing techniques across the 60 years of available data. 
Analyses of these historical data sets (Jesmer et al., 2018; Schofield et al., 2018) appear 
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to show patterns of gradual improvement that are suggestive of naturally occurring 
cumulative culture. An experimental study with non-humans has also fulfilled the 
criteria for cumulative culture, although this too focused on naturally occurring 
tendencies. Sasaki and Biro (2017) compared homing pigeons’ route efficiency by 
taking advantage of their natural tendency to fly alongside a partner (or flock) when 
released together. However, it is important to note that these findings with non-humans 
are very likely to be context-specific (e.g., evidence of cumulative culture is likely to be 
restricted to route efficiency in homing pigeons or migratory patterns in ungulates). 
Research with human adults has successfully simulated cumulative culture in a 
laboratory setting using generational replacement (or ‘microsociety’) designs (Caldwell 
& Millen, 2008a). By adapting these methodologies, further studies aimed to establish 
the factors that facilitate or inhibit cumulative culture (Caldwell et al., 2016; Caldwell & 
Millen, 2009; Derex et al., 2019; Fay et al., 2019; Muthukrishna et al., 2014; Zwirner & 
Thornton, 2015), as a way to identify the prerequisite cognitive capacities. These kinds 
of studies do show that particular sociocognitive capacities, for example teaching 
(Caldwell et al., 2018; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015), may aid the transmission of cultural 
traits. However, they do not wholly explain the distinctiveness of human cumulative 
culture or the lack, or extreme rarity, of cumulative culture in non-humans seeing as 
some such capacities are not exclusive to humans. I will return to the issue of common 
sociocognitive capacities and what this might mean for explaining distinctively human 
cumulative culture later in this chapter. 
The seemingly unbounded nature of cumulative culture in human adults stands 
in stark contrast to the extremely restricted evidence in non-humans. Even though recent 
evidence has to some extent quashed prior claims (Dean et al., 2014) of cumulative 
culture being precluded in non-humans, there is a distinct difference in its expression. 
Thus, while non-humans may have some capacity for cumulative culture it appears to 
be restricted relative to the cumulative culture demonstrated in human adults. The 
challenge then is to determine whether there is a particular reason, from a cognitive 
perspective, for the discontinuity between humans and non-humans. One approach to 
bridging the gap between these two populations is to investigate the development of the 
capacity for cumulative culture in young children.  
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There are a number of reasons for examining the developmental trajectory of 
cumulative culture. First, it can be assumed that, as adults are capable of cumulative 
culture, it likely develops during childhood. Therefore, testing young children’s 
capabilities for cumulative culture across different ages could provide a valuable insight 
into its ontogeny. It might also provide evidence as to the degree of such abilities. 
Specifically, whether children demonstrate patterns of cumulative culture that are 
comparable to human adults, or whether such capacities appear to be restricted similarly 
to patterns observed in non-humans. Tracking its developmental trajectory may 
highlight particular ages at which children make significant advances in their capacity 
for cumulative culture. If these advances occur at a similar age to the development of 
particular cognitive capacities, then such capacities may be necessary prerequisites. 
That is, investigating age-related changes in the capacity for cumulative culture could 
expose, more clearly than studies with human adults, cognitive mechanisms that 
underlie distinctively human cumulative culture. Such capacities may be beyond the 
capabilities of non-humans and therefore may help to explain the discontinuity with 
regard to human-like cumulative culture. Finally, to some degree research in adults is 
limited given that there is only so much that can be manipulated experimentally. That is, 
while it is possible to manipulate the availability, type, and source of information, the 
availability of cognitive mechanisms that can be employed to use the information 
cannot be manipulated. Therefore, if the aim is to establish cognitive prerequisites for 
cumulative culture, manipulating learning conditions may not be sufficient to uncover 
the mechanisms responsible. If for instance the key distinction between human and non-
human social learning lies in a capacity for deeper cognitive understanding, rather than 
a particular type of information processing, it is unlikely that it would be possible to 
remove or sufficiently restrict this kind of capacity. However, studies of children might 
enable us to get at this, albeit only through correlational relationships, as younger 
children may not yet have developed such mechanisms. 
While the majority of research in adults has focused on identifying factors that 
facilitate or inhibit cumulative culture, the question remains as to whether capacities for 
cumulative culture are even available in young children. Crucially, the age-related 
development of these capacities, which likely offers the most value in terms of 
establishing prerequisite cognitive mechanisms, has not really been addressed at all. 
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A relatively small number of studies claim to have found evidence of cumulative 
culture in children. For example, Dean et al. (2012) found that, in contrast to 
chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys, 3- to 4-year-old children’s success in reaching the 
most complex solution in a multistage puzzlebox task was dependent on social support 
from other group members. Specifically, transmission of solutions correlated with both 
imitation and teaching measures. Having used a similar method, McGuigan et al. (2017) 
described that simpler solutions preceded more advanced and rewarding solutions, with 
particular techniques more prevalent within rather than between groups, thus suggesting 
a role of social transmission. However, as these studies employ a closed group design 
this limits the conclusions that can be drawn. For example, in regard to the Dean et al. 
(2012) study, it is not possible to determine whether or not children’s improved 
performance was explained by their increasing exposure to the task. Indeed, a recent 
replication, that included a previously absent asocial control condition (Reindl et al., 
2020) found that children were capable of reaching the most complex solution without 
social learning. Thus, closed group studies are not sufficient for concluding the age 
from which capacities for cumulative culture are available. Consequently, they do not 
move us further forward in making use of children’s development as a means to 
establish prerequisite cognitive mechanisms. Although these studies offer an insight into 
children’s capacity to use social information, through adopting others’ solutions, they 
provide only limited insights into the potential for accumulating improvements over 
time.  
Generational replacement studies with young children are rare, and those that 
have been conducted do not provide evidence of the characteristic accumulation of 
improvements over generations that is seen in adult populations (e.g., Caldwell & 
Millen, 2008a). For example, Reindl and Tennie (2018) found that 4- to 5-year-old 
children in later generations did not perform better than earlier generations. Similarly, 
Tennie et al. (2014) found that exposure to social information did not enable 4-year-olds 
to produce more efficient solutions. Both Flynn (2008) and Tennie et al. (2014) found 
that if chains were deliberately initiated with a demonstration of an artificially 
inefficient method, some children removed redundant elements to implement and 
transmit more effective solutions resulting in later generations being more successful 
than earlier generations. However, cumulative culture should result in higher 
performance following exposure to social information than could be achieved without 
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any social information, rather than just a drift back to a baseline asocial learning level of 
success. Therefore, the results of these studies cannot really be considered as evidence 
for cumulative culture.  
Finally, some very recent research (Wilks et al., 2021) using a novel 
methodology, which simulates a transmission chain from individual participant data 
(Caldwell et al., 2020), has tackled as yet outstanding questions regarding the 
developmental trajectory of cumulative culture in children. Indeed, this may be the first 
study that truly addresses the developmental trajetory of cumulative culture. The results 
of this study indicate that the presence or otherwise of cumulative culture can 
sometimes depend on information processing demands. That is, when information was 
presented such that it did not require storage (and indeed would have been difficult to 
ignore), even very young children demonstrated a ratchet-like effect in their learning. 
However, placing constraints on the availability of the information made a big 
difference to the age at which children demonstrated such an effect. Thus, real world 
cases of cumulative culture may require advanced cognitive resources which allow us to 
access, process, and store the information made available by others. 
While examining the development of the capacity for cumulative culture is 
interesting, such an ability relies on more fundamental capacities for social information 
use or transmission. To investigate the sociocognitive capacities that might be necessary 
for distinctively human cumulative culture we need to look more closely at capacities 
for social transmission. For example, contextual differences between populations in 
experimental studies have shown that cumulative culture in adults is influenced by 
factors such as teaching (Caldwell et al., 2018) and the number of available social 
models (Muthukrishna et al., 2014). 
In this thesis I will focus on looking at the more fundamental question of 
whether children are really aware of the fact that they are using social information, and 
their understanding of what makes that social information valuable or useful. The 
characteristic improvement over generations observed in adults’ cumulative culture – 
and the fact that this appears to occur regardless of the form of the available information 
(Caldwell & Millen, 2009) – may even be explained by the learners’ understanding of 
the value of the social information available from the previous generation. Therefore, if 
19 
children have a limited, or lack of, understanding of this value they may be less likely to 
use the available social information appropriately. Thus, the degree of improvement 
across generations may be diminished relative to that of adults. Such an interpretation 
would also help to explain the absence of evidence of cumulative culture in non-humans 
inasmuch as recognising the value of social information is likely beyond their 
capabilities. That is, if recognising the value or relevance of social information is 
necessary for human-like cumulative culture then that might explain why non-humans 
show evidence of cumulative culture only in limited, context-specific, cases (where 
such an understanding might not be necessary). Fundamental questions regarding the 
developmental trajectory of children’s understanding of social information use must be 
tackled before we can truly attempt to answer questions about children’s (and by logical 
extension non-humans’) potential to demonstrate the kind of cumulative culture 
observed in adults. The following section reviews a number of sociocognitive 
mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie distinctively human cumulative 
culture. 
Prerequisite Sociocognitive Mechanisms 
By definition, cultural transmission necessitates using information acquired from 
a social source. In the current thesis, when investigating the sociocognitive mechanisms 
proposed to underlie distinctively human cumulative culture I have focused in particular 
on the sophistication of social information use. In doing so, I have been able to study 
the mechanisms that may be implicated in cumulative culture in a way that permits 
reasonable comparisons across populations. Learning from others – social learning – is 
widespread in humans and a variety of non-human species. However, there appear to be 
key differences in human adults’ social learning (relative to non-humans) that could 
account for the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; 
Dean et al., 2014; Heyes, 2016c). These differences are evident in human adults’ 
capacity to appropriately seek out, attend to, and use social information across a vast 
array of contexts, posing a potentially significant advantage for cultural transmission 
(Morgan et al., 2012). 
A number of sociocognitive mechanisms have been proposed as being what sets 
human learning apart from that of non-humans (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Dean et al., 
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2014; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Tennie et al., 2009). To give an example, Dean et al. 
(2014) proposed that human cumulative culture is the consequence of a ‘suite’ or 
‘package’ of sociocognitive abilities that enable high-fidelity information transmission. 
The proposed package of capacities included imitation, teaching, complex 
communication, and prosociality. However, this proposal does not account for the 
absence of evidence of cumulative culture in non-human species which have shown 
evidence of some of these abilities. Thus, the disparity in evidence of cumulative culture 
between humans and non-humans, in spite of many common sociocognitive capacities, 
presents an interesting conundrum. In this section I will review some of these proposed 
sociocognitive prerequisites and I will highlight the proposal that informs the 
experimental framework applied to the studies reported in chapters to follow.  
The most prominent cognitive capacity that has been proposed in an attempt to 
explain the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture is ‘imitation’ or action-copying 
– the proclivity to copy the actions others (Tomasello et al., 1993). Humans appear to 
have a particular aptitude for copying the actions of others (Heyes, 2011), and the 
resulting high-fidelity information transmission has been claimed as being what permits 
cumulative culture (Tennie et al., 2009; Whiten, 2017b). Indeed, higher-fidelity cultural 
transmission has been found to lead to exponential growth in trait longevity, and lower 
rates of trait loss (Enquist et al., 2010; Lewis & Laland, 2012). However, claims that 
imitation is a learning mechanism that can explain cumulative culture are called into 
question when we consider evidence of imitation in non-humans (for a review see 
Huber et al., 2009) which exhibit limited evidence of cumulative culture. For example, 
there is evidence of imitation in chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1996), marmosets (Voelkl 
& Huber, 2000), and wild birds (Aplin et al., 2015). Furthermore, evidence for 
cumulative culture is found in human adults even without the opportunity to imitate 
(Caldwell et al., 2012; Caldwell & Millen, 2009) suggesting that imitation is not 
essential for cumulative culture. Although, it seems likely that action copying may 
support cumulative culture when the behaviour required to achieve the end state is 
cognitively quite opaque (e.g., as proposed by Wasielewski, 2014). The evidence of 
sociocognitive capacities such as imitation in non-humans suggests that it is unlikely 
that any single capacity, such as this, is solely responsible for human cumulative 
culture. 
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An alternative proposal focuses on when and how social information is used, 
rather than a particular type of social information. Social learning is generally assumed 
to be an adaptive capacity when it is present within a population. Yet although it is 
beneficial and tends to be more efficient relative to individual learning (Rendell et al., 
2011), theoretical models suggest that the ability to be selective and flexibly switch 
between social and individual learning is what increases efficiency and adaptability 
(Enquist et al., 2007; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Rogers, 1988). That is, relying on 
only social learning does not present the opportunities for innovations to occur within a 
population which are necessary for improvements to a cultural trait to be accumulated. 
Recent evidence, drawn from datasets generated by collaborative online programming 
competitions, indicates that selective social learning produces cumulative improvement 
in knowledge over time (Miu et al., 2020). The results of this study showed that those 
who performed best employed a mixture of copying those who were more proficient, 
and learning individually through adding their own innovations. In other words, copying 
alone cannot increase adaptability in a population, relative to individual learning. 
Likewise, always innovating is also likely to lead to relatively low success, and 
accumulation of benefits over generations would not be possible. Rather, it is the ability 
to flexibly switch from copying to individual learning, when copying proves 
unsatisfactory, and vice versa, that increases adaptability. 
Another way to think about selective social learning is in terms of targeting 
learning towards appropriate social sources, specifically those who possess relevant 
knowledge or experience. To some extent this selective, or targeted, social learning has 
been observed in humans and non-humans in the form of social learning strategies 
(SLSs). These are flexible rules that direct learning towards objects, agents, or events 
that are most likely to provide useful information (Kendal et al., 2018; Laland, 2004). 
SLSs help to filter out less useful aspects of available social information, influencing 
selectivity in social learning. These strategies have been considered responsible for 
much of the adaptive social learning found in humans and non-humans (Kendal et al., 
2018; Rendell et al., 2011). The selective nature of SLSs such as ‘copy older 
individuals’ or ‘copy the majority’ makes them generally more effective than learning 
indiscriminately from others or individual learning through trial and error. However, 
evidence of SLSs, and selective social learning more generally, in both humans and 
non-humans (e.g., Price et al., 2017; Wood et al., 2013b) suggests that selective social 
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learning also cannot fully account for the differences between these populations in 
regard to the capacity for cumulative culture. 
There is however an alternative proposal regarding strategic social learning, 
which, in contrast, does focus on capacities widely regarded as unique to humans. 
According to this proposal, the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture can be 
attributed to humans capacity to use explicitly metacognitive SLSs (Dunstone & 
Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c). These are consciously represented and reportable rules 
that reflect an explicit awareness and understanding of the reasoning-based learning 
strategies being employed. Explicitly metacognitive SLSs could therefore enable 
learners to recognise the potential value to themselves of information provided by 
others. This could be due to a reasoned understanding of why a particular person is, 
potentially, a good source of information (Whalen et al., 2018) or the ability to 
recognise shortfalls in one’s own knowledge or access to information. For a learner, 
having an explicit awareness of the strategies they are using and a reasoned 
understanding of the value, or potential value, of social information would allow them 
to flexibly identify, select, or disregard social information across varied contexts (De 
Oliveira et al., 2019; Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c). This ability to 
recognise the value of social information and target learning towards appropriate 
sources is believed to, at least in part, facilitate human-like cumulative culture (Heyes, 
2016a; Shea et al., 2014).  
Explicitly metacognitive SLSs form one half of a dual-process account of social 
learning that suggests that there are distinct categories of SLSs, each based on specific 
types of decision rules (Heyes, 2016c). So, while human adults are assumed to have the 
capacity to use explicitly metacognitive strategies (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 
2016c), the majority of the behaviours that conform to SLSs in both humans and non-
humans are proposed to arise as a consequence of general-purpose associative learning 
processes or biologically selected biases. Indeed, these implicit SLSs (as I will refer to 
them) are proposed to be available to both humans and non-humans, while explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs are only available to humans. Implicit SLSs differ from explicitly 
metacognitive ones in that they are not driven by a causal understanding of the potential 
value of social information. Rather, they direct learning towards objects, agents, and 
events that have in the past (in either individual experience or phylogenetic history) 
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provided useful information. Thus, in principle, any salient association can be formed, 
or bias can be inherited. While implicit SLSs afford adaptive flexibility within a 
population they do not offer the equivalent degree of flexibility afforded by explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs (Heyes, 2017).  
Although implicit SLSs – and SLSs defined more broadly (Kendal et al., 2018) – 
appear to be ‘strategic’ this is not necessarily the case in the everyday sense of the word. 
Non-humans can, and do, use social information in strategic ways. However, it seems 
unlikely that they are basing these strategies on a causal understanding of the value of 
the information or that they are even aware of their use of such strategies. Rather, the 
strategies they use are likely the result of less cognitively demanding learning processes 
such as associations or heuristic biases (i.e., implicit SLSs) which nonetheless function 
to produce behaviour which is likely to be superficially similar to that produced by 
reasoning-based understanding. Therefore, Heyes's (2016c) proposal that non-humans 
do not have the capacity to use explicitly metacognitive SLSs and instead rely on 
implicit SLSs seems extremely plausible. If it is true, the effectiveness of the strategies 
that non-humans use could be limited in many of the contexts in which real world 
cumulative culture occurs. As such, this proposal could offer an explanation as to why 
there is so little evidence of cumulative culture in non-humans. However, categorisation 
of cases of strategic social learning as either implicit, or explicitly metacognitive, has 
thus far been ascribed only retrospectively, rather than on the basis of a direct test 
designed to differentiate them (Heyes, 2016a, 2017; Heyes & Pearce, 2015). Therefore, 
research is required to assess the validity of such a proposal. 
Similarly to non-humans, young children’s social learning is thought to be 
driven by implicit SLSs (Heyes, 2017). Thus, given the assumption that adults have the 
capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs, and that this capacity is likely to be 
experience-dependent (Heyes, 2016c), it follows that this understanding must develop 
during the course of childhood. In the chapters to follow, I will use this framework of 
implicit and explicitly metacognitive social information use to describe the kind of 
reasoning-driven social information use that I think may pose challenges for young 
children. If young children find this kind of social information use challenging, then by 
logical extension, so too would non-humans. Later in this chapter, I will return to the 
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issue of the cognitive challenges that may be associated with social information use, and 
how these could link with age-related advances in children’s cognitive capacities. 
Investigating the scope of selective social learning in children may help us to 
explain the origins of distinctively human cumulative culture. If I can identify when 
children develop the capacity to use explicitly metacognitive over implicit SLSs I may 
be able to use this to predict the likelihood of the capacity being available to non-
humans. That is, if such an ability develops late in childhood then it may depend on 
cognitive mechanisms that are not available to non-humans and could help to explain 
the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture. In the following section I will review 
evidence of cognitive development that might be relevant to the development of the 
capacity for cumulative culture in children. 
Cognitive Development 
To establish which cognitive mechanisms could be key to the distinct differences 
between human and non-human social learning it is necessary to understand their 
ontogeny. Cognitive abilities expand over the course of childhood and adolescence, 
with some of the most dramatic advances in cognitive development occurring in early 
childhood. In this section I will introduce a few of the most pertinent cognitive abilities. 
I will outline their ontogeny, highlighting particular developmental milestones, and 
overall will provide evidence of the continuing advancement of cognition from infancy 
through adolescence. 
The first comprehensive theory of cognitive development was set out by Jean 
Piaget (Barrouillet, 2015). Piaget’s observations of the kinds of mistakes children made 
at different ages indicated to him that there were underlying cognitive mechanisms that 
facilitated understanding, and as these mechanisms developed they would result in 
particular changes in children’s ability to reason about the world. This conclusion led 
him to propose that children pass through a number of observable developmental stages 
on their way to adult-like cognitive logical thinking and reasoning abilities. Specifically, 
Piaget described four universal sequential stages (sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete 
operational, and formal operational) which every child goes through at approximately 
the same age. Each of these stages represented a distinct capacity for, or way of, 
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reasoning which children could only achieve once they had reached that stage. 
However, although these stages were described discontinuously there are not strict 
dividing lines between them, the process of development being continuous (Flavell, 
1971). That is, it is an ongoing process in which infants and children develop and adjust 
their understanding of the world based on experience. Evidence to support Piaget’s 
theory was initially limited, and when tests were developed to assess the feasibility of 
his theory much of the evidence pointed to Piaget having been too conservative in his 
predictions of children’s cognitive capacities at each age. For example, later research 
using paradigms such as the violation of expectations task indicated that infants were 
capable of understanding object permanence earlier (around 5 months; Baillargeon et 
al., 1985) than Piaget had predicted through his own observations (around 8 months). 
Similarly, with regards to tasks of conservation (understanding that superficial changes 
in the appearance of a quantity does not mean that the quantity itself has changed), later 
studies discovered that slight changes in the set-up of the tasks (e.g., accidental 
transformation; McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974) led to successful conservation in 
younger children (4 and 5 years) than was found in the original tasks (from 6 years). 
This suggested that factors such as the language used in the tasks could influence the 
outcome, something that had been neglected in Piaget’s theorising (Barrouillet, 2015; 
McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974). 
Though different theories regarding the ontogeny of cognition present their own 
developmental timelines and proposals for underlying mechanisms, there is little dissent 
regarding the basic idea that cognition advances cumulatively through childhood and 
adolescence. Research into cognitive development has certainly moved on since Piaget 
set out his original theory. However, much of the work that has been carried out during 
the intervening period does link back to the idea that children’s cognitive development 
is a cumulative process characterised by a cycle of change and growth. While generally 
considered plausible at the time, today there is much less conviction about, and 
emphasis on, the notion of stages of cognitive development as a whole. However, there 
are more specific developmental ‘stages’ related to particular cognitive mechanisms 
such as theory of mind, metacognition, and executive functions. 
While cognition continually advances throughout infancy and childhood and into 
adolescence, there are what some might call key developmental milestones. These 
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milestones represent what appear to be important shifts in children’s cognitive abilities. 
For example, there is a general consensus that children’s theory of mind – their 
understanding of others’ mental states – undergoes an important shift at around 4 years 
old. This is observed most readily in children’s ability to pass standard tests of false 
belief. In such tests, children are asked to predict where an agent, who is mistaken about 
an object’s location, will look for the object. Children reliably answer this question 
correctly from around 4 to 5 years old, whereas younger children do not (Krachun et al., 
2009; Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
While the first experiment to look at theory of mind was conducted with 
chimpanzees (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) the challenge of assessing the attribution of 
mental states, both to oneself and others, was soon applied to human cognitive 
development (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The premise for the earliest tests of theory of 
mind was that one way to establish whether an individual has the concept of belief 
would be to assess whether they can attribute a false belief (i.e., a belief or 
representation that contrasts with reality; Dennett, 1978; Spaulding, 2020). As outlined 
above, classic tests of false belief such as the ‘unexpected transfer task’ (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983) and the ‘unexpected contents task’ (Gopnik & Astington, 1988) concur 
that by around 4 to 5 years old children develop the ability to attribute false beliefs to 
others. There are many researchers who contest the notion that children’s false belief 
understanding develops as late as 4 years old. Indeed, there are a raft of studies 
conducted with infants which claim to have found evidence of theory of mind using 
spontaneous responses, used as indirect indices of understanding, rather than directly 
elicited responses (such as answers to explicit understanding-based questions). These 
spontaneous measures include anticipatory looking, looking time, and violation of 
expectation paradigms (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate et al., 2007). These 
tasks are designed to minimise task demands associated with the standard false belief 
tasks, which rely on verbal communication, and facilitate testing in non-verbal or pre-
verbal populations. Sometimes these spontaneous measures are referred to in the 
literature as implicit theory of mind tasks. Tasks such as these report that false belief 
understanding may be present from infancy (e.g., from 7 months, Kovács et al., 2010; 
15 months, Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005 though see Baillargeon et al., 2010 for a full 
review). Spontaneous measures have also been used in tests with great apes (Kano et al., 
2019; Krupenye et al., 2016). An alternative to these tasks is the ‘active helping’ 
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paradigm. This paradigm does not require verbal responses, and does not involve a 
direct understanding-based question, but rather than relying on measures of processing 
during passive observation (e.g., tracking eye gaze during false belief scenarios), it does 
require an active response – assisting an agent with their goal (Buttelmann et al., 2009; 
Priewasser et al., 2018; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). 
However, there has been a lot of dispute about whether these spontaneous 
measures actually capture early theory of mind understanding. Recent issues regarding 
failed replications suggest that these spontaneous measures, regardless of their validity, 
are also not robust or reliable (see Kulke et al., 2019). It is also difficult to know exactly 
what infants or great apes are responding to. For example, some researchers have 
argued that spontaneous behavioural response tasks highlight only what an individual 
sees as unusual, which does not necessarily require an understanding of mental states 
(Buttelmann et al., 2009; Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Furthermore, on the assumption 
that the tests may be tapping a different type of understanding from the explicit tests, 
the implicit nature of this understanding is unlikely to underpin the kind of theory of 
mind which could be unique to humans. Thus, despite the debate regarding spontaneous 
measures of belief understanding, the general consensus is that by around 4 to 5 years 
old children understand that others can hold conflicting beliefs and can attribute them 
accordingly. Indeed, 5-year-olds, but not great apes, have been found to successfully 
pass other non-verbal tests of false belief (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Krachun et al., 
2009). 
Theory of mind has been proposed to be linked to metarepresentation. If that is 
the case, then the evidence is more consistent with the theories that propose late-
development than those that propose early-development. The attribution of mental states 
in theory of mind has been proposed to be based on a more general capacity for 
metarepresentation. Metarepresentation refers to the representation of representational 
states, and a mental state can be thought of as a representation of the world (i.e., a 
representational state; Perner, 1991). While representation of others’ mental states is 
akin to theory of mind, representation of one’s own mental states is generally referred to 
as metacognition (Carruthers, 2009). Metacognition can be broadly described as the 
ability to recognise and monitor knowledge of one’s own cognitive processes (Flavell, 
1979). This ability relates to understanding one’s own states of knowledge and 
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ignorance, but also an awareness of how knowledge is formed (Kuhn, 2000). It is 
difficult to truly separate theory of mind and metacognition. Indeed, there have been a 
number of accounts describing the relationship between these two capacities (for a 
review see Carruthers, 2009). The account that appears to have most traction proposes 
that metacognition might rely upon prior theory of mind understanding. That is, 
metacognition is the result of focusing our theory of mind capacities upon ourselves. 
Metacognitive capacities appear to emerge early in children’s development and 
these early capacities appear to be shared with non-humans (e.g., chimpanzees, Beran et 
al., 2015; rats, Foote & Crystal, 2007). However, during development metacognition 
becomes more explicit and effective as it becomes increasingly under control (Kuhn, 
2000). Behavioural tests of implicit metacognition commonly employ ‘opt out’ 
(Carruthers & Ritchie, 2012) or ‘ask for help’ (Goupil et al., 2016) paradigms to assess 
individuals’ appreciation of uncertainty in decision making. For example, Balcomb and 
Gerken (2008) reported that 3.5-year-old children engage in memory-monitoring, as 
shown by their tendency to skip trials in which they were uncertain, suggesting that 
children may have an implicit awareness of their own knowledge states from a very 
young age. However, the ability to recognise uncertainty is not akin to full 
metacognitive understanding – a reflective evaluation of one’s own knowledge (S. R. 
Beck et al., 2012). Only from around 6 years old have children been found to accurately 
report what and how much they know. Younger children repeatedly overestimate how 
much they know in both verbal (Wimmer et al., 1988) and behavioural (Kloo et al., 
2017; Rohwer et al., 2012) partial exposure tasks (participants are exposed to a range of 
objects, but then cannot see which of the objects is being put inside a box). Similarly, 
research into the development of children’s response to uncertainty has indicated that 5- 
to 6-year-old’s ability to evaluate their own knowledge could be influenced by how 
easily they can imagine multiple possible outcomes (S. R. Beck et al., 2011). For 
example, if the identity of a hidden object is known, children might find it easier to 
imagine a particular outcome, and therefore may only acknowledge (guess) one of the 
multiple possible outcomes. However, children’s explicit judgements about their 
confidence in such guesses repeatedly reveals unwarranted overconfidence (S. R. Beck 
et al., 2012) suggesting that children find it difficult to evaluate what they know. It 
seems unlikely then that the early forms of metacognition, shared with non-humans, are 
sufficient to support reasoned understanding of one’s own learning needs as is 
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demonstrated in human adults. That is, although they may demonstrate some aversion to 
risk (e.g., in opt out tasks) or recognition of knowledge or ignorance, they do so 
apparently without explicit awareness of those states. This early metacognition appears 
to precede the ability to explicitly evaluate knowledge states in young children 
(Robinson et al., 2008; Sodian et al., 2006). Thus, while responses may give the 
appearance of an understanding of states of knowledge, the inability to report these 
states suggests otherwise. Rather, these early metacognitive abilities may be simply the 
foundation for the more explicit metacognition that develops later. This explicit 
metacognition has been proposed to be unique to humans (Metcalfe, 2015) and 
potentially implicated in distinctively human cumulative culture (Dunstone & Caldwell, 
2018). 
Executive functions play an important role in learning and problem solving. 
Studying their developmental progression in childhood offers a key insight into the 
advancement of cognitive development more generally. Also referred to as cognitive 
control, executive functions refer to a group of core cognitive processes that are 
necessary for self-regulatory behaviour such as directing attention when it would not be 
appropriate to react automatically (e.g., goal-directed behaviours, Diamond, 2013; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001). The three core executive functions are generally agreed to 
include: working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility (Miyake et al., 
2000). Unlike some other cognitive abilities, the protracted development of executive 
functions extends through adolescence (Anderson, 2002; Best & Miller, 2010). Indeed, 
there is extensive evidence of continued advancement of executive functions in late 
childhood and adolescence (Brydges et al., 2014; Davidson et al., 2006; Xu et al., 
2013). Although the core executive function components rely on related and highly 
correlated cognitive processes, each develops according to its own trajectory (Anderson, 
2002; Diamond, 2006).  
Inhibitory control, or inhibition, can be described as the ability to deliberately 
control attention and inhibit automatic or prepotent responses when necessary, such that 
reactions and outcomes are intentional (Miyake et al., 2000). Evidence suggests that 
inhibitory control develops dramatically in infancy and early childhood (Carlson & 
Moses, 2001). Tasks such as the day-night task (Gerstadt et al., 1994) work by assessing 
children’s ability to inhibit a prepotent response (e.g., saying “day” when viewing a 
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sun) and responding instead with an alternative response (e.g., saying “night” when 
viewing a sun). In such tasks by around 6 years old children are reliably able to inhibit 
the prepotent response, while younger children (3 to 4 years) make more errors and take 
longer to respond. This pattern of performance, also found in other similar tasks 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001), shows that there is a gradual improvement in inhibitory 
control between 3 and 6 years. However, this component continues to develop through 
adolescence as evidenced by tasks such as the Stroop test, in which participants’ 
performance continues to improve until age 21 (Best & Miller, 2010). Working memory 
refers to the ability to store and manipulate information over brief periods of time when 
it is no longer externally available (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Best & Miller, 2010; 
Diamond, 2013). Working memory has been found to improve in early childhood 
(Gathercole et al., 2004). Gathercole et al. (2004) found that the developmental 
trajectories of simple and complex working memory tasks were similar, describing a 
linear increase from 4 to 14 years old which flattens out between 14 and 15 years old. 
This suggests that working memory capacities develop progressively through 
childhood. Finally, cognitive flexibility, sometimes referred to as set shifting, involves 
thinking about something in multiple ways, for example, task switching or considering 
someone else’s perspective on a situation (Miyake et al., 2000; Zelazo, 2015). Though 
successful shifting has been found in limited contexts in children aged 3 and 4 years old 
(Hughes, 1998b), the most rapid development of cognitive flexibility appears to occur 
between 7 and 9 years old (Anderson, 2002). Specifically, 7-year-olds struggle with 
switching in multi-dimensional switching tasks, however this ability improves 
considerably by 9 years old, and continues to improve into adolescence (Anderson et 
al., 2000). 
A common test of executive functions in young children is the Dimensional 
Change Card Sort task (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006). This task serves as a relatively 
comprehensive measure of the core executive functions in early childhood, requiring 
cognitive flexibility, working memory, and inhibitory control (Zelazo, 2015). The 
DCCS task involves children being shown two target cards (e.g., a blue rabbit and a red 
boat), they are then asked to sort a series of cards (that differ on the dimensions of 
colour and shape, e.g., blue boats and red rabbits) according to one of those dimensions. 
Then in a post-switch phase, children are asked to sort the same set of cards according 
to the opposite dimension. During this task, cognitive flexibility is required to make the 
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shift between rules, working memory is required to keep in mind and apply the current 
rule, and inhibitory control is needed to prevent the perseveration of the previous rule. 
Children aged 3 years tend to fail this task by continuing to sort the cards according to 
the first dimension even in cases when they can report the current rule to the 
experimenter. By around 5 years old children can switch between dimensions. 
However, it is important to note that this does not mean that executive functions are 
fully developed by this age. For example, not until around 7 to 9 years can children 
switch flexibly on a trial-by-trial basis as tends to be required in adult tests of cognitive 
flexibility (Davidson et al., 2006). 
When considered broadly, executive functions develop gradually. However, 
individual components advance through ‘jumps’ or ‘step-changes’ in capacity. That we 
know the approximate timing of these more specific advances means that we can assess 
whether changes in other cognitive mechanisms are related to, correlated with, or 
dependent on such executive function abilities. For instance, we know that the three 
core executive functions provide the basis for higher-order executive functions such as 
reasoning, problem solving, and planning (Diamond, 2013). So, taking reasoning as an 
example, working memory is crucial for the ability to make connections between 
apparently independent components. Working memory also makes it possible to apply 
existing knowledge to current perceptual contexts such that reasoning, or decision 
making, can be based on understanding and past experience rather than just reacting to 
perceptual stimuli (Diamond, 2013). 
Complex language is a hallmark of our species, and unquestionably language 
develops with age. While early signs of language emerge in the first year of life (e.g., 
babbling), adult-like language abilities do not develop until later. Children’s vocabulary 
develops dramatically during early childhood, estimates vary but children go from 
having a vocabulary of approximately 6 words at 12 months old, to having a vocabulary 
of 10,000 – 14,000 words at 6 years old (Bloom & Markson, 1998; Herschensohn, 
2007; Saxton, 2017). While language might not be necessary for the development of 
cognitive capacities themselves, quite often the cognitive tests used to assess them do 
require a certain degree of language development, at least in that they require a 
reasonable level of vocabulary. There are many reports of a close relationship between 
false belief understanding and verbal ability (Hughes, 1998a). For example, Jenkins and 
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Astington (1996) found that after controlling for age, general language ability and 
verbal memory were found to be significant predictors of false belief understanding.  
More generally, the development of any cognitive mechanism can be categorised 
with regard to the source of the information that is required for its development (Heyes, 
2018a, 2019; Shea, 2013). That is, whether development of a particular capacity is 
dependent on information that has been inherited genetically (nature), information 
gained by direct interaction with the environment (nurture, e.g., associative learning 
processes or trial and error), or information gained via social interaction (culture; 
Heyes, 2018a, 2019). Abilities that develop in line with increased opportunities for 
interaction with the environment or social interaction would indicate experience-
dependence (Heyes, 2018a). That is, cognitive abilities that emerge only after a learner 
has had the opportunity for direct interaction with the environment or the opportunity 
for relevant social interaction (e.g., when information is not directly available from the 
current environment) can be described as experience-dependent. Learning through 
social interactions enables learners to gain information that has potentially been 
constructed from the experience of many others, passed on from multiple previous 
generations. Therefore, information gained through social interaction may achieve 
learning beyond that which an individual could achieve alone. 
Whether particular cognitive abilities are experience-dependent or not can be 
assessed by looking at their developmental trajectory. As these capacities require the 
opportunity to learn through experience, they are expected to develop relatively late. To 
give an example, learning to read can be considered as experience-dependent as 
although an individual may have developed requisite capacities such as language 
(Lundberg, 2010) and working memory (Savage et al., 2006) they typically do not learn 
to read without being taught by others who can read. That is, developing the ability to 
read depends on opportunities for relevant social interaction (Heyes, 2012, 2019) not 
only exposure to written words. Simply looking at written words will not enable a child 
to acquire the skill of reading, they also need to hear the words being read aloud in 
order that they can form links between sounds (phonemes) and the relevant written 
symbols (graphemes). We can say that reading is experience-dependent as reading 
ability improves with increased exposure to relevant social learning (e.g., teaching). 
Therefore, the ability to read emerges relatively late in development after children have 
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had appropriate and sufficient opportunities to learn. Globally, 14% of adults aged 15 
years and older (~750 million people) are considered to be illiterate (UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics, 2017). This rate is considerably higher in regions with low access to or 
poor quality of education, for example in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia adult 
literacy rates in some countries are below 50%. These relatively high rates of illiteracy 
underline the fact that the ability to read (and write) is unlikely to be acquired without 
access to appropriate learning opportunities. 
While the particular developmental trajectories of the advances described above 
vary both from one child to another and between cognitive mechanisms. It is clear that 
cognitive abilities, more broadly, continue to advance through childhood and 
adolescence. The repeated addition of new skills results in advances to cognitive 
abilities that accumulate as we get older. In this respect Piaget appears to have got it 
right when he proposed that children’s cognitive development is an ongoing process 
characterised by a cycle of change and growth. In the following section I will discuss 
how these cognitive developments could influence social information use and how this 
could help to explain distinctively human cumulative culture. Furthermore, in order to 
highlight the advantages of studying age-related changes in social information use, I 
will also present a series of challenges that might relate to challenges faced in real world 
cases of cumulative culture.  
Age-Related Changes in Social Information Use 
In this section, and in this thesis more broadly, I will identify particular cognitive 
challenges that could be relevant for social information use in the context of real world 
cases of cumulative culture. Looking at the developmental trajectory of effective and 
appropriate use of social information in response to these particular challenges could 
offer crucial insights into which cognitive capacities are implicated. If these capacities 
emerge late in development, this may indicate that they are beyond the capabilities of 
non-humans and therefore could offer an explanation for the distinctiveness of human 
cumulative culture. That is, the challenges faced by younger children in terms of social 
information use are likely to be shared with non-humans. If particular contexts are 
identified in which cognitive developments seem to have a relevant influence on social 
information use, this may help to explain why cumulative culture is not often found in 
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non-humans. Such a conclusion might then be consistent with the idea that a lot of the 
real world contexts in which we see cumulative culture in humans could, in practice, 
involve a lot of these challenges. 
For instance, one challenge that might pose a problem for young children (and 
non-humans) is the ability to reflect on one’s own knowledge (metacognition) and 
importantly to recognise gaps in knowledge to identify one’s own learning needs. 
Without recognition of what information is needed, it is possible that useful and 
relevant information will not be exploited. On the other hand, having an understanding 
of what one does not know may make individuals more sensitive as to where to source 
useful information and what to do with it. This is particularly important in cases in 
which gaining relevant information through direct experience with the environment 
(i.e., through trial and error) would be inefficient or costly. For example, some foods 
require particular preparation techniques in order to remove toxins and make them safe 
for consumption (e.g., cycas seeds, W. Beck, 1992; manioc tubers, Henrich, 2016). 
These, often multistage, processes have to be learned from knowledgeable others, since 
relying on learning through trial and error could result in serious illness or death before 
a safe method of preparation is discovered. However, such information about processing 
methods is unlikely to be readily available if you are in a situation in which you might 
need it. If for instance you discovered a new plant that looked like it might be edible, 
but you were not sure whether this was the case, nor how it might be processed, then it 
would be a good idea to seek out information from someone else who has this 
knowledge. However, as the processing is likely performed in a different location from 
the food source, this is not information that you would necessarily chance upon. 
Therefore, you need to have an awareness of what you need to know. If you do have 
this understanding, you might recognise that you could look out for someone collecting 
the same plant and then either ask or observe them to find out whether and how it can 
be eaten. Thus, there are real world contexts in which appropriate social information 
seeking might be essential for survival. 
Relatedly, consider a situation in which there are a number of people but only 
some of them have access to useful information – through experience or perceptual 
access. This might be a situation in which appropriate social information use, and 
consequently cumulative culture, is dependent on understanding what others know 
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(theory of mind). That is, in order to make best use of the available information it is 
necessary to be able to identify which of the available others has the required 
knowledge. Having the ability to attribute mental states to others may offer a significant 
advantage for understanding who can provide useful and relevant information. Such an 
advantage might relate to real world contexts of cumulative culture in that identifying 
and then using information from an appropriate social source (such as someone who has 
access to relevant information) could lead to a better outcome than would have been 
achieved by using information provided by someone who did not have access to 
relevant information. Theory of mind understanding may also help overcome challenges 
associated with opaque information. By this I mean that being able to attribute mental 
states to others could make it possible to infer the outcome of others’ behaviour even if 
the outcome itself is not directly observable. An everyday example of this might be: you 
are waiting for a train in a foreign country, following an announcement over the 
loudspeaker all the other passengers, who are on the same platform as you, move 
together to a different platform. As you do not speak the local language you did not 
understand the announcement, however, you can infer that the announcement probably 
conveyed that the train you are waiting for is now due to arrive at a different platform. 
This leads you to follow the other passengers to the new platform. The ability to form 
such an inference likely depends on some degree of understanding of the intentions of 
the other passengers and recognition that the other passengers were likely to have 
understood the announcement, therefore giving them access to information that you do 
not have access to. 
Here I have provided examples that were intended to highlight situations in 
which having, or not having, an explicit understanding (e.g., of what others know) 
might make a difference to how social information is used in a particular context, in 
terms of setting oneself on the right or wrong track. More generally, if we see a gradual 
development in appropriate information use in a particular context, it might indicate that 
children’s performance is improving due to their increasing general executive function 
capabilities. However, if we see that there are jumps or step-changes in performance at 
particular ages then this may imply that children are making use of a specific cognitive 
capacity that comes online at that age which then allows them to perform better. 
Looking for age-related changes in social information use is a useful way of identifying 
the potential for social transmission, and also for looking at the understanding of that 
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transmission. However, children may demonstrate appropriate information use even 
when they have not in fact understood the relevance of the social information and are 
not aware of its potential value to themselves. As such, if one is particularly interested 
in the question of explicit awareness, it is important to design studies in such a way that 
we can distinguish true understanding and recognition of the value of social 
information, from use of the information using a broadly adaptive but less flexible 
strategy (e.g., implicit SLSs).  
Depending on the developmental trajectories that are identified, it might be 
possible to make some claims about the cognitive developments that are necessary for 
distinctively human cumulative culture. It may also be possible to make some 
predictions regarding the potential of non-humans to show similar patterns of social 
information use, and thus the likelihood of their capacity to demonstrate human-like 
cumulative culture. In the following section I will outline the aims and hypotheses of 
this thesis and the specific research questions tackled within each chapter. 
Thesis Goals 
This chapter has summarised the current state of the literature with regard to 
cognitive capacities proposed to be responsible for the difference in cumulative culture 
between human adults and non-humans. As outlined above, such differences point to 
the potential value of investigating the capacity for cumulative culture in young 
children. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to investigate fundamental questions 
regarding children’s awareness of their social information use and what makes that 
social information valuable or useful. To investigate what is happening during 
development, we can look for age-related changes in children’s response to social 
information as a means to understand the cognitive processes that might be implicated 
in distinctively human cumulative culture. If children’s use of social information 
appears to differ between ages, or their performance advances at a particular age, this 
may indicate that children are employing different cognitive capacities. For example, 
the capacity to recognise the relevance or value of social information will likely result 
in more appropriate or flexible social information use relative to heuristic biases or 
simple associations. Therefore, the experimental studies in this thesis seek to investigate 
age-related changes in children’s reasoning about and use of social information as a 
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means to understand the cognitive capacities they might be employing. Specifically, the 
following three chapters will examine children’s use of implicit and explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c). The studies reported 
in this thesis are mainly concerned with distinguishing cases in which social 
information use is driven by reasoned understanding, from situations which can be 
explained by a more implicit adaptive heuristic. That is, each study will explore the 
development of children’s capacity to reason about and understand the value of 
information that has been provided by others, the potential value of information that can 
be acquired from others, and what makes others good sources of social information. 
Chapter two begins my investigation into the development of children’s capacity 
to use social information strategically, based on reasoned understanding about the value, 
to themselves, of information that has been provided by others. Understanding others’ 
motivations and desires is likely necessary for recognising whether information 
available from them is valuable and relevant for achieving a specific goal. However, the 
vast majority of social learning paradigms are designed such that the demonstrator and 
the participant are motivated to reach the same goal. To address this, chapter two 
employs a novel paradigm to examine the developmental trajectory of children’s 
capacity to understand others’ goals relative to their own, their ability to use this 
knowledge to infer the outcomes of social demonstrations, and their ability to apply this 
understanding in order to use the social information strategically. In contrast to previous 
social learning studies, this paradigm compares both cases in which the goals of the 
demonstrator and the participant are aligned, and cases in which they are not aligned. 
Investigating whether children can account for others’ conflicting motivations might 
offer insight into the SLSs they are employing and whether these change over the course 
of childhood. 
To make best use of social information we must focus learning on those who 
possess relevant knowledge and experience, however social information is rarely 
acquired passively. Therefore, chapters three and four focus on the development of 
children’s ability to assess who has the potential to be an appropriate source of 
information by examining whom they choose to seek information from. The aim of both 
of these chapters is to document the developmental trajectory of children’s capacity to 
use reasoning-based explicitly metacognitive SLSs relative to alternative strategies for 
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success which could be explained by simpler processes, including heuristic biases and 
associative learning. 
Chapter three examines age-related changes in children’s capacity to seek out 
and use appropriate social information. Specifically, it looks at children’s recognition of 
the information they need to complete a particular problem and their understanding 
about who can provide valuable information about that problem. The methods 
employed in this study facilitate investigation into age-related differences in the SLSs 
children are employing. By looking at children’s choices of who to seek information 
from, it may be possible to determine whether their selections are based on an 
understanding of the potential value of the information the model could provide (in this 
case, access to relevant information), or on superficial yet salient characteristics such as 
age or gender.  
Chapter four investigates whether children can take into account reasoning about 
others’ mental states when judging ‘who knows’. In particular, it looks at the ability to 
identify an appropriate source of information based on a causal understanding of the 
link between the informants’ knowledge or experience and their value as a source of 
information. Using a novel methodology adapted from studies of social understanding 
in non-human primates, this study attempts to differentiate the learning processes that 
underpin children’s selections of social sources. To assess children’s capacity to use 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs this study involves inducing a scenario in which explicit 
reasoning about others’ knowledge directly conflicts with an association or rule formed 
on the basis of more salient, but not causally relevant, cues. By incorporating a switch 
in the scenario, the design is intended to reveal the underlying rule or bias that 
participants are using. 
Chapter five summarises the key findings of the empirical studies in relation to 
existing literature, presents a discussion of the methodological limitations, and offers 
suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2: 
Taking Account of Others’ Goals in Social Information Use: 
Developmental Changes in 3- to 7-Year-Old Children 
The following chapter has been submitted for publication at the Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology and is currently under revision for resubmission, the 
reference is given below. The chapter is presented in its submitted form. Data and 
analysis code are available in the OSF repository: 
[https://osf.io/xrwgq/?view_only=990e63c30e4d479c96868af95fdf2288]. 
Blakey, K.H., Atkinson, M., Rafetseder, E., Renner, E., and Caldwell, C.A. (Under 
Revision). Taking account of others’ goals in social information use: Developmental 





The majority of social learning paradigms are designed such that a demonstrator 
and participant have the same goal. In reality it may be relatively rare to 
opportunistically encounter social information provided by another who shares a goal. 
Rather, human adults use their understanding of others’ goals, relative to their own, to 
strategically select and use the most relevant social information. We explored age-
related changes in 3- to 7-year-old children’s ability to account for others’ goals relative 
to their own, assessing their understanding of others’ goals, ability to interpret others’ 
behaviour, and ability to apply this to their social information use. Children observed a 
social demonstration by a puppet whose goal aligned or did not align with their own. 
The demonstrator selected a capsule, peeked inside, and chose to accept or reject it, 
following which children made their own selection. The target capsule was dependent 
on the individual’s goal. Children had to use their understanding of the demonstrator’s 
goal and reaction to the capsule to infer the value of the information relative to their 
own goal. The results revealed a pervasive age effect on success across all aspects of the 
task, suggesting that taking into account others’ goals in the interpretation and use of 
social information is not trivial. This late development is consistent with accounts 




Experimental social learning paradigms are almost exclusively designed such 
that a demonstrator and participant are motivated to reach the same goal (e.g. Flynn & 
Whiten, 2013; Haun et al., 2012; Renner et al., 2020; van Leeuwen et al., 2018). In 
reality it is likely to be relatively rare to encounter social information from another 
individual who shares our immediate goal, at the precise moment when we are 
simultaneously in a position to put this to use. Effective social learning may therefore 
require an ability to interpret others’ behaviour in relation to their goals in order to 
identify information that may be relevant to us, or the contexts in which it might be 
applied. Furthermore, it may be the case that, even when a potential learner’s goal 
conflicts with that of a potential demonstrator, their choices and preferences may still 
provide valuable information that could guide the learner’s responses, as long as it is 
possible to take account of the conflicting motivations. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the ability to understand and 
represent others’ goals is influenced by the degree to which they align with one’s own. 
Reasoned understanding of others’ goals (or intentions) is thought to be an important 
precursor for recognising why another’s behaviour is relevant. In turn, this is likely 
necessary for interpreting the outcome of others’ behaviour, and crucially, for using 
social information strategically to achieve a specific goal (Hawthorne-Madell & 
Goodman, 2019). Human adults regularly make use of their understanding of others’ 
intentions, relative to their own, to strategically select and use the most relevant social 
information (Caldwell, 2018; Vélez & Gweon, 2019). However, there is little evidence 
of such capacities in children or non-human animals (henceforth animals). Thus, 
investigating the developmental trajectory of these abilities, and the cognitive 
challenges they pose to children, could advance our understanding of the differences 
between human and animal social learning. Evidence of relatively late development of 
particular ways of using social information in children, that we have little evidence of in 
animals, could indicate that they influence distinctively human cumulative culture 
(Caldwell et al., 2020; Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c). The lack, limited 
scope, or inflexibility of such capacities may have a restrictive influence on cultural 
transmission in animals, precluding the potential for human-like cumulative culture 
(Caldwell, 2018). Cumulative culture refers to the accumulation of beneficial 
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modifications to cultural traits over successive generations of learners resulting in 
increased functionality or efficiency (Dean et al., 2014; Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018; 
Tennie et al., 2009). The aim of the current study is to investigate age-related changes in 
children’s ability to use their understanding of others’ goals to interpret the outcome of 
others’ behaviour, and thus identify how to use the social information available to 
achieve their own goal. Crucially, to assess whether children’s abilities to interpret and 
use social information are influenced by their ability to represent others’ goals relative 
to their own, we compare instances in which the goals of the demonstrator and the 
participant align (i.e., same goals) and instances in which they do not (i.e., different 
goals). 
There is strong evidence of selective social learning in both very young children 
(Haun et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2016) and many animal species (Horner et al., 2010; 
Laland, 2004). Referred to as social learning strategies (SLSs) this selectivity reflects 
the influence of heuristic biases on individuals’ social information use, directing 
learning towards objects, agents, and events that are most likely to provide useful 
information (Kendal et al., 2018; Rendell et al., 2011). Though broadly adaptive 
(Heyes, 2017), even this seemingly strategic social learning does not account for the 
distinct differences between humans and animals in regard to the capacity for 
cumulative culture.  
There appear to be key differences in human adults’ social learning (relative to 
animals) that could account for the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture. These 
differences manifest in human adults’ capacity to seek out, attend to, and use social 
information across a vast array of contexts, posing a potentially significant advantage 
for cultural transmission (Morgan et al., 2012). One proposal suggests that the 
distinctiveness of human cumulative culture could be attributed to the selective use of 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c). These are 
defined as consciously represented and reportable rules regarding an explicit awareness 
and understanding of the reasoning-based learning strategies being employed. Such 
recognition could enable individuals to recognise the potential value to themselves of 
information provided by others due to a reasoned understanding of why that person is, 
potentially, a good source of information (Whalen et al., 2018).  
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While adults have the capacity to use explicitly metacognitive strategies 
(Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c), much of the behaviours that conform to 
SLSs in both humans and animals are likely based on less cognitively demanding 
heuristic biases. Heyes's (2016c) dual-process account of selective social learning 
proposes that there are distinct categories of SLSs: implicit SLSs (as we will refer to 
them here) that are available to both humans and animals, and explicitly metacognitive 
SLSs that are only available to humans. Thus, the capacity to use explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs could be what sets human learning apart from animals.  
Implicit SLSs (attributed by Heyes to be largely an outcome of general-purpose 
associative learning processes) differ from explicitly metacognitive ones in that they are 
not driven by an understanding of the potential value of social information. 
Experimental social learning paradigms and literature on the phenomenon of ‘selective 
trust’ report a variety of heuristic biases in children (see Heyes, 2017; Sobel & Kushnir, 
2013 for reviews). Children have preferences for older over younger models (Jaswal & 
Neely, 2006; Wood et al., 2012), higher over lower status models (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 
2019; McGuigan, 2013), and more reliable models (Zmyj et al., 2010). Arguably these 
preferences are the product of repeated exposure to the successes of others with 
particular characteristics, or previous positive outcomes from copying such others. That 
is, heuristic biases such as these could easily be the result of associative learning 
processes that result in rule-like strategies. This brings into question previous claims of 
‘adult-like’ social information use or ambiguous claims of selective ‘rule-governed’ 
copying in young children (Heyes, 2017). The selective social information use 
described in children under about 5 years (see Over & Carpenter, 2012 for a review) 
may therefore be largely explained as a result of implicit biases. 
Reasoning-based understanding of the potential value of social information is 
thought to be cognitively challenging and experience-dependent, emerging later in 
childhood (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016b). While individuals may appear 
as though they are making strategic decisions regarding social information use, we 
propose that younger children and animals are unlikely to be making reasoning-based 
decisions. Rather, they likely rely on less cognitively demanding learning processes 
such as associations, or heuristic biases, which nonetheless function to produce 
behaviour which is superficially similar to that produced by reasoning-based 
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understanding. However, reliance on such implicit biases does not offer the equivalent 
degree of flexibility afforded by reasoned understanding. Indeed, implicit SLSs such as 
‘copy successful individuals’ are only appropriate when the goals of both parties are 
aligned. If goals are not aligned, then copying another’s behaviour or selection is 
unlikely to be successful for a learner even if it has been successful for another. 
As outlined above, adults strategically use social information in a wide array of 
contexts due to their ability to recognise its potential value to themselves (i.e., explicitly 
metacognitive social learning). In contrast, we can reasonably assume that human 
infants and animals lack, or have a limited capacity for, a causal understanding of the 
potential value of social information. If adults can account for others’ goals and 
experience when using social information, it follows that this ability likely develops 
during childhood. Yet, there have been few attempts to explore the presence or 
emergence of these abilities in children.  
By virtue of their design, the vast majority of social learning studies involve the 
demonstrator(s) and the participant being motivated to reach the same goal (Haun et al., 
2012; van Leeuwen et al., 2018; Want & Harris, 2001; Wood et al., 2012), even if the 
method of reaching the goal varies (Dean et al., 2012; Evans et al., 2018; Wood et al., 
2013a). Therefore, we argue that the questions being asked in such studies are not 
wholly reflective of the challenges associated with social learning in the real world, as 
they offer little opportunity to make strategic decisions regarding whether and how to 
use the available social information. This failure to address scenarios in which 
participants are required to reason about the value, to themselves, of information 
provided by others, necessarily omits questions regarding flexible learning. This is 
problematic as models suggest that it is the ability to be selective, and flexibly switch 
between social and individual learning, that increases adaptability within a population 
(Enquist et al., 2007; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Rogers, 1988), not only the inclusion 
of social learning (despite social learning generally being viewed as adaptive). Flexible 
social learning requires individuals to recognise situations in which social learning is 
most beneficial, and when it is best to learn on one’s own. Yet to make such decisions, 
assuming these involve explicit reasoning, it is likely necessary to understand whether 
the available information is valuable and relevant for achieving a specific goal. We 
expect that this almost certainly requires some degree of representation of others’ goals, 
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as well as the capacity to interpret the outcomes of others’ behaviour in relation to those 
goals. Thus, we propose that the ability to account for others’ goals could be key to 
engaging in the kind of reasoning-based strategic social information use thought to be 
implicated in distinctively human cumulative culture. Below we discuss the 
developmental trajectory of sociocognitive and metacognitive abilities thought to be 
necessary to engage in such strategic social information use. 
The development of goal understanding is likely underpinned by an 
understanding of the potential for differential beliefs and desires. Children’s explicit 
understanding of conflicting mental states appears to develop between 3 and 4 years 
old. A study by Flavell et al. (1992) exploring young children’s understanding of 
conflicting belief states between individuals, reported that while 4- and 5-year-olds 
indicated an understanding that others’ beliefs could be different from their own, 3-
year-olds attributed their own belief state to others. Studies of belief understanding 
centre on children’s understanding that others can hold false beliefs (i.e., a belief or 
representation that contrasts with reality). Classic tests of false belief such as the 
‘unexpected transfer task’ (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and the ‘unexpected contents task’ 
(Gopnik & Astington, 1988) concur that by around 4 years children develop the ability 
to attribute false beliefs to others. However, these explicit tests rely on verbal 
communication, precluding young children and animals from completing them. Implicit 
tests using spontaneous behavioural measures (see Baillargeon et al., 2010 for a review) 
suggest that false belief understanding may be present from the second year of life and 
in great apes (Krupenye et al., 2016; see Krupenye & Call, 2019 for a review). 
However, the implicit nature of this understanding is unlikely to underpin the kind of 
explicitly reasoned social information use we are proposing could be unique to humans. 
Despite the debate regarding implicit measures of belief understanding, the general 
consensus is that by around 4 years children understand that others can hold conflicting 
beliefs. However, the development of the capacity to understand others’ desires is more 
complicated.  
The ability to recognise and represent others’ goals relative to one’s own has 
primarily been investigated with regards to understanding desires (Moses et al., 2000; 
Rakoczy et al., 2007; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). 
Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) found that 18-month-old infants were able to correctly 
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infer others’ desires for a particular type of food even when their own desire was 
different, in contrast to 14-month-old infants who pervasively attributed their own 
desire to others. However, more recent studies have been unable to replicate such an 
early development of this capacity (see Ruffman et al., 2017), instead finding that 
understanding of others’ desires develops close to 3 years of age as was previously 
suggested by Wellman and Woolley (1990). These studies examine desire 
understanding in relation to emotional responses, so it is important to consider whether 
the developmental trajectory is the same for other categories of desires or goals (i.e., 
abstract or task-specific goals). There is evidence that suggests that children struggle to 
recognise others’ desires when they conflict with their own until about 5 years (Moore 
et al., 1995; Rostad & Pexman, 2014). 
Another way to examine children’s understanding of task-specific goals is to 
investigate differences in understanding of others’ diverse desires in cooperative 
compared to competitive contexts. Cooperation appears to closely align with children’s 
ability to understand others’ mental states (Priewasser et al., 2013). However, children 
under 5 years struggle to report another player’s desire in a competitive game, instead 
reporting their own desire as that of the other players (Moore et al., 1995). Thus, 
recognising the potential for incompatible desires appears to remain cognitively 
challenging for longer during development in competitive contexts. Direct comparison 
of cooperative and competitive contexts found that 4-year-olds still have difficulty 
understanding others’ diverse desires, and while cooperative contexts aid desire 
reasoning, competitive contexts appear to pose greater challenges (Jin et al., 2017). 
Competitive contexts may be particularly challenging due to the necessity to explicitly 
reason about another’s conflicting desire, and how that can be used to benefit oneself. 
Cooperative contexts may not require the same level of explicit reasoning. 
Social learning situations in which the reward value of others’ behaviour is 
transparent do not necessitate an understanding of others’ goals to achieve one’s own 
goal. By contrast, understanding whether another’s goal is aligned with one’s own is 
particularly important in situations in which the reward value is opaque, as there are 
only others’ reactions and choices to go on. However, an ability to understand others’ 
goals can help you to interpret these cues. Understanding others’ goals is not sufficient 
for interpreting an opaque outcome but is necessary to appreciate the link between 
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experience and knowledge. That is, a learner will be required to make the inference that 
a demonstrator has privileged access to the information that allows them to make an 
informed choice. This is particularly relevant for the experimental procedure used in the 
present study. 
 Though children show evidence of understanding concepts of their own 
knowledge and ignorance from around 3 years (Pratt & Bryant, 1990; Rohwer et al., 
2012), it is not until around 6 years that they consider the role of access to information 
in knowledge formation (Kloo & Rohwer, 2012). Children’s appreciation of the causal 
influence of visual perceptual access on knowledge formation is likely to be learned, 
gradually developing until around 5 years (Robinson et al., 2008; Sodian et al., 2006). 
Prior to this children appear to rely on a ‘feeling of knowing’ when evaluating their own 
ignorance (Kloo & Rohwer, 2012), and if required to identify others’ epistemic states 
they likely rely upon less cognitively demanding processes such as a previously formed 
associative rule or bias. Use of such rules or biases may give the appearance of 
understanding that someone is knowledgeable due to their access to information when 
in reality information access has not been considered, and instead they have relied on a 
more salient, less cognitively demanding cue (e.g., others’ success). 
The ability to attribute epistemic states to others based on their reaction to an 
opaque outcome likely relies on a sound representation of the other’s goal (i.e., their 
desired outcome) and an understanding of whether the behaviour was knowledge based 
or not (i.e., whether they made an informed choice). Therefore, younger children may 
struggle to correctly identify the outcome of others’ behaviour, despite being able to 
appropriately represent others’ goals, due to an inability to recognise the link between 
information access and privileged knowledge. Even if children have developed the 
ability to understand and represent others’ goals and use this understanding to interpret 
the outcome of their behaviour, they may not have the capacity to recognise the 
potential value of such information to themselves. To appropriately apply this 
understanding to their social information use, children have to recognise the value of the 
information relative to their own goal, an important aspect of which is determining 
whether the other’s goal is aligned with one’s own. Correctly interpreting the outcome 
of another’s behaviour, but not appropriately applying that understanding to inform 
information use, may indicate reliance on implicit SLSs rather than explicitly 
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metacognitive ones. In such cases, if learners are more likely to base decisions on 
salient cues such as a positive reaction to an outcome, this may appear as reasoned 
when their goals align with others but will result in lower success when goals are not 
aligned. 
The aim of the current study was to investigate age-related changes in children’s 
ability to strategically use social information by taking into account others’ goals 
relative to their own. Specifically, we were interested in whether children’s abilities to 
interpret and use social information were influenced by the degree to which others’ 
goals aligned with their own. Using a simplified social learning scenario, we compared 
the social information use of children assigned to two different conditions: in one 
condition the goals of the demonstrator and the participant were aligned (Same Goals 
condition), while in the other their goals were not aligned (Different Goals condition). 
Task goals were related to retrieving a target capsule from one of two locations, each 
containing a different type of capsule; the target capsule was dependent on the 
individual’s goal. Participants observed a demonstrator select and peek inside a capsule 
and then accept (successful outcome) or reject it (unsuccessful outcome). Both 
outcomes are potentially equally informative to someone who has represented others’ 
goals relative to their own and recognised the value of the information. After observing 
the demonstrator’s reaction, participants had to make a binary choice between copying 
the demonstrator’s selection by selecting a capsule from the same location and shifting 
away from the demonstrator’s selection to select a capsule from the alternative location. 
The appropriate response was dependent on the demonstrator’s goal and the outcome of 
the demonstration. If the demonstrator had the same goal as the participant, the 
appropriate response was to copy successful selections and shift following unsuccessful 
selections. If their goals were different, the appropriate response was to shift after 
successful selections and copy unsuccessful selections. As such, task success was 
dependent on participants’ ability to represent others’ goals relative to their own and 
interpret the demonstration outcome to inform their own selection. 
In addition to appropriate information use, we examined participants’ 
understanding of the task goals (their own and the demonstrator’s), and their ability to 
interpret the outcome of the demonstration. To use the information strategically children 
had to recognise the value of the information that had been provided in the 
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demonstration in respect to their own goal while also taking into account the goal of the 
demonstrator. Therefore, even if children understood the task goals and correctly 
inferred the outcome of the demonstration, this would not necessarily mean that they 
would be able to use this information strategically. 
We predicted that goal understanding, interpreting the demonstration outcome, 
and thus appropriate information use would improve with age because of children’s 
developing understanding of diverse desires and conflicting motivations. Any age-
related increases in children’s ability to use social information strategically in this 
context could suggest that this ability is dependent on advanced cognitive capacities that 
develop relatively late. This would be consistent with proposals which suggest that 
explicitly reasoned SLSs may account, at least in part, for distinctively human 
cumulative culture. Furthermore, we predicted that performance would be greater in the 
Same Goals condition compared to the Different Goals condition. The expected 
difference between the conditions could indicate that children find it more challenging 
to use social information from another whose goal does not align with their own, 
compared to another whose goal matches their own. More specifically, differences 
between the conditions may offer an insight into whether children are using implicit or 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs. For example, low performance in the Different Goals 
condition compared to the Same Goals condition might indicate that children have not 
recognised the relevance of the social information and are relying on implicit SLSs. 
Method 
Participants 
The final participant sample comprised 190 children aged three to seven years 
(97 females; Mean age = 65.7 months, SD = 16.6 months). Participants were 
unsystematically allocated to one of two experimental conditions (Same Goals 
condition, n = 97; Different Goals condition, n = 93) subject to the constraint that the 
number of children in each age group was balanced across conditions. In the final 
sample there were between 18 and 20 participants per age group in each condition. The 
nationality of the sample, as identified by parents/legal guardians, was predominantly 
British. Participants were recruited from nurseries, primary schools, and public 
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attractions in Scotland. An additional 15 children were tested but later excluded from 
analyses due to researcher error (n = 3), missing data (n = 8), task interference (n = 2), 
or confidential disclosures by the child’s guardian which cast doubt on whether that 
child’s performance could be considered as representative of the intended recruitment 
population (n = 2). This study was granted ethical approval by the University of Stirling 
General University Ethics Panel (GUEP338), and informed written consent was 
provided by each participant’s parents/legal guardians prior to data collection.  
Materials 
Task apparatus is presented in Figure 1. Two hand puppets, ‘Rabbit’ (A.S. 
Puppets) and ‘Bird’ (The Puppet Company Ltd.), served as demonstrators. Two round 
mesh buckets (342 x 235mm) each contained 23 carrot shaped plastic capsules (142 x 
31mm; Figure 1A/B). Each carrot shaped capsule could be opened to reveal hidden 
contents (Figure 1C). The capsules inside one of the buckets contained a roll of orange 
felt, while the capsules inside the other bucket contained a pink knitted 'worm’. Each 
bucket was fitted with an elasticated fabric lid with an elasticated hole in the centre 
(Figures 1A and 1B). Within a trial both buckets were fitted with lids of the same colour 
(e.g., both red), between trials the colour of the lids was different (red, purple, and 
blue). Six grey plastic tokens (23mm diameter) and a wooden box (580 x 580 x 350mm) 
were employed as a ‘pay to play’ system for the puppet demonstrators and child 
participants. The demonstrators stored target capsules in a wicker basket, participants 




Participants took part individually in a single session for which they received a 
sticker. Two experimenters were present: experimenter one (E1) provided instructions 
and asked all questions (see Appendix A for a verbal script), experimenter two (E2) 
controlled the demonstrations, using their spare hand to assist the puppets’ actions, and 
live coded all responses. In some sessions, a familiar adult was present but was asked 
not to interact with the participant. 
The task comprised a series of three trials completed in one of two conditions. In 
the Same Goals condition the participant and demonstrator (Rabbit puppet) shared the 
same task goal: both searched for capsules containing orange felt. By contrast, in the 
Note. A: example set-up during a trial in the Same Goals condition with Rabbit as 
demonstrator; B: example set-up during a trial in the Different Goals condition with 
Bird as demonstrator; C: example of the carrot capsules opened to reveal the two 
different content types, the capsules inside one bucket contained orange felt and the 
capsules inside the other bucket contained a pink knitted ‘worm’. 
Figure 1 
Illustration of the Experimental Set-Up 
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Different Goals condition the participant and demonstrator (Bird puppet) had different 
task goals: the participant searched for capsules containing orange felt, but the 
demonstrator searched for capsules containing a worm. Across both conditions the 
format of all trials was the same. Each trial included a social demonstration in which the 
demonstrator selected a capsule from one of the two buckets and ‘peeked’ inside, 
without letting the child see the contents. Demonstrations were either successful 
(demonstrator selected, and accepted, a target capsule) or unsuccessful (demonstrator 
selected, and rejected, a non-target capsule), the target capsule was dependent on the 
condition. Each participant experienced a combination of successful and unsuccessful 
demonstrations. The combination and order of the demonstrations were randomly 
assigned subject to the constraint that each participant observed at least one successful 
and one unsuccessful demonstration across the three trials. The demonstrator accepted 
the capsule by placing it in their basket or rejected it by giving it to E1. Rejected 
capsules were given to E1 rather than being returned to the buckets to remove the risk 
of participants returning capsules to the wrong bucket causing potential confusion in 
following trials, and to avoid a noticeable difference in the quantity of capsules in each 
bucket, particularly in the Same Goals condition. Between each trial both buckets were 
removed from the table, the lids were replaced with lids of a different colour, and the 
buckets were returned to the table for the next trial. The sides that the buckets 
(distinguished by the contents of the capsules) were presented on was randomly 
allocated in each trial. Following completion of the third trial participants were asked to 
provide explicit verbal reasoning for their selections: “How were you deciding which 
bucket to choose?”.  
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were going to play a game with Rabbit (Same 
Goals condition) or Bird (Different Goals condition). Between conditions, the procedure 
varied only to accommodate the demonstrators’ alternative goals. E1 presented the two 
buckets of carrot shaped capsules and explained that inside one of the buckets the 
carrots were orange inside and that in the other bucket the carrots had a worm inside; 
examples of each capsule type were presented alongside the explanation. Each trial 
began with the participants being informed (trial one), or reminded (trials two and 
three), of their own goal, “You are looking for the carrots that have orange inside”, and 
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the demonstrator’s goal: Same Goals condition, “Rabbit is looking for carrots with 
orange inside”; Different Goals condition, “Bird is looking for carrots with worms 
inside”. Participants were asked four goal understanding questions about their own and 
the demonstrator’s goals (i.e., identifying contents of the target and non-target 
capsules). If participants did not initially respond, they were prompted with the two 
possible answers by E1, “orange” or “worms”. Due to a lack of verbal responses in 3-
year-olds it was necessary to adapt how they were required to respond; therefore, E1 
asked participants to point and held out examples of the capsule contents. Incorrect 
responses were not corrected. Children were considered as having goal understanding if 
they answered all four questions correctly. 
Participants and demonstrators were each provided with three tokens. Before 
making a selection, each had to pay a token. The demonstrator always went first to 
provide the demonstration. Participants observed as the demonstrator paid a token and 
indicated a bucket for E2 to select a capsule from (only E2 was aware of the contents of 
each bucket prior to selection). Once a capsule had been selected, the demonstrator 
opened it slightly and ‘peeked’ inside, ensuring that the contents were not visible to 
participants. The demonstrator then accepted or rejected the selected capsule: in the 
Same Goals condition Rabbit accepted carrots that were orange inside, and rejected 
carrots that contained worms, and in the Different Goals condition Bird accepted carrots 
that contained worms and rejected carrots that were orange inside. 
Following the demonstration, participants were encouraged to take their turn by 
paying a token and selecting a capsule from one of the buckets. Once they had selected 
a capsule they were instructed to “peek” inside and choose whether they wanted to keep 
it in their pan or not keep it and give it to E1 (children chose to keep non-target capsules 
in 11.6% of trials). To determine whether children had correctly inferred the outcome of 
the demonstration in a given trial, they were asked a demonstration outcome 
understanding question: “What was inside the carrot that Rabbit/Bird found?” At the 
end of each trial participants were asked three memory questions, requiring them to 
recall which buckets they and the demonstrator selected capsules from, and the contents 
of their selected capsule. 
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Statistical Analysis 
Analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 2020), with generalised linear 
mixed effects analyses (GLMMs) performed using lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) with logit 
regression. P-values < .05 were accepted as statistically significant. The binary 
dependent variables in the analyses were: goal understanding, demonstration outcome 
understanding, and use of an appropriate response. Where specified as fixed effects the 
following variables were sum coded: condition (Same Goals as −1, Different Goals as 
1) and demonstration outcome (unsuccessful as −1, successful as 1). Age was centred 
and scaled to measure thousands of days. The random effects structure for each model 
aimed to include by-participant random slopes for all fixed effects and keep random 
effects structures ‘maximal’ where possible (following Barr et al., 2013). Where the 
‘maximal’ model resulted in non-convergent or singular fit models, random slopes were 
removed, followed by random intercepts where necessary, until a convergent, non-
singular model was obtained. Post hoc analyses were carried out using estimated 
marginal means using the emmeans package (Lenth et al., 2019). Post hoc results are 
given on the log odds ratio scale. 
Results 
The key aim of this study was to determine whether children were able to take 
others’ goals into account when interpreting and using social information to achieve 
their own goal. We were particularly interested in whether children would find it more 
challenging to use information provided by a demonstrator whose goal was different to 
their own.  
Understanding 
Goal Understanding 
First, we looked at children’s understanding of their own and the demonstrators’ 
goals. Children were considered to have understood the task goals in 74% of the 570 
trials (answered all four goal understanding questions correctly within a trial). We 
compared children’s goal understanding with regards to the condition to which they 
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were assigned (Same Goals or Different Goals) and age. A GLMM for goal 
understanding in each trial was built with fixed effects of condition and age, the 
interaction between these variables, and a random intercept of participant ID. A 
significant main effect of age (b = 6.39, SE = 1.26, z = 5.09, p < .001) indicated that 
children’s goal understanding improved with age. A one-way ANOVA revealed 
significant differences in goal understanding between ages (in years), F(4, 565) = 52.28, 
p < .001. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD tests indicated that 3-year-olds’ goal 
understanding was significantly poorer than all other ages’ (p < .001), and that 6- and 7-
year-olds’ goal understanding was significantly greater than 4-year-olds’ (p ≤ .003). 
There was a particularly striking increase in goal understanding between 3-year-old (M 
= .29, SD = .45, n = 108) and 4-year-old children (M = .73, SD = .45, n = 114; Figure 
2A). The GLMM did not reveal evidence of an effect of condition (b = 0.28, SE = 0.45, 
z = 0.63, p = .529), or an interaction between condition and age (b = 1.20, SE = 1.02, z 
= 1.17, p = .241) suggesting that although goal understanding improved with age there 
were no differences relative to the Same and Different Goals manipulation. 
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Demonstration Outcome Understanding 
Looking only at the trials in which children demonstrated goal understanding (N 
= 420), we examined children’s understanding of the demonstration outcome (i.e., 
whether children correctly inferred the contents of the capsule that the demonstrator 
selected, as measured by their answer to the question “What was in the capsule that 
Rabbit/Bird picked?”). Children correctly inferred the outcome of the demonstration in 
81% of trials. A GLMM was built for demonstration outcome understanding with fixed 
effects of condition, demonstration outcome, age, the interactions between these 
variables, and a random intercept of participant ID. Results revealed that children’s 
Note. A: Goal understanding (N = 570), children were considered to have understood 
the task goals in a given trial if they answered all four goal understanding questions 
correctly. B: Demonstration outcome understanding (including only the trials in which 
children demonstrated goal understanding, N = 420), trials in which children correctly 
inferred the contents of the capsule that had been selected by the demonstrator. Dashed 
line indicates chance. 
Figure 2 
Proportion of Trials in Which Children Were Considered to Have Each Type of 
Understanding in Each Age Group 
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understanding of the demonstration outcome improved significantly with age (b = 2.19, 
SE = 0.46, z = 4.72, p < .001; Figure 2B). Demonstration outcome understanding was 
significantly greater in trials with a successful demonstration (M = .87, SD = .34, n = 
202; b = 0.41, SE = 0.17, z = 2.40, p = .016) compared to trials with an unsuccessful 
one (M = .76, SD = .43, n = 218). There was no evidence of an effect of condition (b = 
0.02, SE = 0.19, z = 0.13, p = .896), nor any interactions between age, condition, and 
demonstration outcome (p ≥ .213). 
We analysed children’s demonstration outcome understanding with regards to 
children’s age in years. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences in 
demonstration outcome understanding between ages F(4, 415) = 12.4, p < .001. Post 
hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD tests indicated that 6- and 7-year-olds’ 
understanding was significantly greater than 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds’ (p ≤ .03), and 4-
year-olds’ understanding was significantly greater than 3-year-olds’ (p = .016). 
Binomial tests revealed that the proportion of trials in which 4- to 7-year-olds correctly 
inferred the demonstration outcome was significantly greater than chance (p < .001), 
while 3-year-olds were no different to chance (M = .52, SD = .51, n = 31, p > .999). 
Appropriate Information Use 
Appropriate information use was measured by the proportion of trials in which 
children selected a target capsule. Overall, children responded appropriately in 60% of 
570 trials. A GLMM was built for appropriate information use with fixed effects of 
condition, demonstration outcome, age, the interactions between these variables, 
random intercepts of goal understanding and demonstration outcome understanding, and 
a by-participant random slope for demonstration outcome. A significant main effect of 
age revealed that target capsule selections increased with age (b = 0.54, SE = 0.24, z = 
2.26, p = .024; Figure 3). Although information use improved significantly with age, 
even 7-year-olds did not perform particularly well, selecting the target capsule in only 
70% of trials. Binomial tests revealed that the older three ages selected the target 
capsule in significantly more trials than would be expected by chance: 5 years (p = 
58 
.022), 6 years (p = .002), and 7 years (p < .001). By contrast, younger children were not 
different to chance (3 years, p = .387; 4 years, p = 1.00). 
There was no evidence of an overall effect of condition (b = −0.12, SE = 0.10, z 
= −1.14, p = .253) or demonstration outcome (b = −0.02, SE = 0.11, z = −0.22, p = 
.827) on appropriate information use. However, a significant two-way interaction 
between condition and demonstration outcome (b = 0.47, SE = 0.11, z = 4.44, p < .001) 
indicated that appropriate information use was dependent on both the condition and the 
demonstration outcome. To clarify this interaction, we performed a post hoc analysis 
using emmeans. This revealed that appropriate information use in the Same Goals 
condition was significantly greater following unsuccessful demonstrations (b = 0.99, SE 
= 0.31, z = 3.21, p = .001) and in the Different Goals condition following successful 
demonstrations (b = 0.89, SE = 0.29, z = 3.04, p = .002). This pattern relates to 
appropriate use of two possible response types: copying and shifting. Children 
appropriately used the copy response in only 51% of 280 trials. By contrast, children 
appropriately used the shift response in 69% of 290 trials (Figure 4). Shifting was the 
appropriate response in the Same Goals condition following unsuccessful 
Note. Dashed line indicates chance performance. 
Figure 3 
Proportion of Trials in Which Participants in Each Age Group Selected a Target 
Capsule 
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demonstrations (71% appropriate responses in 147 trials), and in the Different Goals 
condition following successful demonstrations (67% appropriate responses in 143 
trials). 
The model also revealed a significant three-way interaction between the 
condition, the demonstration outcome and age (b = 0.76, SE = 0.21, z = 3.64, p < .001). 
To clarify this interaction, we performed a post hoc analysis using emmeans. This 
highlighted the difference between the two response types (copying and shifting) with 
regard to age: appropriate copying did not improve with age (p ≥ .561), remaining close 
to chance, while appropriate shifting did increase with age (appropriate information use 
in the upper quartile was significantly greater than lower quartile; p ≤ .022; Figure 5). 
Separating information use by age in years relative to the appropriate response required 
in each condition following each demonstration type (Figure 6) showed that 3- and 4-
year-olds did not follow the same pattern of appropriate responses as 5-, 6- and 7-year-
olds. It is worth highlighting that 3- and 4-year-olds’ information use was no different to 
chance following both conditions and demonstration types, whereas 5-, 6-, and 7-year-
Figure 4 
Proportion of Trials in Which Children Selected the Target Capsule by Condition, 
Demonstration Outcome and Appropriate Response 
Note. Dashed line indicates chance performance. 
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olds information use was only greater than chance when the appropriate response was to 
shift. This pattern of results suggests that there may be an age-related change in the way 
that children approach the use of social information; in this sample this change appears 
to occur between 4- and 5-years-old.  
For completeness, we repeated the above analysis including only the trials in 
which children had demonstrated goal understanding (N = 420), therefore we built a 
GLMM for appropriate information use with fixed effects of condition, demonstration 
outcome, age, the interactions between these variables, and a random intercept of 
participant ID. As expected, the results of the GLMM revealed the same effects and 
interactions captured in the original analysis. 
Figure 5 
Proportion of Trials in Which Children Selected the Target Capsule by Condition, 
Demonstration Outcome, Age in Months, and Appropriate Response 
Note. Dashed line indicates chance performance. 
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Memory Check 
Children recalled the location of their own capsule selection in 93% of trials, 
with similar rates across all ages (84% - 97%). Children recalled the location of the 
demonstrator’s selection in 85% of trials and showed age-related differences in recall: 
5-, 6-, and 7-year-olds successfully recalled in ≥90% of trials, and 3- and 4-year-olds 
successfully recalled in 69% and 78% of trials, respectively. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed significant differences in recall between ages F(4, 565) = 11.11, p < .001. Post 
hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD tests indicated that 5-, 6- and 7-year-olds’ recall 
was significantly greater than that of 3- and 4-year-olds (p ≤ .045).  
The pattern of appropriate information use for trials in which children recalled 
the demonstrator’s selection was not different to the full sample. Binomial tests revealed 
Figure 6 
Proportion of Trials in Which Children Selected the Target Capsule by Age in Years, 
Condition, Demonstration Outcome, and Appropriate Response 
Note. The pattern of results observed in Figure 4 were only evident in 5-, 6-, and 7-year-
old children, while 3- and 4-year-old children’s use of both types of appropriate 
response was no different from chance. Dashed line indicates chance performance. 
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that the older three age groups selected the target capsule significantly above chance (5 
years, M = .60, p = .036; 6 years, M = .65, p = .002; and 7 years, M = .70, p < .001), 
while younger age groups were not different to chance (3 years, M = .61, p = .064; 4 
years, M = .51, p > .999). 
Explicit Verbal Reasoning 
We examined children’s responses to the explicit verbal reasoning question 
regarding how they were choosing which bucket to select a capsule from. Participants 
were asked this only after all three trials had been completed, each providing a single 
response. Responses were categorised into three levels: 1) non-reasoned response, 
including an incorrect response, an incoherent response, or no response; 2) partially 
reasoned response, explanation included some evidence of explicit task understanding 
though was incomplete; and 3) fully reasoned response, the explanation provided clear 
evidence of explicit task understanding. 
Of the 190 participants, only seven were categorised as having provided fully 
reasoned responses. Older children gave more reasoned responses than younger children 
(Table 1). The poor rate of explicit verbal reasoning suggests that children found 
articulating justifications for their choices particularly challenging despite older children 
displaying high levels of goal understanding and demonstration outcome understanding. 
 
 Age (years) 
 
Total 3 4 5 6 7 
Non-reasoned 172 36 37 34 35 30 
Partially reasoned 11 - 1 5 2 3 
Fully reasoned 7 - - 1 2 4 
Table 1 
Number of Children Providing Each Category of Response to the Explicit Verbal 
Reasoning Question, by Age in Years 
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Adult Participants 
As 7-year-olds used the appropriate response in only 70% of trials, we 
conducted an exploratory follow-up study using the same methods with adults (six in 
each condition; N = 12). Adults used the appropriate response to select the target 
capsule in 33 of the 36 trials (92%), and all gave fully reasoned responses to the explicit 
verbal reasoning question. Adults were recruited at the University of Stirling and 
received £3 compensation for participation. 
Discussion 
The methods employed within this study allowed us to examine the 
developmental trajectory of children’s capacity to understand others’ goals relative to 
their own, their ability to use this knowledge to infer the outcomes of social 
demonstrations, and their ability to apply this understanding to strategically adopt an 
appropriate response. 
We found that the proportion of trials in which children were considered to have 
understood both their own and the demonstrator’s task goals increased with age. A 
particularly large improvement in goal understanding between 3- and 4-year-olds is 
indicative of a developmental jump in children’s capacity to recognise, represent, and 
report others’ goals. Contrary to our predictions, whether the child’s and the 
demonstrator’s goals were aligned, or not, did not predict children’s understanding of 
the task goals. This suggests that from around 4 years children understand others’ goals 
even when they conflict with their own. This is consistent with evidence from the 
explicit false belief literature which indicates that children understand that people can 
hold divergent beliefs from around 4 years. Though the evidence regarding the age at 
which children develop an understanding of others’ diverse desires is inconsistent, the 
lack of difference between the conditions suggests that children older than 3 years 
understood the demonstrators’ diverse goals. 
As the demonstration outcome was opaque to the participants, we examined 
their ability to interpret it using their understanding of the demonstrator’s goal and the 
demonstrator’s reaction to the capsule. To appropriately infer the demonstrator’s 
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reaction to the selected capsule, children needed to understand that the demonstrator had 
obtained perceptual access via peeking and therefore had privileged knowledge about 
the contents of the capsule to make an informed choice. Of those who understood the 
task goals, older children were found to correctly infer the outcome of the 
demonstration in a greater proportion of trials than younger children. Though 4- to 7-
year-olds correctly inferred the outcome of the demonstrations significantly more often 
than would have been expected by chance, only from 6 to 7 years were they able to 
reliably infer the correct outcome. Thus, there appears to be another developmental 
step-change between 5 and 6 years, this time in children’s capacity to interpret the 
content of social information. 
Appropriate interpretation of the demonstration outcome likely improved with 
age due to two key developments. Firstly, older children were more likely to be able to 
use their understanding of others’ goals. Secondly, older children may have been more 
likely to have recognised that the demonstrator had had visual access to the contents of 
the capsule and made the link between information access and knowledge. We can only 
speculate about whether this is related to a capacity to account for others’ goals or 
related to understanding of access to information and knowledge formation. Literature 
suggests that children do not demonstrate understanding of how knowledge is formed 
with consideration of the role of access to information until around 6 years (Kloo & 
Rohwer, 2012). Therefore, older children’s more reliable performance could be linked 
to the ability to reason about others’ access to information. We found no effect of the 
Same and Different Goals manipulation on children’s interpretation of the 
demonstration outcome, suggesting that children were not impacted by the need to 
account for others’ conflicting goals. However, that children correctly inferred the 
demonstration outcome more often following successful demonstrations suggests that at 
least some children may have used less cognitively demanding processes such as a 
previously formed associative rule or bias (in this case, children may have used a 
positive cue from the demonstrator’s choice to keep the capsule). This may give the 
appearance of understanding that someone is knowledgeable due to their access to 
information when in reality information access has not been considered. It is also 
possible that the younger children could have been basing their responses on a ‘feeling 
of knowing’ (Kloo & Rohwer, 2012) rather than an understanding of knowledge 
acquisition. That is, children under 6 years have been found to rely on the ease with 
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which plausible information comes to mind when assessing their own epistemic states 
(Kloo & Rohwer, 2012). Therefore, as children had been made aware of the contents of 
both capsules at the outset of the task (similar to partial exposure tasks), they may have 
felt that they ‘knew’ what the contents of the selected capsule were. These alternative 
explanations may go some way to explaining why some younger children appeared to 
have understood the outcome of the demonstration but were not then able to use the 
information. 
In line with our predictions, appropriate information use increased with age 
demonstrating that older children were better able to strategically adopt an appropriate 
response. This age-related difference may reflect younger children’s reduced capacity to 
represent the task goals and interpret the outcome of the demonstration. However, the 
performance of even the oldest children was not particularly high, suggesting that 
applying understanding of others’ goals relative to one’s own is challenging even if 
others’ goals are understood and the content of the social information has been correctly 
inferred. Again, in contrast to our predictions, we found no effect of the Same and 
Different Goals manipulation, suggesting that the degree to which the demonstrator’s 
and participant’s goals aligned did not influence children’s ability to strategically use 
social information. Although children were more likely to correctly infer the outcome of 
successful demonstrations, this did not extend to appropriate use of the information. 
Appropriate social information use was greater when the appropriate response was to 
shift, but not when the appropriate response was to copy. However, this pattern of 
results was also related to children’s age. It became clear that 3- and 4-year-olds’ 
appropriate information use did not follow the same pattern as that of the older children. 
While 3- and 4-year-olds’ performance remained no different to chance for both 
response types, 5-, 6-, and 7-year-olds’ performance was no different to chance for 
copying responses but was significantly above chance when the appropriate response 
was to shift. Therefore, the age-related improvement in children’s use of appropriate 
responses was restricted to trials in which the appropriate response was to shift. The 
chance performance of 3- and 4-year-olds may have been in part due to high cognitive 
demands taxing their executive functions such as memory. Indeed, we found they 
recalled which location the demonstrator had selected a capsule from less often than the 
older children. Below we discuss possible explanations for this pattern of performance. 
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Appropriate use of social information may indicate that children have recognised 
the value of the information that has been provided by others. Such reasoning-based 
understanding may suggest that children are employing explicitly metacognitive SLSs. 
If this is the case it would suggest that children can account for others’ goals relative to 
their own, correctly interpret the content of social information, and apply this 
understanding to strategically adopt an appropriate response. Though the results suggest 
that children can account for others’ conflicting motivations, the age-related 
improvement being restricted to appropriate shift responses suggests that some older 
children are not using explicitly metacognitive SLSs. Rather, they may have been 
relying upon implicit biases. The adult sample offers a useful comparison for what to 
expect from a participant who is using explicitly metacognitive social learning as we are 
confident that adults are capable of such a strategy. Therefore, the distinct difference 
between the performance of the oldest children and the adults supports our 
interpretation that some children were not using explicitly metacognitive strategies. 
Alternatively, this pattern of results may be an artefact of the binary choice task. Other 
tasks that have used a logically similar binary choice reward structure have also 
reported better performance in children when the appropriate response was to shift, 
albeit in slightly younger populations than the sample tested here (Atkinson et al., 
2020). In a binary choice task, in which the demonstrator and participant share the same 
goal, a shift response following an unsuccessful demonstration performs an explore 
function which does not need to be traded off against an exploit option since the 
participant already knows that the alternative is undesirable. In contrast, appropriate 
copying following a successful demonstration involves a trade-off between explore and 
exploit motivations. When the demonstrator and participant have different goals, the 
opposite applies. Overall, this will inevitably favour shift responses (Gopnik, 2020). 
Evidence does suggest that children often choose to explore even in situations in which 
they might benefit from exploitation (Blanco & Sloutsky, 2020). Thus, it is possible that 
even in cases in which children recognise the value of the social information and can 
identify the appropriate response to achieve their goal, the motivation to explore may 
override the motivation to achieve the goal, making it difficult to ascertain the reason 
for particular decisions.  
Previous research into SLSs has focused primarily on social information use 
with regards to copying. However, using tasks in which the demonstrated solution is 
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always successful, or the desired response is to copy (e.g., Carr et al., 2015; van 
Leeuwen et al., 2018), makes it difficult to distinguish between preferences for 
exploration and a failure to copy. This means that researchers have sometimes 
concluded that children have failed to use the available social information to inform 
their responses when an alternative solution has been employed. Recent evidence 
suggests that in these cases children could be driven by a preference for exploring 
alternative options rather than simply copying or exploiting the options previously 
presented to them (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2020). Children who do not copy may in fact be 
fully cognisant of the social (or asocial, Blanco & Sloutsky, 2020) information available 
(e.g., potentially perfectly capable of producing the demonstrated response) but 
applying this with a motivation to explore. Indeed, in the current study the inclusion of 
both successful and unsuccessful demonstrations highlighted a distinct difference in 
children’s performance depending on whether the appropriate response was to copy or 
avoid copying. Older children performed better at our task, but had we only included 
successful demonstrations involving aligned goals, this would not have been apparent.  
We suggest that this motivation to explore should also be distinguished from 
favouring information acquired through personal experience over that acquired from a 
social source, which has been a common interpretation of social learning studies which 
have found low rates of copying. In the context of a social learning task, explore 
responses could reflect a preference for using personally-acquired over socially-
acquired information. However, in the absence of comparison with an individual 
learning condition, it is impossible to distinguish between a preference for personal 
(over social) information from a preference for exploring new (over known) options. 
Indeed, recent research shows that children’s preference for exploration is not peculiar 
to contexts of social information use; it was applied just as strongly following 
personally-acquired and social information (Atkinson et al., 2020; Renner et al., 2021). 
Similarly, Blanco and Sloutsky (2020) found a preference for exploration in an 
individual learning task even when children might benefit from exploitation. Such 
findings suggest that explore responses could indicate that children are motivated by a 
preference for new information. The results of our study are consistent with this 
interpretation. 
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Our discovery of age-related differences between children’s goal understanding, 
demonstration outcome understanding, and task performance suggests ‘jumps’ or ‘step-
changes’ that may be due to the development of abilities required for the use of different 
types of selective social learning. Firstly, there appears to be a jump from correctly 
imputing the goal to accurately inferring the outcome of the demonstration. This 
suggests that children (in this sample, around age 4 and 5) may be able to identify their 
own and others’ goals, but not yet use that goal understanding in addition to the 
demonstrator’s reaction to infer the outcome of the demonstration. There also appears to 
be a second jump from children’s understanding of the demonstration outcome to being 
able to apply this understanding to inform their choice of response. This likely involves 
representing others’ goals relative to one’s own while also considering the outcome of 
the demonstrator’s selection and recognising that the information provided by the 
demonstrator is valuable for one’s own selection. The poor rate of explicit verbal 
reasoning indicates that children found articulating justifications for their choices during 
the task particularly challenging. Again, this is consistent with our suggestion that many 
children may have relied on implicit SLSs rather than being driven by reasoned 
understanding of the value of the social information. 
Overall, these findings suggest that children are capable of understanding and 
representing others’ goals from around 4 years whether they are aligned or not with 
their own. We also demonstrated that children younger than 6 years find it difficult to 
infer, from others’ reactions, the content of social information when the outcome, or 
reward value, is opaque. Older children’s more consistent performance was likely 
underpinned by reasoning-based understanding of others’ access to information. Four- 
and five-year-olds’ difficulty did not appear to be related to understanding others’ goals. 
Rather, better performance following successful demonstrations indicated that some 
children were perhaps relying on less cognitively demanding biases based on more 
salient cues. In addition to this, it appears that using information about others’ goals, 
whether they are aligned to one’s own or not, poses further challenges. So, even if 
children have the ability to interpret the content of social information, they may still 
struggle to recognise its value to themselves. Such reasoning is likely dependent on the 
capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs which are proposed to be experience-
dependent and to develop relatively late in childhood (Blakey et al., 2020, Chapter 3 of 
this thesis). This late development may go some way to explaining the below-ceiling 
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performance of even the older children in using social information appropriately. In the 
absence of the capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs younger children’s choices 
may have instead been determined by implicit biases and motivations towards 
exploration. This developmental trajectory highlights the significant cognitive challenge 
associated with using social information strategically and suggests that such abilities 
may be rare, or even absent, in animals. As cumulative culture may depend on strategic 
social information use in relation to specific goals, this late development is consistent 
with accounts proposing that such abilities may be linked to the distinctiveness of 





Development of Strategic Social Information Seeking: 
Implications for Cumulative Culture 
Chapter two demonstrated that children can account for others’ conflicting 
motivations from around 4 years and they can reliably interpret the outcome of others’ 
behaviour from around 6 years. While younger children’s performance suggested that 
they might have been relying on implicit SLSs to correctly interpret the content of 
social information, older children’s better performance appeared to reflect an 
understanding of the information’s value indicating the capacity to employ explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs. However, appropriate use of information based on inferences 
about others’ goals appeared to be challenging. The age-related improvements in 
appropriate information use applied only when the correct response was to shift, 
suggesting that even the older children may not have been using explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs.  
While children’s use of social information can indicate to some degree their 
understanding of it, looking at how they seek out or select information to attend to 
offers more potential in terms of gaining an insight into their recognition of its value. 
Indeed, in reality, learners may very rarely passively acquire social information that is 
valuable and relevant for achieving a specific goal. More likely, they have to seek out 
information from another individual who is in a position to provide the required 
information. Therefore, in a bid to better understand the developmental trajectory of 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs, the study reported in chapter three considers children’s 
ability to seek out information based on an understanding of what information they 
require and who can provide that information. 
The following chapter has been published as a preprint on PsyArXiv and is 
under revision for submission for publication, the references are given below. The 
chapter is presented in its submitted form. Data and analysis code are available in the 
OSF repository: [https://osf.io/ctse7/]. 
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 Abstract  
Human learners are rarely the passive recipients of valuable social information. 
Rather, learners usually have to actively seek out information from a variety of potential 
others to determine who is in a position to provide useful information. Yet, the majority 
of developmental social learning paradigms do not address participants’ ability to seek 
out information for themselves. To investigate age-related changes in children’s ability 
to seek out appropriate social information, 3- to 8-year-olds (N = 218; recruited in a 
school and at a public visitor attraction) were presented with a task requiring them to 
identify which of four possible demonstrators could provide critical information for 
unlocking a box. Appropriate information seeking improved significantly with age. The 
particularly high performance of 7- and 8-year-olds was consistent with the expectation 
that older children’s increased metacognitive understanding would allow them to 
identify appropriate information sources. Appropriate social information seeking may 
have been overlooked as a significant cognitive challenge involved in fully benefiting 
from others’ knowledge, potentially influencing understanding of the phylogenetic 




Seeking out relevant information from appropriate social sources is ubiquitous in 
human adults. Human adults may therefore demonstrate key differences in the way they 
seek, attend to, and use social information compared to children and non-human 
animals (henceforth animals). This propensity for identifying and gathering relevant 
social information has been proposed as one of a suite of cognitive mechanisms that 
may be required for distinctively human cumulative culture (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; 
Heyes, 2018a; Tomasello et al., 1993). By ‘distinctively human’ cumulative culture we 
are referring to the accumulation of beneficial modifications to cultural traits over 
successive generations of learners, which results in increased functionality or efficiency 
(Caldwell & Millen, 2008b; Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018; Tennie et al., 2009). Its rarity 
in animals and apparent importance in accounting for human evolutionary success has 
prompted interest regarding the emergence and development of cognitive mechanisms 
in human children that support cumulative culture (Caldwell et al., 2020; Dean et al., 
2014; Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018). It may be the lack, limited scope, or inflexibility of 
mechanisms such as information seeking that impedes development of human-like 
cumulative culture in animals despite them showing evidence of culture (Allen, 2019; 
Aplin et al., 2015; Hobaiter et al., 2014) and social learning abilities (Hoppitt & Laland, 
2013; Whiten, 2017b). The current study aimed to address the gap in our understanding 
regarding age-related changes in children’s ability to seek out and use appropriate social 
information. Documenting the developmental trajectory of this capacity could provide 
insights into the cognitive demands involved and whether it is likely to be observed in 
animals. 
In a bid to understand the discontinuity between humans’ and animals’ capacity 
for cumulative culture a number of sociocognitive mechanisms have been considered 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Dean et al., 2014; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Tennie et al., 
2009). Some of these proposals focus on when and how social information is used. 
Social learning is generally considered to be adaptive when it is present within a 
population. However, models have shown that under most conditions it is the ability to 
flexibly switch from social to individual learning, when social learning proves 
unsatisfactory, that increases adaptability in a population (Enquist et al., 2007; Henrich 
& McElreath, 2003; Rendell et al., 2011; Rogers, 1988). That is, for social learning to 
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be most beneficial and more efficient than individual learning it must be used 
selectively. Selective or flexible rules that influence individuals’ use of social 
information are referred to as social learning strategies (SLSs). These refer to heuristic 
biases or rules that dictate when, what, and from whom social information should be 
acquired (Kendal et al., 2018; Laland, 2004), helping to filter out less useful aspects of 
available social information. The selective nature of SLSs such as ‘copy older 
individuals’ or ‘copy the majority’ makes them generally more effective than learning 
indiscriminately from others or individual learning. However, extensive evidence of 
SLSs in both young children and animals (Horner et al., 2010; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 
2019; Laland, 2004; Price et al., 2017; Wood et al., 2012) suggests that selective social 
learning cannot account for the marked differences we see between humans and animals 
with regard to the capacity for cumulative culture. 
One proposal that attempts to explain the distinctiveness of human cumulative 
culture outlines a dual-process view of social learning. This view suggests that there are 
distinct categories of SLSs each based on specific types of decision rules (Heyes, 
2016c). According to this account, distinctively human cumulative culture could be 
attributed to the use of explicitly metacognitive SLSs (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; 
Heyes, 2016c). Explicitly metacognitive SLSs are defined as consciously represented 
and reportable rules. This means that learners are aware of the reasoning-based learning 
strategies that they are employing, and may also explicitly recognise states of 
knowledge, ignorance, and uncertainty in both themselves and others. Such strategies 
involve the use of theory of mind and metacognitive processes that enable human adults 
to flexibly identify, select, or disregard social information across varied contexts (De 
Oliveira et al., 2019; Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c, 2018a). As such, 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs afford learners the capacity to reason about what 
information is required and recognise the potential value to themselves of information 
that can be provided by others. These strategies are proposed to be experience-
dependent and learned through social interaction, therefore we would expect them to 
emerge relatively late in development (Heyes, 2016c).  
The second part of Heyes's (2016c) dual-process account of social learning 
proposes that the majority of the behaviours that conform to SLSs in both humans and 
animals are based on decision rules that depend on general-purpose associative learning 
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processes or biologically selected biases. These rules direct learning towards objects, 
agents, and events that are most likely to provide useful information. However, unlike 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs, these implicit SLSs (as we will refer to them here) are 
not driven by a causal understanding of the potential value of social information. 
Although we refer to these strategies as implicit, we do not claim that learners 
employing them are necessarily devoid of insight regarding personal preferences that 
guide their social learning. It is likely that learners sometimes explicitly represent 
strategies related to salient yet superficial cues without appreciating why their strategy is 
successful. However, we suggest that such strategies, while they may be explicitly 
represented, are not explicitly metacognitive due to the absence of a causal 
understanding of informants’ potential to provide valuable information. Social learning 
biases in young children and animals are likely driven by such implicit, and relatively 
crude, heuristic decision rules (Heyes, 2017). Indeed, cases in which very young 
children (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 2005; McGuigan, 2013; Rakoczy et 
al., 2010) and animals (Horner et al., 2010; Kendal et al., 2015; Ottoni et al., 2005; 
Price et al., 2017) select knowledgeable others are likely the result of implicit SLSs 
(e.g., associative learning or biologically selected biases), rather than the reasoning-
based strategies employed by adults. For example, model-based biases for older 
(Rakoczy et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2012; Zmyj & Seehagen, 2013), higher-status 
(Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019; McGuigan, 2013), or even more reliable models (Koenig & 
Harris, 2005) may be the result of repeated exposure to the successes of models with 
these characteristics, resulting in rule-like strategies. 
While there is evidence of implicit SLSs, based on heuristic biases, in both 
young children and animals, in our view, there is as yet no solid evidence of explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs in either population. By contrast, adult humans are (with good 
reason) assumed to be able to use social information in an explicitly metacognitive 
manner (although this should not be taken to mean that they do not also use implicit 
SLSs). For example, it is routine for human adults to actively seek out models of social 
behaviour, using their understanding of others’ intentions relative to their own to 
strategically select and use the most relevant social information (Caldwell et al., 2018; 
Vélez & Gweon, 2019). A critical question, then, is how children’s use of social 
information develops with age, particularly in relation to their explicit understanding of 
the value of social information, and how they might be able to benefit from it. Since we 
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assume that this understanding is not present from infancy, but is certainly in place by 
adulthood, it follows that this transition must occur over the course of childhood. We 
may therefore be able to identify key stages during development when children begin to 
change how they respond to social information (i.e., developing the ability to reason 
about its value). That is, it might be possible to identify when children develop the 
capacity to employ explicitly metacognitive SLSs that are driven by the value of the 
information, rather than relying on implicit SLSs (e.g., pre-existing biases from personal 
experience or phylogenetic history). This would provide insights into the cognitive 
capacities upon which such abilities depend, and therefore might also shed light on the 
reasons for the apparent absence of these abilities in animals. 
Research into social learning has largely been restricted to investigating the 
circumstances under which social information is used, the efficacy of that use, and its 
role in cultural transmission (Burdett et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2018; Hoehl et al., 2019; 
Over & Carpenter, 2012; Rawlings et al., 2017; Subiaul et al., 2016; Wood et al., 
2013a). Indeed, to date, developmental research into SLSs has focused on examining 
children’s responses to task-relevant social information (usually an effective solution) 
which is provided in advance of an opportunity to solve the same task (Dean et al., 
2012; Horner & Whiten, 2007; Lucas et al., 2017; van Leeuwen et al., 2018; Wood et 
al., 2013a). However, while cultural transmission necessitates using information 
acquired from a social source, human learners are rarely passive recipients of valuable 
social information. Here, we propose that actively seeking out valuable information 
when faced with a particular problem to solve is more analogous to real world social 
learning scenarios, compared with being passively provided with relevant information. 
Therefore, in the current study we were particularly interested in determining 
when children develop the ability to seek out social information based on an 
understanding of the value of that information. This led us to consider selective 
information seeking paradigms that already exist in the literature. Specifically, we 
looked at the selective trust paradigm. This paradigm is commonly used to examine 
children’s preferences for information provided by models with conflicting social 
and/or epistemic characteristics, and is built on the premise that children learn from 
others’ testimony (see Harris et al., 2018 for a full review). 
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These studies typically employ a ‘conflicting sources paradigm’ in which 
children first observe two informants who differ on social (e.g., gender or accent) and/or 
epistemic (e.g., accuracy or reliability) characteristics (Koenig & Harris, 2005). 
Following a familiarisation phase, children are faced with an unfamiliar scenario, for 
example, naming an unfamiliar object. In some tasks, children are required to select one 
of two potential informants to ‘seek’ information from (i.e., ‘ask’ questions) and/or 
required to make their selection following the informants’ claims about the name of the 
object (i.e., ‘endorse’ questions). The model selected by the child is considered to be the 
model whose claim they trust. With regards to the influence of social characteristics on 
selective trust, evidence suggests that in the absence of epistemic differences children 
ask and endorse informants who have positive social characteristics (Tong et al., 2020). 
These selections are influenced by both the models’ and the learners’ own 
characteristics (e.g., age or gender, Wood et al., 2013b). In particular, social 
characteristics that signal a model’s similarity to the learner (i.e., ingroup membership) 
are consistently favoured by young children (e.g., preference for informant with a native 
accent, Corriveau et al., 2013; preference for informant of the same gender, Terrier et 
al., 2016). Model-based biases such as these are unlikely to require explicit cognitive 
reasoning. Similar to the selective preferences in children’s proclivity to copy and 
consistent with the SLS ‘copy successful individuals’, they are likely the result of 
implicit biases that promote learning from sources that are most likely to provide useful 
information across the broadest range of contexts. The selective trust literature reports 
that children as young as 3 years old are sensitive to informants’ social and epistemic 
characteristics (Corriveau et al., 2013; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 2005; 
Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Recent meta-analyses examined the relation between 
children’s age and their selective trust decisions (Tong et al., 2020). Results indicated 
that children asked and endorsed more knowledgeable (accurate/reliable) informants 
when they differed on only epistemic characteristics. Specifically, 4-year-olds were 
more likely than 3-year-olds to endorse knowledgeable informants. When informants 
differed on epistemic and social characteristics simultaneously, 4- to 6-year-olds were 
more likely to endorse informants who were knowledgeable but had a negative social 
characteristic while 3-year-olds appeared to weigh both characteristics equally. Thus, 
from 4-years children appear to place greater value on epistemic characteristics. 
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Whilst these preferences may be linked to a developing explicit awareness of the 
potential value of social information, the design of these studies precludes this 
conclusion. The paradigm depends on participants being exposed to information about 
the accuracy or reliability of the two informants in the familiarisation phase, in order to 
establish the respective epistemic characteristics (e.g., knowledgeable/ignorant) of the 
conflicting sources. Thus, the literature on selective trust, like much of the literature on 
SLSs, depends on children making choices between models on the basis of 
characteristics for which they are likely to have a prior history of associations or a pre-
existing bias (whether established as part of the experimental procedure, e.g., reputation 
for accuracy, or from the child’s own life experience, e.g., age, VanderBorght & Jaswal, 
2009). The results can therefore be likewise attributed to implicit biases. However, the 
apparent transition to favouring epistemic characteristics (such as prior accuracy) over 
social ones (such as familiarity, Corriveau & Harris, 2009) is perhaps suggestive of a 
developing insight into the value of others as sources of social information. 
While it is useful to know how children use social information and who children 
prefer to learn from, we argue that this is not sufficient to determine the cognitive 
mechanisms that children are employing during social learning. Children’s ability and 
proclivity to seek out relevant social information has not yet been adequately addressed. 
That is, nothing in the SLSs or selective trust literature has examined children’s ability 
to select valuable social information on the basis of its relevance for solving a specific 
problem. 
Explicitly metacognitive SLSs are proposed to depend on relatively late 
developing cognitive capacities (Heyes, 2016c). Therefore, to help explain why 
cumulative culture appears to be restricted to humans we can look at whether age-
related changes in children’s ability to seek out relevant social information coincide 
with advances in cognitive development. If we find particular ages at which children 
make significant advances in their appropriate social information seeking and these 
occur at a similar age to the development of particular cognitive capacities, then these 
capacities might be necessary prerequisites. Similarly to Heyes (2016c), Baldwin and 
Moses (1996) proposed that motivations for initiating an appropriate search for social 
information likely rest on advanced metacognitive capacities. They emphasised that to 
seek social information effectively, the seeker should have awareness of what 
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information is required and from whom it can be obtained. While behavioural tests of 
implicit metacognitive ability suggest that infants (Goupil et al., 2016), young children 
(Bernard et al., 2015), and animals (Call & Carpenter, 2001; Neldner et al., 2015) react 
to the state of ignorance, they do so without necessarily recognising a metacognitive 
awareness of that state. However, we know that children’s cognitive capacities continue 
to progress well beyond those of animals. In particular, as their cognition advances, 
children develop abilities such as evaluating their own knowledge state (Kloo & Sodian, 
2017; Rohwer et al., 2012), understanding others’ mental states (Krachun et al., 2009; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and recognition that perceptual access to information 
facilitates knowledge formation (O’Neill et al., 1992; Pillow & Weed, 1997; Ruffman & 
Olson, 1989). Such abilities are thought to be cognitively demanding; thus, their 
requisite nature may preclude younger children’s (and by logical extension animals’) 
ability to seek out appropriate social information. Therefore, if we can identify when 
children develop the capacity to use explicitly metacognitive over implicit SLSs we 
may be able to use this to predict the likelihood of the capacity being available to 
animals. That is, if we find that this ability develops late in childhood then this would be 
consistent with the hypothesis that it is dependent on cognitive capacities that are not 
available to animals, and could help to explain the distinctiveness of human cumulative 
culture. 
The aim of the current study was to investigate when children develop the ability 
to seek out social information using explicitly metacognitive SLSs. To explore the 
development of children’s appropriate information seeking we designed a task in which 
3- to 8-year-old children were faced with a problem for which they could not use prior 
experience or knowledge. Rather, to solve the problem children had to reason about the 
information needed and who had the potential to provide that information. That is, 
appropriate information seeking should be based on a reasoned understanding of the 
value, to themselves, of the social information. Heyes (2016c) argued that this kind of 
cognitive reasoning may not be available in young children or animals. In the absence 
of the ability to reason about the potential value of social information provided by 
others, we expected children to rely on less cognitively demanding implicit SLSs. In the 
current study we specifically looked at whether children’s information seeking might 
instead be influenced by heuristic model-based biases for superficial demonstrator 
characteristics, such as age or gender. Thus, the task was designed such that the use of 
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model-based biases in the absence of cognitive reasoning would be inappropriate, 
leading to imperfect information seeking. 
Overall, we expected to find an age-related transition from the use of heuristic 
model-based biases to reasoning-based choices driven by the value of the information. 
Specifically, we predicted that appropriate information seeking would improve with age 
due to our anticipation that advances in children’s metacognitive understanding would 
enable them to identify appropriate sources of information. We expected that younger 
children would struggle to employ explicitly metacognitive SLSs and instead rely on 
less cognitively demanding heuristic biases (implicit SLSs) related to superficial 
demonstrator characteristics such as age or gender. Any age-related changes in 
children’s appropriate information seeking could indicate use of different SLSs when 
approaching the task. Thus, we examined the developmental trajectory of appropriate 
social information seeking to provide insight into the emergence of cognitive reasoning 
as a mechanism required for distinctively human cumulative culture. Finding evidence 
of reasoning-based choices in older, but not younger, children would support Heyes's 
(2016c) proposal that explicitly metacognitive SLSs are experience-dependent, 
developing relatively late in children. 
Appropriate use of social information (following appropriate information 
seeking) could further help to distinguish between learners with some level of 
metacognitive understanding, and those reliant on implicit rules for what, when, and 
whom to copy. That is, understanding the relevance of the acquired information would 
be expected to also result in more appropriate use of that information. By investigating 
social information use in conjunction with appropriate information seeking we can 
really begin to expose the cognitive mechanisms that underlie these processes. How 
children use particular types of information provided by others can tell us much about 
the nature of their social learning processes – most importantly whether they might be 
using reasoning-based strategies or relying upon adaptive heuristic biases. In the current 
study, copying was not always the correct response, and success was sometimes 
dependent on making a different choice to the one made by the demosntrator. As with 
appropriate information seeking, we expected successful use of the social information to 




The final participant sample comprised 218 children aged three to eight years 
(112 females; Mean age = 71.1 months, SD = 20.4 months, range = 37 to 106 months). 
The sample size was balanced across age groups: 3 years (n = 36), 4 years (n = 40), 5 
years (n = 37), 6 years (n = 36), 7 years (n = 35), 8 years (n = 34). The sample includes 
children recruited from a school in Scotland (n = 118) and visitors recruited at 
Edinburgh Zoo (n = 100). The nationality of the sample, as identified by parents or legal 
guardians, was predominantly British. An additional eight children were tested but later 
excluded from analyses due to researcher or technical errors (n = 4), missing data (n = 
2), and task interference (n = 2). This study was approved by the University of Stirling 
General University Ethics Panel (GUEP555), and informed written consent was 
provided by each participant’s parent or legal guardian.  
Materials 
The task apparatus is presented in Figure 1. Four identical wooden boxes 
(16cm3) were locked using child friendly plastic padlocks (Alphabet Learning Locks, 
Lakeshore, Carson, CA, USA). Each target padlock was a different colour (red, blue, 
orange, purple) with a different cartoon image (elephant, queen, pig, sun) on the front. 
Additional padlocks of different colours and with different cartoon images were used 
for non-target social demonstration videos. One locked box was presented in each trial 
along with two plastic keys. Only one key could unlock the padlock. A coloured shape 
(star, rectangle, circle, oval) was fixed to each key: within a trial the same shape was 
fixed to both keys each in a different colour. So that the colours of the keys were salient 
in the demonstration videos each key was placed on a rectangular laminated card of the 
same colour as the shape on each key. Each box contained a coloured rubber duck. 
Retrieved ducks were placed on a laminated image of a pond. A Lenovo Yoga 520 
touchscreen laptop running PsychoPy v1.84.2 (Peirce et al., 2019) in tablet mode was 
used to present visual stimuli and videos. 
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Social Demonstration Videos 
A total of 20 demonstration videos were created, including two possible target 
videos (successful and unsuccessful) and three non-target videos for each of the four 
trials. Each video depicted a demonstrator faced with a similar set-up to the participant, 
selecting one of two keys to try to unlock a padlock to open a box. Within each trial the 
age and gender of the four potential demonstrators was different (adult male, adult 
female, child male, child female; child demonstrators were all between 3 and 4 years) 
and each demonstrator had a different combination of padlock and keys from one 
another. In each trial a single target video showed a combination of padlock and keys 
which matched the participant’s combination of padlock and keys, and three non-target 
videos in which none of the apparatus matched that of the participant. Thus, the target 
Figure 1 
Example of the Experimental Set-Up for One of the Four Trials 
Note. A: trial indicator cards placed in front of boxes; B: trial indicator image displayed 
on screen; C: box locked with a distinctive padlock, and two possible keys (one 
correct); D: still images presented on the screen representing available demonstration 
videos, in this example the target video is on the top right. 
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video would provide useful information regarding which key would unlock the padlock, 
and the non-target videos would provide irrelevant information. The age and gender of 
the target demonstrator was different in each trial and the order of the trials was 
randomised between participants. The arrangement of the target and non-target 
demonstrators on the screen was also randomly assigned between trials and participants. 
A successful demonstration showed the selection of the key that unlocked the padlock 
and the box being opened, while an unsuccessful demonstration showed the selection of 
the key that did not unlock the padlock and the box remaining closed. Target videos 
were randomly allocated as successful or unsuccessful in each trial so that a participant 
would see a maximum of two videos of each demonstration type if they selected all four 
target videos. The three non-target videos in each trial comprised both successful and 
unsuccessful demonstrations. 
Procedure 
Participants took part individually in a single session that lasted approximately 
10 minutes. Two experimenters were present, experimenter one (E1) provided 
instructions and presented materials to participants (see Appendix B for a verbal script), 
while a second experimenter controlled the laptop and live coded participants’ 
responses. In some sessions, a familiar adult was also present but was asked not to 
interact with the participant during the task. Participants received a sticker for taking 
part. 
At the outset each of the four locked boxes were placed behind one of four trial 
indicator cards (sun, rain, rainbow, snow) that corresponded to the trial in which that 
box was to be attempted (see Figure 1A). The participant touched the screen to begin 
the task, generating one of the trial indicator images (see Figure 1B) and allowing E1 to 
retrieve the corresponding box and keys for that trial from behind the trial indicator 
card. The box was brought to the front of the testing table and the two keys were placed 
on the correspondingly coloured cards side by side (see Figure 1C) between the box and 
the participant (keys were presented on the same sides as in the associated target 
demonstration video). E1 explained that one of the keys would unlock the padlock so 
the box could be opened and one of the keys would not unlock the padlock so the box 
would stay closed. Participants were told that they would watch a video before trying to 
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open their own box. E1 explained that participants would “see four pictures of other 
people who have boxes they want to unlock” and that they could “choose one of the 
pictures to see a video of that person trying to open their box”. Participants were 
instructed to “choose a video that will help you choose which key to try and open your 
box with”. The laptop screen was turned away during the instructions to reduce 
distraction. When it was turned to face the participant, four still images from the 
beginning of each demonstration video were presented on the screen (one target and 
three non-target; see Figure 1D). Participants were asked “Which video are you going to 
choose?” to prompt them to select one of the videos to watch. Once an image had been 
selected, the corresponding demonstration video played immediately. When the video 
ended the screen turned white and was turned away; participants were told, “Now it’s 
your turn to try and unlock your box” and asked, “Which key are you going to 
choose?” If participants chose the target key and successfully opened the box, they 
retrieved the rubber duck. If participants chose the non-target key the box remained 
locked. The same procedure was repeated for each of the four trials. Following 
completion of all trials E1 asked “How were you deciding which videos to watch?” and 
“How were you deciding which keys to use?” to probe whether children were able to 
explicitly and reasonably justify their choices of videos and keys. 
Statistical Analysis 
The analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2020), with generalised linear 
mixed effects analyses (GLMMs) performed using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014) 
with logit regression. P-values < .05 were accepted as statistically significant. The 
binary dependent variables in the analyses were: appropriate information seeking and 
appropriate information use. Where specified as fixed effects the following variables 
were sum coded: participant’s gender (female as −1, male as 1), participant-target 
demonstrator gender congruence (incongruent as −1, congruent as 1), target 
demonstrator age (child as −1, adult as 1) and demonstration outcome (unsuccessful as 
−1, successful as 1). Age was centred and scaled to measure thousands of days. The 
random effects structure for each model aimed to include by-participant random slopes 
for all fixed effects and keep random effects structures ‘maximal’ where possible 
(following Barr et al., 2013). Where the ‘maximal’ model resulted in non-convergent or 
singular fit models, random slopes were removed, followed by random intercepts where 
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necessary, until a convergent, non-singular model was obtained. Post hoc analyses were 
carried out using estimated marginal means using the emmeans package (Lenth et al., 
2019). Post hoc results are given on the log odds ratio scale. 
Results 
The two key aims of this study were to examine whether children were able to 
seek out and select the target demonstration video and, if successful, whether they were 
able to use the social information in the demonstration to select the target key to unlock 
the padlock. We were also keen to explore the errors that children were making with 
regards to information seeking, specifically looking for evidence of any model-based 
biases for demonstrator characteristics. Finally, we examined children’s responses to 
post-test questions probing their explicit reasoning. 
Information Seeking 
Appropriate information seeking was measured by the proportion of trials in 
which children selected the target video. This required children to reason about the 
information they needed to solve a problem (unlock their box) and which of the 
demonstrators could provide that information (which of the demonstrators were facing 
the same problem). If children were reasoning appropriately, they should have 
disregarded demonstrator characteristics such as age and gender. Overall children 
selected the target demonstration video in 65% of 872 trials. 
A GLMM was built for information seeking success with fixed effects of age, 
gender, participant-target demonstrator gender congruence, target demonstrator’s age, 
and interactions between these variables, a random intercept of trial number and a by-
participant random slope for target demonstrator’s age. A significant main effect of age 
(b = 2.72, SE = 0.41, z = 6.70, p < .001) indicated that children’s appropriate 
information seeking improved with age (see Figure 2), with 7- and 8-year-old children 
successfully selecting the target video in 90% and 91% of trials, respectively. Binomial 
tests revealed that appropriate information seeking was significantly above what would 
be expected by chance (25%) in each age group (p < .001). 
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A significant main effect of participant-target demonstrator gender congruence 
(b = 0.36, SE = 0.11, z = 3.22, p = .0013; see Figure 3) suggested that children selected 
the target video significantly more often when the gender of the target demonstrator was 
congruent (M = .69, SD = .46) rather than incongruent (M = .60, SD = .49) with their 
own. The GLMM did not reveal any evidence of an overall effect of gender (b = −0.15, 
SE = 0.19, z = −0.79, p = .429) or the target demonstrator’s age (b = −0.09, SE = 0.18, z 
= −0.49, p = .622) on appropriate information seeking. However, there was a significant 
two-way interaction between gender congruence and participant gender (b = −0.23, SE 
= 0.11, z = -1.98, p = .048). To clarify this interaction, we performed a post hoc analysis 
using emmeans. This indicated that the gender congruence effect was present in female 
Figure 2 
Proportion of Target and Non-Target Demonstration Video Selections by Age in Years 
Note. Proportion of trials (N = 872) in which participants selected target and non-target 
demonstration videos. Target video selections equate to appropriate information 
seeking. All age groups selected the target video significantly above chance. Dashed 
line indicates chance. 
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(b = 1.17, SE = 0.33, z = 3.52, p = .0004) but not male participants (b = 0.27, SE = 0.30, 
z = 088, p = .378). 
A three-way interaction between gender congruence, target demonstrator age 
and participant gender was also found to be significant (b = 0.30, SE = 0.11, z = 2.63, p 
= .009). To clarify this interaction, we performed a post hoc analysis using emmeans. 
This indicated that the gender congruence effect found in female participants was 
restricted to cases in which the target demonstrator was a child (b = 1.60, SE = 0.68, z = 
2.42, p = .016), while male participants showed a marginally non-significant gender 
congruence effect when the target demonstrator was an adult (b = 1.03, SE = 0.42, z = 
2.47, p = .064). For an overview of the distribution of demonstrator selections split by 
participant age and gender see Figure 4. 
Figure 3 
Proportion of Target and Non-Target Demonstration Video Selections by Participant-
Selected Demonstrator Gender Congruence 
Note. Proportion of trials (N = 872) in which participants selected target and non-target 
demonstration videos by participant-selected demonstrator gender congruence. Target 
video selections equate to appropriate information seeking. Dashed line indicates 
chance. 
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Information Seeking Errors 
The proportion of trials in which children successfully selected the target 
demonstration video was significantly above chance in all age groups. However, in 35% 
of trials children selected a non-target video. Therefore, we assessed whether, in the 
absence of the ability to reason about the information needed, younger children were 
relying on heuristic model-based biases, pertaining to demonstrator characteristics. We 
focused on the errors of 3- to 6-year-old children due to 7- and 8-year-olds’ high 
success rate (however inclusion of the 7- and 8-year-olds’ errors does not alter the 
results). 
Note. Proportion of trials (N = 872) in which participants selected each demonstrator, 
split by participant age and gender. Optimal information seeking would have resulted in 
an equal distribution of selections of each demonstrator. Values presented on bars refer 
to proportion of selections in each section. 
Figure 4 
Proportion of Selections of Each Demonstrator by Participant Age and Gender 
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To explore the information seeking errors we looked at which non-target 
demonstrators children were selecting relative to model-based characteristics, 
specifically demonstrator age (adult or child) or gender. A chi-square test of 
independence revealed no significant preference for either demonstrator age group (ꭓ2 
(1) = 3.63, p = .057). However, a chi-square test of independence revealed a significant 
preference for selecting gender congruent over gender incongruent non-target 
demonstrators (ꭓ2 (1) = 14.53, p < .001; see Figure 3). A chi-square goodness-of-fit test 
was performed to compare the proportion of participants’ selections of each 
demonstrator with the proportion that would be expected given equal distribution of 
selections across all four demonstrators. Goodness-of-fit results for female participants 
indicated a significant difference in the proportion of selections of each demonstrator (ꭓ2 
(3) = 20.27, p < .001). Female participants showed a preference for female child 
demonstrators, selecting them significantly more often than chance (ꭓ2 (1) = 7.40, p = 
.007), while selecting the other demonstrators no differently to chance (p ≥ .14) 
indicative of a specific model-based bias. Goodness-of-fit results for male participants 
indicated a distribution of demonstrator selections that was no different to chance (ꭓ2 (3) 
= 4.40, p = .22) suggesting that male children had no specific preference for any of the 
demonstrators. 
Information Use 
Appropriate information use was measured by the proportion of trials in which 
children, who had selected and watched the target demonstration video, selected the 
target key. The appropriate response was dependent on the success of the 
demonstration. Viewing a successful demonstration should have encouraged a copying 
response (using either the colour or the position of the key), while viewing an 
unsuccessful demonstration should have encouraged avoidance of that response, and 
selection of the alternative. Overall children chose the target key in 83% of 564 trials 
(287 successful and 277 unsuccessful demonstrations).  
A GLMM was built for appropriate information use with fixed effects of age, 
demonstration outcome, and the interaction between these variables, and random 
intercepts of participant gender, target demonstrator (adult male, adult female, child 
male, child female), and participant ID. Similarly to the information seeking results, a 
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significant main effect of age was revealed (b = 1.86, SE = 0.30, z = 6.26, p < .001) 
indicating that appropriate information use improved with age (see Figure 5). The 
model also identified a significant main effect of demonstration outcome (b = 0.69, SE 
= 0.18, z = 3.89, p < .001) indicating that children were more successful following 
successful demonstrations (M = .88, SD = .33), than unsuccessful demonstrations (M = 
.78, SD = .42). It is worth noting that appropriate information use was particularly high 
in 6-, 7-, and 8-year-old children following successful demonstrations, with children 
successfully copying the demonstrator’s key choice in >95% of trials. Finally, there was 
a significant two-way interaction between age and demonstration outcome (b = 0.52, SE 
= 0.25, z = 2.10, p = .037). To clarify the direction of this interaction, we performed a 
post hoc analysis using emmeans. This indicated that the effect of demonstration 
success was slightly more pronounced in older children (upper quartile; b = 1.88, SE = 
0.53, z = 3.52, p = .0004) than younger children (lower quartile; b = 0.85, SE = 0.29, z 
= 2.98, p = .003).  
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Explicit Verbal Reasoning 
We examined children’s responses to explicit reasoning questions regarding 
their choices in both the information seeking and information use aspects of the task. 
Responses to each reasoning question were categorised into four levels: 0) no response; 
1) non-reasoned response – responses that did not relate to the question asked (e.g., ‘the 
good ones’/’I just used my brain’), or comprised single words or gestures; 2) reasoned 
but incorrect responses – explanations that showed evidence of explicit reasoning but 
the motivations were incorrect or the answer was insufficient to determine full correct 
reasoning (e.g., ‘picked one of the grown ups’ /’because some are wrong and some are 
Figure 5 
Proportion of Target and Non-Target Key Selections by Age in Years 
Note. Proportion of trials in which participants who watched the target demonstration 
video (N = 564) selected the target and non-target keys. Target key selections equate to 
appropriate information use. After successful demonstrations, the appropriate response 
was to copy the demonstrator’s key selection; after unsuccessful demonstrations, the 
appropriate response was to avoid copying the demonstrator’s selection. Dashed line 
indicates chance. 
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right’); and 3) reasoned correct response – the explanation provided clear reasoned 
evidence of explicit task understanding (e.g., ‘because they had the same lock’/’in the 
video, if they didn't get it I chose the other one, if they did I chose the same one’). When 
asked to justify how they were selecting which videos to watch, 38% of children 
provided correct reasoned responses, and when asked to justify how they were selecting 
which keys to use, 23% gave correctly reasoned responses. 
We investigated whether children’s verbal reasoning was predicted by age or 
task performance by conducting two ordinal regressions (using the ordinal package in 
R, Christensen, 2019). For each reasoning question (information seeking and 
information use) we submitted children’s responses to an ordinal regression with fixed 
effects of age, performance (total number of target video and target key selections, 
respectively), and the interaction between these variables. Both models indicated 
significant main effects of both age (information seeking: b = 1.38, SE = 0.61, z = 2.24, 
p = .025; information use: b = 2.49, SE = 0.54, z = 4.61, p < .001; see Figure 6) and 
performance (information seeking: b = 0.59, SE = 0.12, z = 5.11, p < .001; information 
use: b = 0.39, SE = 0.11, z = 3.44, p < .001; see Figure 7). There was no evidence of 
any significant interactions between age and performance (information seeking: b = 
0.24, SE = 0.21, z = 1.18, p = .237; information use: b = −0.07, SE = 0.19, z = -0.35, p = 
.729). These results suggest that in response to both reasoning questions older children 
and children who made more target selections provided better reasoned responses than 






Proportion of Participants Providing Each Category of Explicit Verbal Reasoning 
Responses by Age in Years and Reasoning Question 
Note. Proportion of participants in each age group who provided each category of 
responses to the explicit reasoning questions about how they sought out and used the 
social information. All participants are included (N = 218) regardless of whether they 
sought out the correct information. Values presented on bars refer to the number of 




Proportion of Participants Providing Each Category of Explicit Verbal Reasoning 
Responses by Task Performance and Reasoning Question 
Note. Proportion of participants who provided each category of responses to the explicit 
reasoning questions about how they sought out and used the social information (N = 
218). Information Seeking: responses by target video selections; Information Use: 
responses by target key selection. Values presented on bars refer to the number of 
participants each proportion represents. 
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Discussion 
In this study we investigated the development of appropriate social information 
seeking in 3- to 8-year-olds. Specifically, we were interested in identifying when 
children develop the ability to seek out information based on a reasoned understanding 
of what information is required to solve a particular problem and who could provide it 
(explicitly metacognitive SLSs). We were also interested in exploring the alternative 
strategies children rely on prior to this development, therefore we examined the possible 
influence of model-based biases (implicit SLSs), which (if the task had been 
understood) should have been disregarded. 
We found that the proportion of trials in which children selected the target 
demonstration video increased with age. This corresponded to our prediction that older 
children (7- to 8-years) would exhibit more appropriate social information seeking than 
younger children (3- to 6-years). Despite finding that all ages selected the target video 
significantly more often than would have been expected by chance, we saw relatively 
high information seeking error rates in the younger age groups. This suggests that older 
and younger children might have been approaching the task differently. The particularly 
high rate of appropriate information seeking we observed in 7- and 8-year-olds (close to 
ceiling) was consistent with our expectation that increased metacognitive understanding 
would allow them to recognise what information was required to solve the problem and 
to identify who, of the available demonstrators, could provide relevant information. 
Thus, we suggest that older children understood the potential value to themselves of the 
information that the target demonstrator could provide having employed an explicitly 
metacognitive SLS. By contrast, we postulate that younger children’s target video 
selections were less likely to have been driven by reasoned understanding of the 
information they needed and the potential value of the target demonstration video. 
Therefore, when selecting a video, younger children might have instead relied on less 
cognitively demanding implicit SLSs such as model-based biases, or a bias for selecting 
models whose box matched their own box (without appreciating the value of the 
information). 
The primary aim of this study was to establish when children develop the ability 
to seek out information based on a reasoned understanding of its value. However, we 
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were also interested in what strategies children used to seek out information in the 
absence of this ability. The design of this study made it possible to explore whether 
children might be relying on less cognitively demanding implicit SLSs such as heuristic 
model-based biases. If children understand the value of social information and its 
relevance to their goal, then it should not matter what age or gender the appropriate 
demonstrator is. That is, appropriate information seeking based on an understanding of 
the value of the information should override model-based biases. Therefore, in our 
analyses we assessed whether children’s information seeking showed evidence of any 
biases towards either of the demonstrator characteristics we manipulated, namely age 
and gender. Results showed that children were more likely to select target 
demonstrators who were the same gender as themselves, therefore showing a gender 
congruence effect. Our exploratory analysis into the information seeking errors made by 
3- to 6-year-olds revealed a similar effect of gender congruence. While there were slight 
differences in particular demonstrator preferences between male and female 
participants, we found no overall bias related to the demonstrators’ age. Therefore, it 
seems that even when it was apparent – from salient visual cues – which demonstrator 
could provide relevant information, some children were still driven by biases for 
superficial model characteristics (in this case demonstrator gender) rather than the 
potential value of the information. These findings support the interpretation that in the 
absence of the capacity for explicit reasoning about what information is needed and who 
can provide it, younger children were influenced by model-based biases. These biases 
are in line with the reports of preferences for same-gender models in selective trust 
paradigms (Terrier et al., 2016). That the gender congruence effect extended across both 
target and non-target demonstrator selections suggests that some target demonstrator 
selections were probably made as a result of model-based biases rather than reasoning 
about the value of the information that the demonstrator could provide.  
As outlined above, we propose that the older children’s high rate of appropriate 
information seeking was driven by reasoned understanding of the value of the 
information, whereas the younger children who have likely not yet developed the 
capacity to use these reasoning-based SLSs instead relied on model-based biases (in this 
case a preference for gender congruent demonstrators). The results of the current study 
highlight the importance of considering cognitive mechanisms involved in seeking out 
social information, as they reveal evidence of the different strategies that older and 
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younger children use when approaching the task. Thus, we believe this provides 
evidence of a relatively late age-related transition from implicit SLSs to explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs, consistent with accounts proposed by Dunstone and Caldwell 
(2018) and Heyes (2016c). 
In line with our predictions, the proportion of trials in which children selected 
the target key (appropriate information use) increased with age. Rates of target key 
selections were found to be higher in older children following both successful and 
unsuccessful demonstrations, indicating that older children were more adept at flexibly 
using social information to inform their responses than younger children. We propose 
that older children knew what to do with the information they received in the 
demonstration because their appropriate information seeking had been based on an 
understanding of the information needed to solve their problem. Overall, these results 
provide further evidence for the interpretation that older children’s social information 
seeking was based upon reasoned understanding of the value of the information 
(explicitly metacognitive SLSs). By contrast, younger children appeared to make less 
effective use of the information they acquired despite selecting the target video. We 
posit that this offers further evidence to support our interpretation that younger 
children’s target video selections were less likely to have been driven by reasoned 
understanding of what information was required and the potential value of the target 
demonstration video. Rather, their selections might have been based on superficial but 
salient demonstrator characteristics driven by implicit SLSs (in this case, model-based 
biases for gender congruence).  
Including a range of ages in our study allowed for investigation into age-related 
changes in children’s use of SLSs. Previous research has tended to focus on a behaviour 
of interest in more limited age groups (e.g., only including 5-year-olds: McGuigan, 
2013; Wood et al., 2012), therefore precluding investigation into developmental 
trajectories or age-related changes. Our results suggest that the transition from implicit 
SLSs to explicitly metacognitive SLSs begins at around 6 years. Compared to 7- and 8-
year-olds, the proportion of information seeking errors made by 6-year-olds was still 
relatively high. However, for those 6-year-olds who did select the target video, their 
appropriate information use was at a level comparable to that of 7- and 8-year-olds for 
both demonstration types. This suggests that 6-year-olds who selected the target video 
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were likely to have been motivated by a reasoned understanding of the relevance of the 
information or were at least able to recognise its value once the information had been 
received, indicative of explicitly metacognitive SLSs. Indeed, the information seeking 
error rate in 6-year-olds (see Figure 2) could be a reflection of the transition from 
implicit to metacognitive SLSs, with some children having not yet developed the 
capacity to use such strategies so relying on less cognitively demanding implicit SLSs. 
This interpretation would be consistent with reports of advances in metacognitive 
understanding in partial exposure tasks (Rohwer et al., 2012) and tasks that require 
children to ascribe knowledge to others (Ruffman & Olson, 1989) from 6 years. Thus, 
we propose that cognitive advances in explicit metacognition are implicated in the 
ability to recognise the value of social information. These advances are related to the 
ability to reflect on one’s own knowledge and, importantly, the ability to recognise 
when more information is needed to solve a particular problem, what that information 
is, and from where or whom it can be acquired. However, as we used age as a proxy for 
cognitive development and developmental trajectories of other cognitive capacities 
overlap with that of explicit metacognition, we cannot say for certain which cognitive 
developments might be implicated in the emergence of the capacity for explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs. 
Finally, by using the explicit reasoning questions, we examined children’s own 
understanding of the strategies they were employing when approaching the task. The 
results not only show that explicit reasoning improves with age, but also that higher 
rated reasoning responses were associated with better performance in both the 
information seeking and information use aspects of the task. In both cases we found that 
older children gave more responses that reasonably justified the selections they had 
made. This supports our assumption that appropriate information seeking (observed in 
older children) is indicative of employment of an explicitly metacognitive strategy 
rather than reliance on implicit biases (observed in younger children) which are not 
related to an understanding of the potential value of information. As alluded to in the 
introduction, implicit SLSs may sometimes be explicitly represented. As such, 
information seeking responses that were rated as reasoned but incorrect provide an 
interesting insight into children’s interpretations of their model selections. This type of 
response revealed explicitly represented justifications for particular model selections 
that were not linked to the potential to provide valuable information. Rather, these 
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responses indicated use of strategies related to alternative superficial cues, that, for 
example, fit with the model-based biases we observed in the results (e.g., response from 
5-year-old female: ‘they were all girls’). While these responses are explicitly 
represented, they are not explicitly metacognitive. Thus, these results are consistent 
with the account we have presented proposing that younger children relied on implicit 
SLSs that were not driven by reasoning about the value of the available information. 
Overall, these findings suggest that children, like adults, can actively seek out 
relevant information in order to identify appropriate social models. Here we presented 
evidence that 3- to 8-year-old children’s capacity to actively seek out appropriate social 
information from multiple potential models exceeds what we would expect to see if they 
were selecting a model at random. We believe that our results suggest that older and 
younger children might have been using different SLSs in the information seeking 
phase of the task. In older children (7- and 8-year-olds), social information seeking 
appears to have been driven by explicitly metacognitive SLSs pertaining to an 
understanding of the information required and the potential value of the information that 
could be provided. By contrast, younger children appeared to rely on less cognitively 
demanding heuristic model-based biases (implicit SLSs) due to having not yet 
developed the capacity to use reasoning-based strategies. The pattern of results 
observed in this study highlights the need for and the benefits of expanding 
developmental social learning paradigms to take account of information seeking as well 
as information use. By doing so we provided evidence of an age-related transition from 
use of implicit to explicitly metacognitive SLSs.  
Finding that older, but not younger, children were making reasoned choices, 
based on the value to themselves of social information, supports Heyes's (2016c) 
proposal that explicitly metacognitive SLSs are experience-dependent and develop 
relatively late in children. The relatively late emergence of the capacity to use 
reasoning-based, or explicitly metacognitive, SLSs suggests that this may be a cognitive 
mechanism that is unique to humans and is unlikely to be observed in animals. Thus, we 
propose that our findings are consistent with the interpretation that reasoned 
understanding of social information could account for distinctively human cumulative 
culture (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c). Real 
world instances of the evolution of cumulative culture are likely to involve learners 
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acquiring social information that is very limited in its availability, almost by definition. 
Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that capacities for appropriate information 
seeking could determine whether or not a particular population exhibits cumulative 
culture. The late development of this skill, as identified in our findings, suggests that 
appropriate social information seeking may have been overlooked as a significant 
cognitive challenge to fully benefit from others’ knowledge. It is possible therefore that 
this could provide part of the explanation for the phylogenetic distribution of 





Age-Related Transition From Simple Associations to 
Reasoning-Based Social Learning Strategies 
in 4- to 8-Year-Old Children 
The results of the study presented in chapter three indicated that children’s 
appropriate information seeking appeared to be driven by a reasoned understanding of 
the information required to achieve their goal only from 7 to 8 years old. Therefore, 
older children demonstrated understanding of the value of others as sources of 
information and used explicitly metacognitive SLSs to appropriately seek out relevant 
information. By contrast, younger children seemed to rely on implicit SLSs, in this case 
heuristic biases for gender congruent informants. 
However, the task employed in chapter three did not require participants to 
reason about the mental states of others. Instead, it was concerned with whether children 
were able to reason about the information that was required in order to solve a particular 
problem and whether they could determine who had the potential to provide relevant 
and valuable information. Thus, the study reported in chapter four aims to address 
whether children can use explicitly metacognitive SLSs in cases in which it is necessary 
to consider others’ mental states. In particular, chapter four investigates the 
developmental trajectory of children’s ability to identify potential informants’ suitability 
as a source of information based on an understanding of the informant’s knowledge, in 
this case privileged perceptual access. 
The following chapter has been submitted for publication to the Journal of 
Comparative Psychology and is currently under revision for resubmission, the reference 
is given below. The chapter is presented in its originally submitted form. Data and 
analysis code are available in the OSF repository: [https://osf.io/et6ub/]. 
Blakey, K.H., Renner, E., Atkinson, M., Rafetseder, E., and Caldwell, C.A. (Under 
Revision). Age-related transition from simple associations to reasoning-based social 
learning strategies in 4- to 8-year-old children (Homo sapiens).  
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Abstract 
To differentiate the use of simple associations from the use of explicitly 
reasoned selective social learning, we can look for age-related changes in children’s 
behaviour that might signify a switch from one social learning strategy to the other. We 
presented 4- to 8-year-old children (N = 109) with a task in which they could at first 
succeed by forming an association or inferring a rule. However, following a switch in 
the scenario, success required explicit reasoning about the informants’ potential to 
provide valuable social information based on their perceptual access to a critical event. 
The switch occurred once a proficiency criterion (five consecutive correct responses) 
was reached, or after 10 trials. Older children were more likely to reach criterion. Of all 
children meeting criterion, older participants were more likely to select a 
knowledgeable informant in the switch phase trials. This suggested that some of the 
younger children who had succeeded in the pre-switch trials had inferred rules or 
formed associations based on superficial, yet salient, visual cues, whereas older children 
had made the link between perceptual access and the potential to inform. This late 
development and apparent cognitive challenge are consistent with accounts proposing 
that such capacities may be linked to the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture.  
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Introduction 
The ability to focus social learning on knowledgeable others has been proposed 
as a cognitive capacity underpinning distinctively human cumulative culture. This is 
because such abilities may enable explicitly metacognitive social learning strategies 
(Heyes, 2016c), which are proposed to fundamentally alter the pace and scope of 
cultural evolution (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2018c). Social learning 
strategies (SLSs) – defined more broadly – have been considered responsible for much 
of the adaptive social learning behaviours found in humans and non-human animals 
(henceforth animals; Kendal et al., 2018; Rendell et al., 2011). However, it is generally 
accepted that human adults are good at identifying appropriate sources of social 
information and tracking ‘who knows’ (Heyes, 2016c; Nickerson, 1999), potentially 
revolutionising the strategic use of social information.  
Despite interest in the idea that certain SLSs may be distinctively human, there 
have been few forays into the presence or emergence of these abilities in human 
children. The SLSs employed in all animal and much human behaviour are proposed to 
be based on implicit heuristics, including those learned through general-purpose 
associative learning processes. In contrast, explicitly metacognitive SLSs are claimed to 
be based on consciously represented reasoning-based rules. Determining whether 
individuals in particular studies were using associative learning processes or explicitly 
reasoned selective social learning has largely been applied in retrospect (Heyes, 2016a, 
2017; Heyes & Pearce, 2015). However, as a means of potentially differentiating use of 
simple associations, or implicit heuristics, from use of explicitly reasoned selective 
social learning empirically, we can look for age-related changes in children’s behaviour 
that might signify a shift from reliance on one process to the other. Thus, this study 
investigates the ontogeny of explicitly metacognitive SLSs through exploring how 
children of different ages approach the task of identifying an appropriate person from 
whom to request information. Teasing apart the learning processes that underpin 
children’s selections of social sources could provide evidence to support the theory that 
reasoning-based explicitly metacognitive SLSs emerge relatively late in development. 
Tracking development may offer credence to proposals that such capacities are at least 
in part responsible for distinctively human cumulative culture. 
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Learning From the Right Others 
Learning from others – social learning – can be very beneficial and is generally 
considered to be an adaptive capacity when it is present in a population. However, 
models have shown that adaptability is not improved simply by the inclusion of social 
learning. Rather, it is the ability to be selective and flexibly switch between social and 
individual learning that increases efficiency and adaptability (Enquist et al., 2007; 
Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Rogers, 1988). It follows then that specifically learning 
from appropriate others is key to successful social learning. To make best use of 
learning from others one should focus learning on those who possess relevant 
knowledge or experience. To some extent this targeted learning has been observed in 
humans and animals in the form of SLSs. These are flexible decision rules that 
influence when, what, and from whom social information should be acquired (Kendal et 
al., 2018; Laland, 2004; Rendell et al., 2011). Employing SLSs such as ‘copy the 
majority’, ‘copy when uncertain’, or ‘copy the most successful’ will generally improve 
the efficiency of social learning compared to learning indiscriminately from others 
(usually via blind copying) or learning by trial and error via individual learning. 
However, the majority of research has focused on the scope and functions of these 
SLSs, overlooking the cognitive mechanisms and the processes that underlie them. 
There is widespread evidence of social learning (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; 
Whiten, 2017b), use of SLSs (Horner et al., 2010; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019; Laland, 
2004; Price et al., 2017), and culture (Allen, 2019; Aplin et al., 2015) in animals. In 
spite of this, there are marked differences between animals and humans. Specifically, 
there is disparity in regards to the capacity for cumulative culture (Caldwell et al., 2020; 
Dean et al., 2014). Cumulative culture refers to the accumulation of beneficial 
modifications to cultural traits over successive generations of learners, which results in 
increased functionality or efficiency (Dean et al., 2014; Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018; 
Tennie et al., 2009; Wilks & Blakey, 2018). One theory that has recently been proposed 
in an attempt to explain this seemingly distinctively human capacity is the idea that 
humans sometimes use explicitly metacognitive SLSs (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; 
Heyes, 2016c). Explicitly metacognitive SLSs are defined as consciously represented 
and reportable rules. This means that the agent is explicitly aware of the reasoning-
based learning strategies that they are employing, including taking into account states of 
107 
knowledge, ignorance, and uncertainty. These abilities may significantly influence how 
individuals seek out, attend to, and use social information, and as such may account for 
the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture (Blakey et al., 2020, Chapter 3 of this 
thesis; Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018). Learners who employ an explicitly metacognitive 
SLS have an appreciation of why their strategy is successful because they understand 
the causal link between another’s knowledge or experience and their value as a source 
of information. That is, they have the capacity to recognise the potential value to 
themselves of others’ knowledge based on an understanding of what makes that person 
a good source of information. Therefore, explicitly metacognitive SLSs are thought to 
enable tracking of when others are likely to have superior knowledge, and who of the 
available others is likely to be the best source of knowledge, so that social learning can 
be most efficient (Heyes, 2016a). As humans appear to be the only animals that focus 
their social learning by asking ‘who knows’, this targeted learning towards appropriate 
social sources is believed to, at least in part, facilitate cumulative culture (Heyes, 2018b; 
Shea et al., 2014).  
Reasoning-based explicitly metacognitive SLSs form half of a dual-process 
account of selective social learning that suggests that there are distinct categories of 
SLSs, each based on specific types of decision rules (Heyes, 2016c). The other half of 
this account suggests that the majority of the behaviours that conform to SLSs in both 
humans and animals arise as a consequence of general-purpose associative learning 
processes or biologically selected biases. On the basis of relatively crude and imperfect 
heuristics, these implicit SLSs (as we will refer to them here) function to direct learning 
towards objects, agents, and events that are most likely to provide useful information. In 
contrast to explicitly metacognitive SLSs, they are not driven by a causal understanding 
of the potential value of social information, thus in principle, any salient association can 
be formed, or rule can be inferred. Though we refer to these strategies as implicit, it is 
possible that participants may sometimes infer and represent explicit rules that are not 
causally linked to the informants’ potential to provide valuable information, and rather, 
are based on alternative more salient but relatively superficial cues. Thus, these rules 
may be explicitly represented; however, we suggest that they are not explicitly 
metacognitive due to the absence of a causal understanding of the relevance of the 
informants’ mental states. Though we stated above that humans have the capacity to use 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs, it is likely that much of human behaviour is based upon 
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these less cognitively demanding implicit heuristics. However, it is argued that while 
both humans and animals use implicit SLSs, only humans have the capacity for 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs. 
Adult humans are - justifiably - assumed to be able to use explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs when seeking out and using social information (Caldwell et al., 
2018; Vélez & Gweon, 2019). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to question the presence 
or emergence of these abilities in human children. Explicitly metacognitive SLSs are 
likely to be experience-dependent and learned through social interaction (Heyes, 
2016c). As such they are likely to emerge relatively late in development after children 
have had the opportunity to learn through experience. Therefore, we would not expect 
to see explicit understanding of the value of social information, and how one might 
benefit from it, in infants or very young children. Given the assumption that adults do 
have this capacity, it follows that this understanding develops during the course of 
childhood. It may be possible to differentiate the SLSs that children are using, and 
identify age-related changes in behaviour, that might signify a switch from implicit to 
explicitly metacognitive strategies. This would provide insights into the cognitive 
capacities upon which these abilities depend, and therefore might also shed light on the 
reasons for the apparent absence of these abilities in animals. 
The Learning Processes That Underpin Who Children Learn From 
SLSs in the broadly-defined sense (also referred to in the literature as ‘learning 
heuristics’, or ‘transmission biases’) have been extensively researched in young 
children, especially in relation to ‘who’ strategies (see reviews by Price et al., 2017; 
Wood et al., 2012). These studies have tended to focus on children’s responses to social 
information (usually their propensity to copy, and their preferences for what and whom 
to copy) that has been passively acquired, rather than information that they have 
actively sought out. Similarly, literature on the phenomenon of ‘selective trust’ entails 
children choosing between models on the basis of social and/or epistemic characteristics 
(Koenig et al., 2004; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013) for which they have a pre-existing bias 
(from personal experience or phylogenetic history) or a prior history of associations 
(established as part of the experimental paradigm). While useful in terms of 
understanding how children use social information and who they learn from, in both 
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lines of study (SLSs and selective trust) children’s behaviour is consistent with a 
number of different potential mechanistic explanations, which include implicit 
associative learning and biologically selected biases, as well as explicitly reasoned 
metacognitive strategies. Therefore, they offer little scope for determining which of 
these is responsible. Moreover, Heyes (2017) proposed that the empirical evidence of 
SLSs in young children (under 4 or 5 years old) can largely be explained as a result of 
associative learning processes. We propose that only by setting the different potential 
mechanisms in conflict with one another can we really discover which is responsible. 
For example, to distinguish between implicit associations or biases and explicitly 
metacognitive reasoning, we could create a situation in which each potential mechanism 
will result in a different preference. 
To date there have been very few studies that have specifically set out to track 
the development of explicitly metacognitive SLSs. However, recent evidence does 
indicate an age-related transition from the use of implicit heuristics to explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs that, as expected, occurs relatively late in childhood (Blakey et al., 
2020, Chapter 3). Blakey et al. (2020, Chapter 3) examined children’s understanding of 
what information they themselves required to solve a particular problem. This was 
achieved by examining children’s model selections to see whether they were based on 
an understanding of the potential value of the information the model could provide, or 
on superficial, yet salient, characteristics such as age or gender. The results showed that, 
only at 7 to 8 years old did children’s responses appear to be driven by reasoned 
understanding of the information required to identify an appropriate social model, 
consistent with an ability to use explicitly metacognitive SLSs. Younger children (3 to 6 
years old) instead relied upon imperfect heuristic biases (in this case model-based biases 
for gender congruence), likely due to having not yet developed the capacity to use 
explicitly metacognitive strategies. However, that task did not require children to reason 
about the mental states of the potential informants. Rather, it focussed on children’s 
recognition of the information they needed to complete a particular problem and their 
understanding about who could provide valuable information about that problem (i.e., 
faced with the same, rather than an alternative, problem). Thus, in the current study we 
sought to examine whether children take into account reasoning about others’ mental 
states when judging ‘who knows’. In particular, we wanted to investigate the 
development of the ability to identify an appropriate source of information based on a 
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causal understanding of the link between the informants’ knowledge or experience and 
their value as a source of information (i.e., tracking who knows). To test this, we 
created a situation in which different strategies for success could be learned, or inferred, 
across iterated trials during a training phase. We then examined what had been learned 
by inducing a switch in the scenario, intended to reveal the underlying rule or bias being 
applied by the participant. In these ‘switch trials’, a response informed by causal 
interpretations based on mentalistic reasoning about others’ knowledge would directly 
conflict with a learned non-mentalistic association, or inferred rule, that had previously 
predicted success. Continued success following the switch would suggest that responses 
were informed by explicitly metacognitive mentalistic reasoning about others’ 
knowledge, while lower success would indicate perseverative use of a learned 
association, or inferred rule, based on superficial cues.  
While implicit SLSs may involve forming an association, or inferring a rule, 
between actions or objects that are predictive of success (Haselgrove, 2016), explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs require reasoned causal understanding as well as appropriate 
application of the rule (Caldwell, 2018; Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018). Reasoned 
understanding related to identifying relevant sources of social information can also be 
considered as reasoning-based information seeking. Similarly to Heyes (2016c), 
Baldwin and Moses (1996) proposed that motivations for seeking out appropriate social 
models are likely to be based on advanced metacognitive abilities. They highlight that 
to seek out social information effectively and appropriately a seeker must recognise the 
information that is needed, and from where, or whom, that information can be acquired. 
Of course, there are a number of prerequisites to recognising sources of social 
information. Seekers need to understand that others are sources of information and can 
thus provide information about particular objects or events, and importantly they should 
be able to appreciate this prior to the information being offered. It is also necessary for a 
seeker to understand concepts such as knowledge formation and ignorance in oneself as 
well as in others, including being aware of the potential for differential knowledge 
states. Dunstone and Caldwell (2018) recently postulated that explicit understanding of 
others’ mental states may offer more flexibility with regards to ascertaining who the 
best informant is likely to be, posing a significant advantage in social information use. 
The abilities and understanding highlighted here are most likely learned, emerging with 
increasing experience of social interaction. The suggestion that these abilities are 
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necessary precursors to reasoning-based information seeking fits with the expectation 
that this capacity, and thus explicitly metacognitive SLSs, becomes available to children 
relatively late in development. We discuss the developmental trajectory of these 
sociocognitive and metacognitive abilities in the following section. 
Cognitive Requisites for Explicitly Metacognitive SLSs 
Developing Understanding of Knowledge and Ignorance 
From around 3 years old children begin to show evidence of understanding 
concepts of their own knowledge formation and ignorance; however, it is not reliable. 
Though they have the ability to evaluate their own knowledge and ignorance when they 
have full or no access to relevant information (Pratt & Bryant, 1990; Rohwer et al., 
2012), issues with reliability arise when considering how much they know when they 
have access to only some of the information. In both verbal (Sodian & Wimmer, 1987; 
Wimmer et al., 1988) and behavioural (Kloo & Sodian, 2017; Rohwer et al., 2012) 
partial exposure tasks (participants are exposed to a range of objects, but then cannot 
see which of the objects is being put inside a box) children under 6 years old 
consistently overestimate their own knowledge. One potential explanation for younger 
children’s poor performance compared to total ignorance tasks is that children under 6 
years old lack an understanding of how knowledge is formed. Without the recognition 
that knowledge is formed on the basis of access to information (Kloo & Rohwer, 2012; 
Rohwer et al., 2012), children appear to rely on a ‘sense of knowing’ when evaluating 
their own ignorance. However, children reflect an understanding of the relevance of 
access to information in knowledge formation in their behaviour earlier (from 3 to 4 
years old) than they do in their explicit judgements of the source of the information 
(from 5 years old; Robinson et al., 2008; Sodian et al., 2006). Similarly, behavioural 
tests of implicit metacognitive ability suggest that although infants (Goupil et al., 2016), 
young children (Bernard et al., 2015), and animals (Call & Carpenter, 2001; Neldner et 
al., 2015) react to the state of ignorance, they do so without necessarily recognising a 
metacognitive awareness of that state. This ability appears to precede the ability to 
explicitly evaluate knowledge states, and these different developmental timelines 
correspond with the idea that explicit responses are underpinned by different processes 
that come online later in development (explicitly metacognitive SLSs). Thus, while 
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younger children’s responses may sometimes give the appearance of an understanding 
of states of knowledge, their struggle to report these states suggests otherwise. Rather, 
their responses likely rest on less cognitively demanding processes (e.g., implicit SLSs, 
in the case of adaptive biases in their social learning). 
Understanding the Role of Perceptual Access in Knowledge Formation 
Appreciating the value of information that another individual can provide 
requires an understanding of how knowledge is acquired both by oneself and by others; 
this includes recognising the link between access to information (commonly and 
saliently afforded via visual or auditory perception) and knowledge formation. Thus, to 
evaluate whether young children appreciate how knowledge is acquired, it is necessary 
to consider the age by which children recognise that perception leads to knowledge 
formation. Such understanding is likely to be an important precursor to determining 
other individuals’ value as sources of information. Identifying whether children (from 
around 3 to 4 years old) recognise that knowledge is formed via access to information 
allows us to ascertain whether their behaviour demonstrates, as is claimed, that they can 
differentiate knowledge and ignorance. 
Here we focus on the role of visual perceptual access in knowledge formation as 
this is arguably the most salient to young children, and most relevant to the procedure 
used in the current study. While there is evidence that children as young as 2 years old 
show sensitivity to others’ knowledge states as a result of their visual experience 
(Dunham et al., 2000; O’Neill, 1996), the majority of research suggests that from 3 to 4 
years old children can use others’ perceptual experience to determine their knowledge 
or ignorance (Perner, 1991; Pillow, 1989; Pillow & Weed, 1997; Pratt & Bryant, 1990; 
Sodian et al., 2006). However, Ruffman and Olson (1989) found that while 3- to 4-year-
olds were able to assess others’ perceptual access correctly, only from 6 years old were 
children able to report another’s knowledge. O’Neill et al. (1992) offered a similar 
finding, indicating that 3-year-old children have some understanding that knowledge 
and perceptual access are associated, but not until around 4 or 5 years old do they 
develop an understanding of how perception and knowledge are causally related (i.e., 
seeing leads to knowing). These results suggest that understanding perceptual access 
precedes the ability to attribute knowledge. The conflicting evidence regarding the age 
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at which children develop an appreciation of the causal influence of visual perception 
on knowledge formation suggests that such recognition develops gradually until around 
5 years old and thus is likely to be experience-dependent, at least in part. If younger 
children are less likely to understand the fundamental role that perceptual access plays 
in knowledge formation, it suggests that the behaviours they display that appear to 
demonstrate such understanding may be based on different learning processes (possibly 
learned associations or heuristics) than those required to be able to attribute knowledge. 
It follows that attributing knowledge on the basis of perceptual access may require 
explicit metacognitive reasoning which appears to develop relatively late. 
Determining Others’ Value as Sources of Information 
It is also vital for understanding the development of reasoning-based social 
information seeking to establish whether children can actually use their understanding 
of others’ knowledge states, as inferred from perceptual access, to ascertain others’ 
value as a source of information. A variety of studies report that children from 3 to 4 
years old preferentially select or report agents as more knowledgeable or trustworthy on 
the basis of their perceptual access (e.g., Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2011; Fedra & 
Schmidt, 2019; Koenig et al., 2019; Mills, 2013; Terrier et al., 2016). Yet research 
investigating whether children can use understanding of others’ knowledge states to 
determine their value as a source of information is scarce. An exception is Robinson et 
al. (2011), who explored whether young children recognise that they can gain valuable 
knowledge from others who have had perceptual access to something that they have not. 
Primary results revealed that 3- and 4-year-old children behaved as if they understood 
that knowledge could be gained from an informant when the informant had had an 
experience (looking inside a box) that the children themselves had not. In follow-up 
tasks children were required to choose who-to-ask or whether-to-ask one of two puppets 
(knowledgeable vs ignorant) to provide desirable information. In the task, children 
observed the experimenter allow one puppet to look inside a target box, and the child 
showed the contents of a pencil case to the other puppet. After the demonstration, the 
experimenter told the child that they had to say what was inside the box. In the who-to-
ask condition children had to choose one of the puppets to help them, while in the 
whether-to-ask condition they could choose one of the puppets or make their own guess. 
The results revealed that 5;3- to 6;2-year-olds asked the knowledgeable puppet more 
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frequently than chance in both conditions. In contrast, even when they were forced to 
ask one of the puppets for help, in the who-to-ask condition, younger children (4;3- to 
5;2-year-olds) were no better than chance at asking the puppet with the relevant 
experience, indicating that the younger children failed to recognise the value of the 
others’ knowledge despite being able to report the puppets’ knowledge based on their 
perceptual experience. Similarly, O’Neill et al. (1992) also reported that 4- and 5-year-
old children found assessing knowledge states relative to their perceptual access more 
challenging when they were required to compare two puppets’ knowledge states rather 
than evaluate the knowledge state of a single puppet. From the evidence presented here 
it appears that while children under 5 years old are able to identify others’ perceptual 
access, they may struggle to recognise that perceptual access grants privileged 
knowledge to an individual such that they become a valuable source of information. The 
cognitive challenge posed by these metacognitive capacities may preclude younger 
children from identifying the most appropriate source of social information. Hence, we 
suspect that while older children are able use others’ perceptual access to explicitly 
reason their knowledge state, younger children may instead be relying upon implicit 
SLSs. 
Differentiating Implicit and Explicitly Metacognitive SLSs Empirically 
Returning to our goal of investigating when children develop the ability to shift 
from using implicit SLSs to flexibly employing explicitly metacognitive ones, in search 
of a suitable study design we considered the efficacy of existing paradigms. When 
experiencing situations of ignorance or uncertainty, individuals who understand 
concepts such as the potential to acquire desired information or knowledge from others 
are more likely to request information from others who they believe to be better 
informed (Baldwin & Moses, 1996). Yet, if the goal is to determine whether individuals 
are using explicitly metacognitive SLSs to determine their choice of informant, it is 
necessary to provide a scenario in which the appropriate choice cannot be predicted by 
alternative environmental cues that do not require consideration of others’ knowledge 
states.  
Several studies have used ‘perspective-taking’ paradigms to investigate whether 
non-human primates (Povinelli et al., 1990, 1991) or young children (Povinelli & 
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DeBlois, 1992) understand the relationship between seeing and knowing. Results 
revealed that chimpanzees and 4-year-old children, but not rhesus macaques or 3-year-
old children, responded preferentially to information provided by informants that were 
knowledgeable as opposed to ignorant. Though argued to have provided evidence that 
non-human primates and young children are able to attribute knowledge and ignorance 
to others, Heyes (1998) contested the validity of such conclusions. Heyes claimed that 
preference for the knowledgeable informant could be explained by formation of an 
associative rule across trials, and thus proposed a novel methodology to address such 
issues.  
Heyes’s proposed method involved giving an individual first-hand experience of 
a novel apparatus (barrier) that granted or denied perceptual access. Though seemingly 
the same from a distance (other than being distinct colours), one barrier would be 
transparent (permitting seeing) while the other would be opaque (preventing seeing). 
Following the self-experience phase, two agents, each assigned one of the barriers, 
would attend to a reward hiding process after which the individual’s choice of agent 
(seeing or not-seeing) would be recorded. When the perceptual access of others is not 
visually salient, such as when it is granted or denied according to the opacity of a barrier 
(e.g., goggles/blindfolds/screens), participants must use personal experience of the 
properties of the barriers to identify the perceptual access it affords to others (Lurz & 
Krachun, 2019). Accordingly, preference for the agent who can see through their barrier 
would suggest attribution of knowledge states on the basis of self-experience of the 
barrier’s properties, as opposed to a response that had been reinforced by prior 
experience of similar situations (as might be true for a preference for e.g., head 
orientation).  
Using Self-Experience to Infer Others’ Perceptual Experience 
Several studies have since employed methods inspired by the paradigm set out 
by Heyes (1998; and adapted by Povinelli & Vonk, 2003, 2004) to investigate whether 
infants (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2008; Senju et al., 2011; Teufel et al., 2013) or great apes 
(Kano et al., 2019; Karg et al., 2015) can use their own perceptual experience to infer 
the perceptual experience of others, and so too, what others know. These studies have 
concluded that both infants (from 18 months old) and great apes can use their own 
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perceptual experience to determine others’ perceptual access. However, arguably these 
studies capture implicit metacognitive abilities, since they rely upon anticipatory-
looking paradigms or behavioural reactions, which, as previously discussed, appear to 
precede explicit reasoning regarding others’ knowledge states. Importantly, Teufel et al. 
(2013) highlighted that although 2-year-olds were able to use their personal experience 
to infer others’ visual perception, they appeared to lack the causal understanding of the 
link between visual perception and knowledge formation. This discrepancy was evident 
from children’s indiscriminate use of pointing to request a hidden object from 
knowledgeable and ignorant parents (knowledge was afforded/denied to parents via 
transparent/opaque glasses during the hiding event). These results suggest that children 
of this age have not yet developed the ability to attribute knowledge to others using their 
own past perceptual experience to infer the perceptual access of others. In comparison, 
adults have the capacity to use reasoning-based strategies. For instance, if adults are 
ignorant about a critical event they can use their past experience of similar events to 
infer the experience (perceptual access) of potential informants and attribute knowledge 
to appropriate individuals (Teufel et al., 2009).  
Despite the wealth of research discussed above, little consideration appears to 
have been given to the question of whether children can use their own perceptual 
experience, not only to identify others’ knowledge or ignorance, but also to ascertain 
and utilise the value of another individual as a source of information. Thus, the purpose 
of this study was to address this gap and investigate age-related changes in children’s 
ability to use their own experience as a means to reason the perceptual access of 
potential informants to a critical event to which the children did not themselves have 
access. 
To summarise, understanding one’s own and others’ perceptual access, and the 
ability to attribute knowledge to others, are necessary for understanding that perceptual 
access to a critical event grants privileged knowledge regarding the outcome of that 
event. If one’s own perceptual access to a critical event was obstructed, we postulated 
that explicit reasoning may be required to identify an appropriate individual from whom 
to request information. While there is evidence, from the SLSs and selective trust 
literature, that very young children (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 2005; 
McGuigan, 2013; Rakoczy et al., 2010; Tong et al., 2020) and animals (Horner et al., 
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2010; Kendal et al., 2015; Ottoni et al., 2005) do sometimes select knowledgeable 
individuals, we propose that these selections are unlikely to be driven by an 
understanding of the causal link between another’s knowledge and their value as a 
source of information. For example, biases for older, high-status, or reliable models 
may be the result of repeated exposure to the successes of models with these 
characteristics, thus resulting in learned associations or rule-like strategies (implicit 
SLSs). In contrast, adults employ strategies that enable them to reason about others’ 
mental states when judging ‘who knows’. Consequently, they appropriately attribute 
and request knowledge from others who have had access to desirable information. The 
flexibility with which adults engage this ability suggests that they reason the perceptual 
access of others and employ their understanding that perceptual access leads to 
knowledge to assess others’ suitability as sources of information (explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs). Though implicit SLSs are necessarily broadly adaptive, being 
able to explicitly reason who is an appropriate informant is likely more advantageous 
due to its flexible nature and that it can be applied across contexts. 
The Current Study 
The aim of the current study was to investigate age-related changes that might 
reflect a switch from the use of implicit SLSs to the use of reasoning-based explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs. To do this we designed a task in which participants could at first 
succeed by forming a simple association, or inferring a rule, to predict success. The key 
element of this study was that, following a switch in the scenario, in order to continue to 
be successful participants were required to explicitly reason the informants’ perceptual 
access to a critical hiding event. Following the switch, continued use of an association, 
or inferred rule, would result in imperfect responses, leading to lower success. 
Importantly, we specifically designed this study in such a way that success in the pre-
switch trials was not limited by the capacity for mentalistic causal understanding. We 
wanted to provide participants with the possibility of being successful by learning 
across multiple trials, either by forming an association or inferring a rule, without the 
need for personal insight into such processes (i.e., through implicit SLSs).  
To provide participants this opportunity to form an association, or infer a rule, 
we adopted an experimental approach more commonly used in studies of non-human 
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primates. This involved exposing participants to repeated trials until they reached a 
proficiency criterion level (or completed the maximum number of trials), at which point 
they progressed to the switch phase of the task. Reaching criterion was taken to mean 
that children had either formed an association, inferred a rule, or that they had 
understood the causal relationship between the informants’ perceptual access and their 
knowledge and were using this to identify a knowledgeable informant. We did not 
expect all children to reach criterion due to the relatively low number of trials children 
had in which to form an association, or infer a rule, compared to the number of trials 
and sessions afforded to other species using tasks similar in design. The switch was 
intended to generate a conflict between the response favoured by associations, or 
inferred rules, that predicted success in the pre-switch phase and the response favoured 
by an understanding of why another’s behaviour is informative. Age-related changes in 
children’s responses following the switch were expected to offer an insight into the 
learning processes being employed (i.e., implicit or explicitly metacognitive SLSs). 
We were primarily interested in what the children who reached criterion were 
responding to in the switch trials, as whilst the appropriate causal mentalistic 
interpretation would continue to be successful in the switch trials, the other cues would 
no longer predict success. Additionally, because of what we know about children’s 
developing capacity for appreciation of others’ mental states, we expected to find an 
age-related difference in the SLSs being employed. We expected that older children 
would be more likely to use reasoning-based judgements to attribute value to the 
informants’ knowledge on the basis of their perceptual access to the critical event (i.e., 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs). By contrast, we expected that younger children would 
struggle to employ such reasoning-based strategies, and therefore would be more likely 
to rely on simple associations, or inferred rules, learned over the course of the pre-
switch trials (i.e., implicit SLSs). If children were using explicitly metacognitive SLSs, 
we would expect them to reach criterion in the pre-switch trials and continue to be 
successful in the switch trials due to a mentalistic causal understanding of the 
informants’ potential to provide valuable information. If, however, children were 
instead relying on learned associations, or inferred rules, we would expect them to 
struggle to continue their success in the switch trials (despite reaching criterion) due to 
their success in the pre-switch trials not being driven by a causal understanding of the 
informants’ mental states. 
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It was anticipated that this task would provide an insight into the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying children’s use of social information and children’s approach to 
learning from social sources. Previous research into the development of reasoning-based 
learning strategies suggests that such capacities are cognitively challenging and develop 
relatively late (Blakey et al., 2020, Chapter 3). Thus, if we were to find a similar 
developmental trajectory this may serve as evidence that reasoning-based learning 
strategies influence distinctively human cumulative culture. More specifically, it would 
be consistent with the interpretation that being able to fully benefit from others’ 
knowledge is dependent, at least in part, on the ability to assess the suitability of others 
as sources of knowledge based upon their perceptual access to the desired information. 
Method 
Participants 
The final participant sample comprised 109 children aged four to eight years (55 
females; Mean age = 76.8 months, SD = 16.9 months, range = 48 to 107 months). 
Participants were visitors at the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland’s Edinburgh Zoo. 
The nationality of the sample, as identified by parents/legal guardians, was 
predominantly British (> 90%). An additional 13 children were tested but later excluded 
from analyses. These exclusions were due to researcher error (n = 3), missing data 
including non-completion of the task (n = 7), and task interference, including 
intervention, or distraction, by parents or other children due to testing taking place in a 
public area (n = 3). This study was granted ethical approval by the University of Stirling 
General University Ethics Panel (GUEP673), and informed written consent was 
provided by each participant’s parent/legal guardian prior to data collection. 
Materials 
Two adult female informants followed a counterbalanced and randomised set of 
actions presented to them via a program written in PsychoPy v1.84.2 (Peirce et al., 
2019) which was run on a Microsoft Surface tablet. Each adult was referred to 
according to the pattern of the t-shirt that they were wearing (one black with white 
polka dots, ‘Spots’, and one with black and white stripes, ‘Stripes’). Two black wooden 
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boxes (5.8 x 5.8 x 3.5cm) served as potential reward locations; a target box contained a 
reward object, and a non-target box was empty. The target box was identifiable to the 
adult informants via a discrete sticker on the back, unnoticeable to participants. Square 
Lego Duplo blocks (red, blue, green, and yellow) were used as the reward objects and a 
Lego Duplo baseboard on which participants could build a Lego tower was provided. 
Two types of free-standing wooden frames consisting of yellow and blue frames (35 x 
35cm) and black opaque or black semi-opaque inner screens (30 x 30cm) were used to 
manipulate informants’ perceptual access (see Figure 1; based on materials used by 
Karg et al., 2015). The blue frame with the semi-opaque screen permitted perceptual 
access when viewed straight on and at a close distance (this was the view children had 
in the experience phase; see Figure 1A), though when viewed at an angle or from a 
distance it appeared to be opaque (this was the view that children had in the pre-switch 
and switch phases; see Figure 1B). The yellow frame with the opaque screen prevented 
perceptual access and was used to occlude an informant’s view. Another larger yellow 
frame (45 x 35cm) fitted with a black opaque inner screen (40 x 30cm) was used to 
occlude the participant’s view. A laminated card (one purple, one green) was fixed to 
each side of the testing table so that the colour of the sides of the table could be used as 
a potentially salient visual cue in the pre-switch phase of the task. 
Note. A: when viewed close up, illustrative of child’s view during the experience phase; 
B: when viewed at a distance, illustrative of child’s view during pre-switch and switch 
phases. 
Figure 1 
Illustration of the Perceptual Access Afforded by the Opaque (Yellow) and Semi-
Opaque (Blue) Frames When Interrupting the View of Another Object 
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Design 
Participants took part individually in a single testing session for which they 
received a sticker. Due to testing taking place in public area, a familiar adult was 
present but was asked not to interact with the participant during the task. The 
experimenter sat beside the participant, and the two informants sat next to each other on 
the opposite side of the table, facing the experimenter and the participant. Ideally, the 
informants would have sat at the corners of the table so that the participant would view 
the frames at an angle. However, practical constraints such as the requirement for the 
Spots and Stripes to repeatedly swap places and that they both had to see the 
instructions on the tablet, meant that they had to sit close together and opposite the 
participant. In spite of this compromise, the distance at which they sat ensured that both 
the opaque and semi-opaque frames appeared to be opaque (see Figure 1B). 
The task comprised three sequential phases: an experience phase, a pre-switch 
phase, and a switch phase (see Appendix C for a verbal script). The experience phase 
was included to familiarise the participants with the properties of each of the different 
frame types thus providing information about the perceptual access afforded by each 
type of frame. The purpose of the pre-switch phase was to present a scenario in which 
participants could form an association, or infer a rule, between one of a number of 
potentially salient visual cues and the desired outcome which did not require explicit 
reasoning of the informants’ perceptual access. Following the pre-switch phase there 
was a critical switch in the task scenario which rendered associations formed, or rules 
inferred, in the pre-switch trials ineffective. The trials in the switch phase were intended 
to generate a conflict between the response favoured by associations, or inferred rules, 
that predicted success in the pre-switch phase and the response favoured by an 
understanding of why another’s behaviour is informative (i.e., explicit reasoning 
regarding the causal link between informants’ perceptual access to the critical event and 
their potential to provide valuable information). Following completion of the switch 
phase, participants were asked to provide explicit verbal reasoning for their selections: 
the experimenter asked, “How were you choosing who you wanted to tell you where the 
Lego was?” Participants’ responses to the reasoning question were categorised into four 
levels: no response, non-reasoned response, reasoned but incorrect response, and 




The task began with participants being introduced to the two types of frames. 
The experimenter explained and demonstrated that “You can see through frames that 
are blue, but you can’t see through frames that are yellow” (see Figure 1A). 
Participants were invited to try looking through both types of frame to see which one 
they could see the experimenter through. They were then asked to identify which frame 
they could see the experimenter through, and which frame the experimenter could see 
the participant through. Responses to these perceptual access questions were recorded 
on the tablet by one of the adult informants as a check of participants’ understanding of 
their own and others’ perceptual access. Any errors were corrected by the experimenter 
before moving on to the pre-switch phase. 
Pre-Switch Phase 
Following the experience phase participants were told that they were going to 
“play a finding and building game with Spots and Stripes”, and the experimenter 
pointed at the adult informants in turn to identify them. At the start of each trial 
participants were shown two boxes, one which contained a Lego Duplo block (target) 
and one which was empty (non-target). The experimenter explained “You and Spots and 
Stripes are going to try and find the Lego to build a tower”. The experimenter explained 
that before the Lego was hidden “One frame will go in front of Spots, one frame will go 
in front of Stripes, and this frame will go in front of you.” The blue (semi-opaque) frame 
was placed in front of the knowledgeable informant and the yellow (opaque) frame was 
placed in front of the ignorant informant; once both informants’ frames were in place 
the second larger yellow (opaque) frame was placed in front of the participant which 
occluded their view of the table and the informants’ frames. When all frames were in 
place the experimenter mixed around the open boxes in the centre of the table between 
the participant’s frame and informants’ frames before closing the boxes so that the Lego 
was hidden. After the Lego had been hidden, the frame in front of the participant was 
removed from the table and the informants moved the frames in front of them to the 
sides of the table (see Figure 2A for an example of a trial). The experimenter asked the 
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participant “Who do you think will tell you where the Lego is hidden?” The informant 
chosen by the participant (either verbally or by pointing) was recorded on the tablet. We 
chose to ask participants to select an informant without any information being offered 
by the informants (e.g., via the informants pointing at the boxes) due to previous 
research finding that pointing interferes with children’s ability to discriminate between 
informants (Palmquist et al., 2012). Regardless of whether the knowledgeable or the 
ignorant informant was chosen, the knowledgeable informant opened the target box to 
reveal the Lego inside (i.e., these trials were ‘no-risk’ as the reward was revealed 
regardless of which informant was selected). The participant was then able to retrieve 
the Lego and begin building a tower. 
The same procedure was repeated for up to ten pre-switch trials, beginning with 
the participant being shown that one of the two boxes contained Lego and that the other 
was empty. The starting side of the knowledgeable informant (side of the semi-opaque 
frame) was randomly generated at the start of the pre-switch trials. Once set by the 
random generator, the sides of the knowledgeable and ignorant informants (i.e., the 
sides of the semi-opaque and opaque frames) remained constant throughout the pre-
switch trials. The sides that Spots and Stripes sat on randomly alternated between trials, 
thus although the position of the knowledgeable informant (as indicated by the blue 
semi-opaque frame) was consistent, the identity of the informant (Spots or Stripes) was 
not. The positions of Spots and Stripes were pseudo-randomly determined for each trial, 
such that if the participant completed all ten pre-switch trials there would be an equal 
distribution of trials in which Spots and Stripes were on each side. The initial frame 
position and all variations of informant positions were indicated to the informants and 





Note. A: example of trials in which perceptual access is indicated by yellow (opaque) 
and blue (semi-opaque) frames; B: example of trials in which perceptual access is 
indicated by the informants facing or not facing the critical event (i.e., the ignorant 
informant faced away). The stages illustrated are: (1) start of the trial, (2) A: frames 
placed in front of informants, B: ignorant informant turns away, (3) yellow (opaque) 
frame occludes participant’s view, behind the frame two boxes (one containing Lego) 
are mixed around and closed, (4) A: frames removed, B: ignorant informant turns back 
around, (5) participant selects informant, reward revealed or not revealed depending on 
phase and selection. 
Figure 2 
Schematic Illustration of the Task From the Perspective of the Participant, Including 
Placement of Frames and Boxes. 
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Participants progressed to the switch phase of the task either after they had 
selected the knowledgeable informant in five consecutive pre-switch trials (met 
criterion), or after they had completed ten pre-switch trials. To reach criterion 
participants could have explicitly reasoned the informants’ potential to provide valuable 
information based on their perceptual access to the critical event (when the Lego was 
being hidden), or they could have used superficial, yet salient, visual cues to form an 
association, or infer a rule, that predicted success. Appropriate associations or rules 
could have been based on the colour of the side of the table, the side of the table, or the 
colour of the frame. Any one of these cues may have been more salient to participants 
than perceptual access and in this phase would have had the same desired outcome. The 
‘no-risk’ nature of this phase was employed to reduce the number of trials that may be 
required for participants to form an association, or infer a rule, that predicted success. A 
reasonably low number of trials, relative to the number of trials and sessions afforded to 
other species using similar paradigms, was considered preferable following piloting of 
this study (see Appendix D) due to the young age of the participants and the need for 
them to remain motivated to complete all phases of the task. It is important to note that 
not all children were expected to reach criterion due to the very limited number of trials 
in which to form an association, or infer a rule, that predicted success. 
Switch Phase 
Following completion of the pre-switch phase (either through reaching criterion 
or completing the maximum number of ten trials) there was a ‘switch’ in the task 
scenario. The switch referred to the random switching of the positions of the 
knowledgeable and ignorant informants at the beginning of each trial. The switch phase 
comprised five trials that followed a similar format to the pre-switch phase trials, 
however there were two key changes to the procedure. 
The first change was that the positions of the informants (as indicated by the 
frames) no longer remained constant. As the positions of the informants had remained 
constant throughout the pre-switch phase, switching the informants’ positions rendered 
most learned associations, or inferred rules, ineffective (with the exception of frame 
colour). Therefore, children were required to reason about the informants’ perceptual 
access to continue to be successful. In the first trial of the switch phase the positions of 
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the knowledgeable and ignorant informants always switched from their pre-switch 
phase positions. Thus, the positions of the knowledgeable and ignorant informants (as 
indicated by the frames) were the opposite of their pre-switch phase positions. In the 
following four trials, the side of the knowledgeable informant was randomly assigned, 
so sometimes the positions of the knowledgeable and ignorant informants switched and 
sometimes they did not.  
As was the case in the pre-switch trials, for the first three trials in the switch 
phase, the informants’ perceptual access was indicated by the two different frame types, 
therefore the positions of the yellow (opaque) and blue (semi-opaque) frames were 
switched randomly at the beginning of each trial. However, in the final two switch 
phase trials perceptual access was indicated by the knowledgeable informant facing, and 
the ignorant informant facing away from, the critical event (see Figure 2B for an 
example of a trial). The final two trials with no frames were included to explore whether 
participants were truly responding to the informants’ perceptual access, or whether they 
had simply made the connection between the reward and the frame, or frame colour, 
that they could have been continuing to use as a predictive cue. Therefore, to be 
successful across all switch trials, participants were required to explicitly reason the 
informants’ perceptual access to the critical event and understand why another’s 
behaviour is informative. 
The second key change to the procedure related to the selection that participants 
were asked to make. The experimenter signalled a change in the importance of the 
participant’s decisions: “This time you can choose who you want to tell you where they 
think the Lego is. Try hard to pick the right person, or you might not get the Lego this 
time.” Instead of being asked who they thought would tell them where the Lego was 
hidden, the participant was asked “Who do you want to tell you where they think the 
Lego is hidden?” The change to this question was also reflected in the informants’ 
reactions to participants’ selections. In contrast to the pre-switch phase, the informant 
chosen by the participant selected a box and opened it to reveal its contents. If the 
knowledgeable informant was chosen then the target box was opened to reveal the 
Lego, while if the ignorant informant was selected the non-target box was opened and 
the Lego remained concealed. 
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Statistical Analysis 
Analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 2020), with generalised linear 
mixed effects analyses (GLMMs) performed using lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) with logit 
regression. P-values < .05 were accepted as statistically significant. The binary 
dependent variable in the analysis was the successful selection of the knowledgeable 
informant in the switch trials. Where specified as fixed effects the following variables 
were sum coded: met criterion (Criterion not met as −1, Criterion met as 1), the 
presence of the frames (No frames as −1, Frames as 1) and the number of pre-switch 
trials required to meet criterion (>5 trials as −1, 5 trials as 1). Age was centred and 
scaled to measure thousands of days. The random effects structure for each model 
aimed to include by-participant random slopes for all fixed effects and keep random 
effects structures ‘maximal’ where possible (following Barr et al., 2013). Where the 
‘maximal’ model resulted in non-convergent or singular fit models, random slopes were 
removed, followed by random intercepts where necessary, until a convergent, non-
singular model was obtained. Post hoc analysis was carried out using estimated 
marginal means using the emmeans package (Lenth et al., 2019). Post hoc results are 
given on the log odds ratio scale. 
Results 
The primary aim of the analysis was to assess the switch phase performance of 
children who met the proficiency criterion in the pre-switch phase of the task. This was 
to investigate whether children were able to use explicit reasoning about the informants’ 
perceptual access to identify which informant was knowledgeable. We also hoped that 
we would be able to identify the SLSs that children were employing when approaching 
the trials in the pre-switch and switch phases. Successful performance was based on 
whether children selected the knowledgeable informant in a given trial. Overall, 52 
children (48%) reached the proficiency criterion in the pre-switch phase (see Table 1). 
Reaching criterion was taken to mean that children had either formed an association, 
inferred a rule, or that they had explicitly reasoned the causal relationship between the 
informants’ perceptual access and their knowledge, leading them to select the 
knowledgeable informant in five consecutive pre-switch trials. Continued success in the 
switch trials after reaching criterion could indicate reasoning of the informants’ 
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knowledge as a result of their perceptual access (i.e., explicitly metacognitive SLSs), 
while failure on switch trials after reaching criterion could suggest that children’s 
success in the pre-switch trials was the result of learned associations, or inferred rules, 
not based on a causal understanding of the informants’ knowledge (i.e., implicit SLSs). 
Switch Phase Performance 
Effect of Reaching Proficiency Criterion 
We first compared the switch trial performance of children who did and did not 
reach the proficiency criterion in the pre-switch trials. A GLMM was built for 
successful selection of the knowledgeable informant in each switch trial with fixed 
effects of age, met criterion, the presence of frames, and the interactions between these 
variables, and random intercepts of trial number and participant ID. A significant main 
effect of age (b = 0.99, SE = 0.27, z = 3.61, p < .001) indicated that older children 
selected the knowledgeable informant more often than younger children. A significant 
main effect of meeting criterion (b = 0.75, SE = 0.14, z = 5.46, p < .001) revealed that 
children who met criterion in the pre-switch phase selected the knowledgeable 
 n 
Criterion met 
No. of pre-switch trials 
required to meet criterion 
No Yes 5 trials > 5 trials 
4 years 21 14 7 (33%) 3 4 
5 years 23 13 10 (43%) 6 4 
6 years 22 11 11 (50%) 8 3 
7 years 23 11 12 (52%) 8 4 
8 years 20 8 12 (60%) 9 3 
All 109 57 52 (48%) 34 18 
Table 1 
Number of Children Who Met Criterion by Age in Years (N = 109) and, for Those 
Who Met Criterion (n = 52), Whether Five or More Than Five Pre-Switch Trials 
Were Required to do so 
129 
informant more often in the switch trials than children who did not meet criterion. There 
was a significant two-way interaction between age and meeting criterion (b = 0.58, SE = 
0.27, z = 2.14, p = .033; see Figure 3). To clarify this interaction, we performed a post 
hoc analysis using emmeans. This revealed that the effect of meeting criterion was 
slightly more pronounced in older (upper quartile; b = 0.29, SE = 0.06, z = 5.15, p < 
.001) than younger children (lower quartile; b = 0.22, SE = 0.07, z = 3.30, p = .001). 
The GLMM did not provide evidence of an effect of the presence of frames (b = −0.08, 
SE = 0.13, z = −0.61, p = .544) on successful selection of the knowledgeable informant. 
This suggests that children were equally successful whether they were required to infer 
the informants’ perceptual access using their experience of the properties of the frames 
or using the direction that the informants were facing. 
Note. Dashed line indicates chance performance. 
Figure 3 
Mean Number of Switch Trials in Which Children Selected the Knowledgeable 
Informant by Age in Years and Whether Children Met Criterion or Not 
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For each participant we calculated the number of knowledgeable informant 
selections they made across the five switch trials. We then used these within-participant 
scores to compare performance to chance (50%) using one-sample t-tests. Children who 
met criterion selected the knowledgeable informant in an average of 4.23 switch trials 
(see Table 2); this was found to be significantly above chance t(51) = 11.78, p < .001, 
one-tailed. Children who did not meet criterion selected the knowledgeable informant in 
2.89 switch trials, this was also found to be significantly above chance t(56) = 2.36, p = 
.011, one-tailed. Though both groups performed above chance, an independent-samples 
t-test showed that the difference between these two groups was significant t(106.27) = 
6.00, p < .001, one-tailed. 
Age-Effects in Children Who Met the Proficiency Criterion 
Having established that children who met criterion selected the knowledgeable 
informant in significantly more switch trials than children who did not meet criterion, 
we looked more closely at their performance to explore potential age effects on the use 
of reasoning-based SLSs. If children were using explicit reasoning about the 
informants’ knowledge, we would expect to see more selections of the knowledgeable 
informant. Alternatively, if children were relying on simple associations, or inferred 
rules, that were successful in the pre-switch trials but not based on an understanding of 
  No. of knowledgeable 
informant selections 
 n Mean SD 
Criterion not met  57 2.89 1.26 
Criterion met 52 4.23 1.06 
Criterion met in >5 pre-switch trials 18 3.56 1.38 
Criterion met in 5 pre-switch trials 34 4.59 0.61 
Table 2 
Mean Number of Knowledgeable Informant Selections Across the Five Switch Trials 
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the informants’ potential to provide information, we would expect to see informant 
selections that were closer to chance. To address whether age affected the likelihood of 
using explicit reasoning to determine who was the appropriate informant, we 
constructed a GLMM for successful selection of the knowledgeable informant in each 
switch trial for participants who met criterion. The GLMM had fixed effects of age, the 
presence of frames, the interaction between these variables, and a random intercept of 
participant ID. The results showed a significant main effect of age (b = 1.63, SE = 0.51, 
z = 3.18, p = .001), which suggests that, as expected, older children selected the 
knowledgeable informant significantly more often than younger children. This pattern 
of results could indicate that some of the younger children who had succeeded in the 
pre-switch trials had done so by forming a simple association, or inferring a rule, but 
that older children were more likely to have explicitly reasoned the informants’ 
knowledge based on their perceptual access. There was no main effect of the presence 
of frames (b = −0.05, SE = 0.20, z = −0.27, p = .786) or interaction between age and the 
presence of frames (b = 0.16, SE = 0.42, z = 0.38, p = .706). 
Alternative Approaches to the Task 
Of the 52 children who met criterion, 65% did so after only five pre-switch 
trials, while the rest required between six and ten trials to meet criterion and move on to 
the switch phase (see Table 1). Meeting criterion after only five pre-switch trials and 
continued success in the switch trials could indicate reasoning of the informants’ 
knowledge from the outset of the task. We compared children who met criterion in only 
five pre-switch trials with children who required more than five pre-switch trials to 
assess whether the number of trials required to reach criterion influenced children’s 
performance in the switch trials. A GLMM was built for successful selection of the 
knowledgeable informant in each switch trial with fixed effects of age, whether criterion 
was met in five or more than five pre-switch trials, the presence of frames, the 
interactions between these variables, and a random intercept of participant ID. The 
GLMM revealed a significant main effect of age (b = 1.45, SE = 0.50, z = 2.88, p = 
.004), indicating that older children selected the knowledgeable informant more often 
than younger children. A significant main effect of the number of pre-switch trials 
required to meet criterion (b = 0.80, SE = 0.26, z = 3.10, p = .002) suggested that 
children who met criterion after only five pre-switch trials selected the knowledgeable 
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informant more often than children who required more than five pre-switch trials to 
reach criterion. Again, there was no evidence of an effect of the presence of frames (b = 
−0.11, SE = 0.24, z = −0.46, p = .648) or of any interactions between the fixed effects (p 
≥ .074).  
One-sample t-tests were used to compare the within-participant switch trial 
performance of each group to chance (50%). The results showed that children who met 
criterion in five trials selected the knowledgeable informant in an average of 4.59 
switch trials (see Table 2), this was significantly above chance t(33) = 20.0, p < .001, 
one-tailed. Children who required more than five trials to reach criterion selected the 
knowledgeable informant in an average of 3.56 switch trials, also significantly above 
chance t(17) = 3.24, p = .002, one-tailed. An independent-samples t-test showed that the 
difference in the number of knowledgeable informant selections between these two 
groups was significant t(50) = 3.75, p < .001, one-tailed. 
To investigate whether children who met criterion after five or more than five 
trials performed differently to the children who did not reach criterion, we compared the 
within-participant performance of each group. A one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant difference between the switch trial performance of children who did not 
reach criterion, children who met criterion in only five pre-switch trials, and children 
who met criterion after more than five pre-switch trials F(2, 106) = 24.15, p < .001 (see 
Figure 4). Post hoc Tukey HSD tests showed that children who met criterion after five 
pre-switch trials (M = 4.59 trials, SD = 0.61, N = 34) selected the knowledgeable 
informant significantly more often than both children who met criterion after more than 
five pre-switch trials (M = 3.56 trials, SD = 1.38, N = 18, p = .006) and children who did 
not reach criterion (M = 2.89 trials, SD = 1.26, N = 57; p < .001). However, there was 
not a significant difference in performance between children who met criterion after 
more than five pre-switch trials and children who did not reach criterion (p = .08).  
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Explicit Verbal Reasoning 
We examined children’s responses to the explicit reasoning question regarding 
how they were choosing who they wanted to show them where the Lego was hidden. 
Children were asked this question after they had completed the switch phase, so each 
child provided a single response. Responses to the reasoning question were categorised 
Note. Children who met criterion after only 5 trials performed significantly better than 
children who took more than 5 trials to reach criterion and children who did not reach 
criterion. Small (black) points show individual participants’ performance, large (red) 
points indicate group means. Brackets indicate differences between groups. Dashed line 
indicates chance performance. 
Figure 4 
Number of Switch Trials in Which Children Selected the Knowledgeable Informant by 
the Number of Pre-Switch Trials Required to Meet Criterion 
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into four levels: 0) no response; 1) non-reasoned responses, i.e., responses that did not 
relate to the task (e.g., “because I used telepathy, cause I watched a video about it I just 
used my brain”), or comprised of single words or gestures; 2) reasoned but incorrect 
responses, i.e., explanations that showed evidence of explicit reasoning but the 
motivations were incorrect (not related to visual perceptual access) or the answer was 
not sufficient to determine full correct reasoning (e.g., “I found a pattern, it switched 
from Spots to Stripes from Spots to Stripes”), and 3) reasoned correct responses, i.e., the 
explanation provided clear reasoned evidence of explicit task understanding with 
reference to visual perceptual access (e.g., “The person that had the blue frame could 
see what you were doing, the person who was turned around you couldn't see, the 
person with the yellow frame couldn't see”). When asked to justify how they made their 
choices 41% of children provided reasoned correct responses. 
We investigated whether children’s verbal reasoning was predicted by age, 
meeting the proficiency criterion, or switch trial performance (number of switch trials 
on which each participant selected the knowledgeable informant) by conducting ordinal 
regressions (using the ordinal package in R, Christensen, 2019). Firstly, children’s 
reasoning responses were submitted to an ordinal regression with fixed effects of age, 
meeting criterion and the interaction between these variables. This model indicated 
significant main effects of both age (b = 1.98, SE = 0.44, z = 4.50, p < .001) and 
meeting criterion (b = 0.83, SE = 0.21, z = 3.97, p < .001; see Figure 5). These results 
suggest that older children and children who met criterion provided better reasoned 
responses than younger children and children who did not meet criterion, respectively. 
There was no evidence of a significant interaction between age and meeting criterion (b 
= 0.83, SE = 0.42, z = 1.03, p = .305).  
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To explore the relationship between switch trial performance and verbal 
reasoning we conducted a further ordinal regression. This model included fixed effects 
of age, met criterion, switch trial performance and the interactions between these 
variables. The results revealed a main effect of switch trial performance (b = 1.30, SE = 
0.26, z = 5.00, p < .001) indicating that children who selected the knowledgeable 
informant on a higher number of switch trials also provided better reasoned responses to 
the explicit reasoning question (see Figure 6). In this model there were no significant 
main effects of age (b = −1.93, SE = 1.81, z = −1.065, p = .287) or meeting criterion (b 
= −1.42, SE = 0.95, z = −1.50, p = .133). However, the model revealed a significant 
interaction between switch trial performance and age (b = 1.01, SE = 0.47, z = 2.14, p = 
Note. Values presented on bars refer to the number of participants each proportion 
represents. 
Figure 5 
Proportion of Participants Providing Each Category of Explicit Verbal Reasoning 
Responses by Age in Years and Whether Children Met Criterion or Not 
136 
.032). This interaction is likely to be, at least in part, the product of older children’s 
switch trial performance being higher than that of younger children. However, the effect 
of switch trial performance (i.e., children who performed well in the switch trials 
providing better reasoned responses) appears to be enhanced by age. Given the absence 
of a main effect of age, this interaction suggests that older children who performed well 
in the switch trials were more likely to provide a better reasoned response than younger 
children who also performed well. This pattern of results suggests that the successful 
switch trial performance of both older and younger children was driven by reasoned 
understanding of the informants’ perceptual access, though this effect was greater in 
older than younger children. Thus, the successful identification of the appropriate 
informant appears to have been driven by explicitly metacognitive SLSs. 
Note. Values presented on bars refer to the number of participants each proportion 
represents. 
Figure 6 
Proportion of Participants Providing Each Category of Explicit Verbal Reasoning 
Responses by Number of Knowledgeable Informant Selections 
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Reasons for Not Reaching the Proficiency Criterion 
We also explored the possibility that the 52% of children who did not meet 
criterion were employing alternative yet consistent strategies regarding informant 
selections. There were a number of potential strategies that could have interfered with 
children’s formation of an association, or inference of a rule, in the number of trials 
available to them. For example, children may have preferred a particular informant, they 
may have alternated their choices between the sides, or they may not have used any 
strategy at all. A chi-square test of independence showed no evidence of an overall 
preference for either informant (ꭓ2 (1) = 0.18, p = .675) or of any particular age group 
(years) having a preference for either informant (ꭓ2 (4) = 2.10, p = .717). To explore 
whether children had any preferences for copying or not copying the side they selected 
on the previous trial we conducted further chi-square tests of independence. These 
revealed no evidence of preference for either copying or not copying the side selected 
on the previous trial (ꭓ2 (1) = 0.02, p = .895) and no evidence of that any age group 
preferred one of these choices (ꭓ2 (4) = 3.15, p = .533). These results suggest that it is 
unlikely that children who did not reach criterion were using a consistent alternative 
strategy for informant selections. 
Discussion 
To make best use of learning from others, learning should be targeted towards 
those who possess the most relevant knowledge or experience. Adult humans’ skill at 
identifying appropriate sources of social information and tracking ‘who knows’ has 
been attributed to the use of explicitly metacognitive SLSs (Dunstone & Caldwell, 
2018; Heyes, 2016c). Such capacities offer a great deal of potential in terms of 
revolutionising the strategic use of social information, relative to the use of implicit 
SLSs. Despite this, there have been few attempts to explore the presence or emergence 
of these abilities in children. It has been argued that explicitly metacognitive SLSs are 
what set human learning apart from that of animals and that such a capacity may be 
responsible for distinctively human cumulative culture. Thus, the current study set out 
to track the development of the capacity to use explicitly metacognitive SLSs in 4- to 8-
year-old children relative to an alternative learning process (their reliance on implicit 
SLSs).  
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To differentiate the SLSs that children have the capacity to use, we investigated 
whether there were any age-related changes that could reflect a switch from the use of 
implicit SLSs to explicitly metacognitive SLSs. To do this we employed a paradigm 
more commonly used in non-human primate research. We exposed children to iterated 
trials in which they could reach a proficiency criterion either by learning an association, 
inferring a rule, or making a causal interpretation based on mentalistic reasoning about 
others’ knowledge. Following a switch in the scenario, to continue to be successful, 
children were required to explicitly reason others’ perceptual access to a critical event 
and assess their suitability as a source of information. The switch was intended to 
generate a conflict between the response favoured by simple associations and the 
response favoured by a mentalistic understanding of why another’s behaviour is 
informative. If children were reasoning others’ suitability as a source of knowledge 
based on their perceptual access, we expected that they would continue to be successful 
on switch trials. However, if children were relying on implicit SLSs, we expected that 
they would struggle to continue to be successful in switch trials, as use of associations, 
or inferred rules, that were predictive of success in the pre-switch trials would no longer 
be appropriate. Thus, high performance in the switch trials would be consistent with use 
of reasoning-based explicitly metacognitive SLSs. 
The results of this study demonstrate that it is possible to differentiate the use of 
implicit and explicitly metacognitive SLSs empirically. Overall, we found that the 
children who reached the proficiency criterion selected the knowledgeable informant in 
significantly more switch trials than children who did not reach criterion. This 
suggested that at least some of the children who met criterion were explicitly reasoning 
about the informants’ perceptual access to identify which informant was 
knowledgeable. Children who did not meet criterion selected the knowledgeable 
informant significantly less often than children who met criterion, suggesting that they 
were less likely to have reasoned the informants’ perceptual access, or recognised the 
value of the information that they could provide. The behaviour of these children was 
not wholly consistent with either having formed an association, inferred a rule, or used 
an appropriate reasoning-based strategy, any of which would have been expected to 
generate success in the pre-switch phase. Accordingly, their informant selections in the 
switch trials were also less selective. To investigate whether there were age-related 
changes that indicated differences in the learning processes underlying children’s 
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selections, we analysed the switch trial performance of those who met criterion. Our 
discussion will focus on the switch trial performance of children who reached the 
proficiency criterion, though first, we will consider explanations for why so many 
children failed to reach the proficiency criterion. 
It is not trivial that 52% of children did not reach the proficiency criterion. It is 
important to note, however, that we were not expecting all children to do so. The task 
required children to form an association, or infer a rule, very quickly. In order to get 
five consecutive correct trials, a successful rule would need to be inferred, or an 
association firmly established, by only the sixth trial, given that we had set a cut-off 
point at ten trials. This was quite a high expectation for young children. However, it 
would not have been practical to have children complete more pre-switch trials. 
Children can only stay focused on a single task for a limited time, and it was critical for 
our results that they retained motivation to complete the final switch phase of the task. It 
is of course possible that some of the children who did not reach criterion had indeed 
formed an association, or inferred a successful rule, by the later pre-switch trials beyond 
the point at which they could have reached the proficiency criterion. We found no 
evidence that the children who did not reach criterion were using any alternative yet 
consistent strategies in the pre-switch trials upon which to base their informant 
selections. Therefore, the failure to form an association, or infer a rule, within the 
available number of trials was likely due to random selections. Similarly, there is no 
evidence that these children had a causal understanding based on mentalistic reasoning 
about the informants’ knowledge. It is possible that the no-risk nature of the pre-switch 
trials and that children were rewarded after every selection may have resulted in a low 
motivation to identify the knowledgeable informant. Always receiving positive 
feedback in the pre-switch phase may have limited children’s motivation to identify the 
knowledgeable informant. Yet, it was arguably beneficial that the knowledgeable 
informant was the only person to provide feedback regarding the location of the reward. 
It reduced the potential for problems to arise as a result of the ignorant informant either 
‘guessing’ correctly or being consistently incorrect. Children may have become 
confused in either such case, as guessing correctly may have confounded the formation 
of associations and being wrong 100% of the time is very unlikely. If we had chosen for 
the ignorant informant to provide feedback in the pre-switch phase, we would have 
required a much larger number of pre-switch trials for children to learn an association or 
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infer a rule. In contrast, in the switch phase we chose to have the ignorant informant 
always reveal the non-target location if they were selected so that there was a clear 
consequence for choosing the ignorant informant. 
Age-Related Transition From Implicit to Explicitly Metacognitive SLSs 
We found that of those who met criterion, older children sought information 
from a knowledgeable informant over an ignorant informant significantly more often 
than younger children in the switch trials. This developmental trend was consistent with 
our prediction that there would be age-related differences in the SLSs underpinning 
success in the pre-switch trials. We propose that these results reveal a relatively late 
age-related transition from the use of implicit SLSs to the use of explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs. Such a finding is also consistent with evidence from a previous 
study (Blakey et al., 2020, Chapter 3) that showed that children’s information seeking 
was not driven by reasoned understanding of the information required to identify 
appropriate sources of information until 7 to 8 years of age. That older children in the 
present study selected the knowledgeable informant more often suggests that they had 
the capacity to assess others’ suitability as sources of knowledge based upon their 
perceptual access (as inferred from personal experience). In contrast, at least some of 
the younger children who had succeeded in the pre-switch trials appeared to have done 
so using visually salient, yet superficial, cues such as colour or side to learn a simple 
association or infer a rule. However, such associations or rules were no longer 
appropriate in the switch trials. This offers an explanation for why younger children 
made fewer selections of the knowledgeable informant in the switch trials despite 
reaching criterion. Reasoning-based information seeking therefore appears to be 
cognitively challenging, and its relatively late development indicates that the 
metacognitive capacities required may preclude younger children from identifying the 
most appropriate source of social information. Therefore, if younger children appear to 
be relying upon imperfect implicit SLSs in place of explicitly reasoning others’ 
perceptual access, it may be that they have not yet developed the necessary 
metacognitive capacities to support explicitly metacognitive SLSs. Specifically, 
younger children might not yet understand that perceptual access grants privileged 
knowledge, or if they do, they may not appreciate that this renders an individual a 
valuable source of information. Though we propose that adults use explicitly 
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metacognitive reasoning, we recognise that once adults have had extensive experience, 
they may switch to using efficient implicit rules (Saling & Phillips, 2007) even if they 
can, in theory, explicitly understand. However, we do not believe that is the case for the 
children in this study due to the very limited number of trials to which children were 
exposed. 
Children who met criterion after only five pre-switch trials selected the 
knowledgeable informant significantly more often in the switch trials than both children 
who took more than five pre-switch trials to reach criterion, and children who did not 
reach criterion. However, there was no difference between children who did not reach 
criterion and children who met criterion after more than five trials. These results suggest 
that the two groups of criterion-passers were employing different SLSs. Those who met 
criterion after only five trials continued to select the knowledgeable informant in the 
switch trials. As outlined above, we believe this is indicative of reasoning the 
informants’ knowledge on the basis of their perceptual access. In contrast, those who 
required more than five trials to reach criterion were relatively less successful in 
identifying the knowledgeable informant in the switch trials, which could suggest a 
reliance on implicit SLSs. We do not claim that all of the children in this group were 
relying on implicit strategies, as it is possible that some were reasoning the perceptual 
access of the informants (albeit dependent on task experience to make this inference) 
while others may have reached criterion by forming an association between superficial 
visual cues and success. Such disparity could explain why we see an average 
performance that is greater (though not significantly so) than children who did not reach 
criterion but lower than those who met criterion in the minimum number of trials. 
In the final two switch trials we removed the necessity to understand the 
properties of the frames by removing them and affording perceptual access via the 
knowledgeable informant facing towards, and the ignorant informant facing away from, 
the critical event. Removing the frames also allowed exploration into whether 
participants were truly responding to the informants’ perceptual access, or whether they 
had simply made the connection between success and the frame, or frame colour, that 
they could have been continuing to use as a cue to predict success. We found no effect 
of the presence of the frames in any of our analyses suggesting that children who were 
reasoning the perceptual access of the informants continued to do so when the frames 
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were removed. This also suggests that these children were unlikely to have been making 
selections based on an association, or rule, related to the colour of the frame. Equally, 
children who were not reasoning perceptual access by way of the frames also appear not 
to have been reasoning the perceptual access of the informants when perceptual access 
was portrayed in the more visually salient manner of the informants facing and not 
facing the critical hiding event. If we had found that children performed better when 
perceptual access was afforded by the informants facing or not facing the critical event, 
then it may have been that children recognised the value of the information offered by 
others on the basis of perceptual access but were unable to use their personal experience 
of the properties of the frames to determine others’ perceptual access and thus 
knowledge state. Yet this is not supported by the results; rather, it appears that those 
children who recognised the value of perceptual access as a source of knowledge were 
able to use their personal experience of the frames to identify which of the two 
informants had the desired knowledge, showing a similar capacity to that observed in 
human adults (Teufel et al., 2009). 
Due to the nature of the methods we used it was not possible to determine the 
reasons for lower success of either the children who did not reach criterion, or those 
who struggled to switch from using implicit SLSs to using explicitly metacognitive 
ones. It is possible that they lacked the necessary conceptual understanding regarding 
the perceptual access of the informants. Alternatively, they may have possessed this 
understanding but could not use this to deduce which of the informants could provide 
valuable information. As highlighted in the introduction, it may be that younger 
children are able to identify others’ perceptual access but may not yet recognise the 
value of the information that that access grants. Studies such as Robinson et al. (2011) 
have found that when required to choose one of two puppets (knowledgeable vs 
ignorant) young children (4;3- to 5;2-year-olds) were no better than chance at asking the 
puppet with the relevant experience. This supports the theory that younger children do 
not recognise the potential value to themselves of others’ knowledge, despite finding it 
relatively easy to report others’ knowledge based on perceptual experience. Due to the 
apparent cognitive challenge associated with actually using such information, the 
requirement to do so in this task may have precluded many children from selecting the 
appropriate informant. Therefore, it is possible that the children in the current study may 
have been capable of reporting the informants’ knowledge state had we asked them to 
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do so. We believe that our findings highlight just how challenging using explicit 
reasoning about others’ knowledge in the context of social learning is likely to be. 
Assumptions about the use of such strategies in the social learning literature should 
therefore be made and interpreted with extreme caution, especially with regards to the 
capacities of young children or animals. 
The explanation above suggests that it is possible that the younger children do 
understand who has perceptual access, but simply fail to see the relevance of this as a 
means to address their own ignorance. However, it also remains possible that the 
younger children’s failure to show the necessary flexibility of response during the 
switch trials could have arisen for reasons completely unconnected to conceptual 
understanding. In particular, this could potentially be explained as a result of limited 
capacities for inhibition, leading to perseverative errors which would cause children to 
persist with a previously successful response in spite of knowledge of an updated rule 
(e.g., see examples from the Dimension Change Card Sort Test, Diamond, 2013; Zelazo 
et al., 1996). However, we would argue that children who recognised the significance of 
perceptual access should in fact give this rule primacy, over alternative interpretations 
focussed on one or other (or some combination) of the other cues which were only 
arbitrarily linked to success. Thus, if children were perseverating with a response other 
than one driven by the perceptual-access rule, this seems to suggest that at the very least 
they were attending to cues other than those associated to perceptual access.  
Explicit Verbal Reasoning 
Our analysis of children’s responses to the explicit verbal reasoning question 
revealed that older children and children who met criterion were rated as having given 
better reasoned responses. However, when switch trial performance was included as a 
predictor, the effects of both age and criterion were eclipsed, and we discovered that 
children who selected the knowledgeable informant more often in the switch trials were 
also more likely to have been rated as having provided appropriate verbal reasoning for 
their choices. Successful identification of the appropriate informant appears to have 
been driven by explicitly metacognitive SLSs regardless of age or whether children met 
the proficiency criterion. Children’s responses to our explicit reasoning question offered 
an insight into their understanding of the benefits of perceptual access on others’ 
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knowledge. The results gained from children’s responses are consistent with the 
interpretation that some children were indeed employing reasoning-based understanding 
regarding others’ perceptual access to assess their suitability as a source of social 
information. This was true irrespective of age, supporting the explanation that selections 
of the knowledgeable informant were driven by an understanding of why another is an 
appropriate source of knowledge. Similarly, Butler et al. (2020) recently reported that 6- 
and 7-year-old children’s ability to select information on the basis of claims that have 
been verified (via perceptual access) is related to a developing ability to offer 
appropriate justification for why they made those selections. 
Conclusions 
The results of this study indicate that it is possible to differentiate implicit and 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs empirically. The methods we employed, drawn from 
existing paradigms in the non-human primate literature, facilitated investigation into the 
developmental trajectory of the transition from use of one process to the other. We 
found that, of all those who met the proficiency criterion, older children were more 
likely to seek information from the knowledgeable informant in the switch trials, 
indicating that they may have taken a different approach to the task. The pattern of 
results suggested that some of the younger children who had succeeded in the pre-
switch trials had done so by forming a simple association, or inferring a rule, based on 
superficial visual cues. Older children were more likely to have explicitly reasoned 
others’ perceptual access. They appeared to have used personal experience to infer 
others’ perceptual access and thus assess their suitability as sources of knowledge. This 
ability was rare in younger children. Rather, younger children’s selections of both the 
knowledgeable and ignorant informants suggested that they were continuing to rely 
upon imperfect implicit strategies learned during the pre-switch trials that were no 
longer appropriate. Moreover, we discovered that children who sought information from 
the knowledgeable informant more often also provided more appropriate verbal 
reasoning for their choices, irrespective of age. This supports the interpretation that 
informant selections were driven by an understanding of why another is an appropriate 
source of knowledge. This disparity in children’s approaches to selecting informants is 
consistent with previous findings (Blakey et al., 2020, Chapter 3) that indicated an age-
related transition from the use of implicit heuristic biases to explicitly metacognitive 
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SLSs. The similar developmental trajectory identified in the current study suggests that 
the capacity to reason about others’ knowledge develops relatively late in childhood. 
This late development supports Heyes's (2016c) proposal that such capacities are 
experience-dependent. The developmental trend captured within our results may also be 
indicative of a significant cognitive challenge associated with employing explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs. Hence, these metacognitive capacities may preclude younger 
children from recognising the value of others’ knowledge. Therefore, we argue that 
being able to fully benefit from others’ knowledge appears to be dependent, at least in 
part, on the ability to assess the others’ suitability as sources of knowledge based upon 
their perceptual access to desired information. The relatively late development of 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs suggests that such capacities are unlikely to be observed 
in animals, offering credence to proposals that such capacities may be involved in 
distinctively human cumulative culture. If human cumulative culture is indeed 
underpinned by explicitly metacognitive SLSs, then the degree of flexibility afforded by 
an explicit understanding of others’ mental states, with regards to assessing others’ 
suitability as informants, may offer the significant advantage in social information use 







The overall aim of this thesis was to investigate cognitive mechanisms that drive 
the development of distinctively human cumulative culture. In particular, the studies 
reported in the preceding three chapters were concerned with investigating fundamental 
questions related to the development of cognitive capacities for social information use. 
Their premise was to look for age-related changes in children’s social information use 
in response to particular cognitive challenges that had been identified as being 
potentially relevant in the context of real world cases of cumulative culture. 
While recent evidence has highlighted some capacity for cumulative culture in 
non-humans (Jesmer et al., 2018; Sasaki & Biro, 2017; Schofield et al., 2018) its 
expression appears to be context-specific and relatively restricted compared to human 
adults (Caldwell & Millen, 2008b; Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018; Tomasello et al., 1993). 
A variety of sociocognitive mechanisms have been proposed as necessary prerequisites 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Dean et al., 2014; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Tennie et al., 
2009). However, many of the proposed prerequisite mechanisms, such as imitation and 
selective social learning, are common to both humans and non-humans. Therefore, they 
cannot fully account for the differences between these populations with regard to the 
capacity for cumulative culture. This thesis adopted a developmental approach, 
examining the ontogeny of sociocognitive mechanisms, to assess whether there is a 
particular reason, from a cognitive perspective, for this discontinuity between humans 
and non-humans. 
In this thesis I have investigated the feasibility of an alternative proposal that 
attributes the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture to the capacity to employ 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c). This 
proposal suggests that these reasoning-based strategies could enable learners to 
recognise the potential value, to themselves, of information provided by others. The 
capacity to recognise the relevance or value of social information would likely offer a 
significant advantage in effective social information use. Given that human adults are 
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assumed to have the capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs, and that the social 
information use of both non-humans and young children is proposed to be driven by 
implicit SLSs (Heyes, 2017), it follows that the capacity for explicitly metacognitive 
SLSs develops during the course of childhood. Therefore, to investigate the 
developmental trajectory of the capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs this thesis 
examined age-related changes in children’s social information use. Changes in 
children’s use of social information could indicate that they are employing different 
cognitive capacities at different ages. Therefore, I designed the studies in such a way 
that it would be possible to establish whether children’s social information use was 
driven by reasoned understanding of its value (explicitly metacognitive SLSs) or 
whether it could be explained by more implicit adaptive heuristics (implicit SLSs). 
Looking at whether age-related changes in social information use coincide with 
advances in cognitive development could offer an insight into the underlying 
mechanisms that are required and help to explain why cumulative culture appears to be 
restricted to humans. That is, if we find particular ages at which children make 
significant advances in their appropriate social information use and these occur at a 
similar age to the development of particular cognitive capacities, then those capacities 
may be necessary prerequisites. If these capacities emerge late in development, this may 
indicate that they are beyond the capabilities of non-humans and therefore could offer 
an explanation for the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture. Indeed, I proposed 
that the capabilities of younger children in terms of social information use are likely to 
also be shared with non-humans. 
In this chapter I will present an overview of the key findings from each of the 
studies presented. I will then discuss these findings more broadly, relating them to the 
existing literature and highlighting the novel contribution they make. Finally, I will 
consider some of the limitations that could be associated with the approaches taken in 
this thesis and outline avenues for further research. 
Taking Account of Others’ Goals 
The first cognitive challenge that I identified as being potentially relevant for 
social information use was the ability to account for others’ goals. Having the ability to 
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understand and take into account others’, potentially conflicting, motivations is likely 
necessary for recognising whether the information they have provided is valuable and 
relevant for achieving one’s own goal. Human adults regularly use their understanding 
of others’ goals, relative to their own, to identify and use the most relevant social 
information (Caldwell, 2018; Vélez & Gweon, 2019), yet there is little evidence of such 
capacities in children or non-humans. Thus, investigating the developmental trajectory 
of these abilities and the cognitive challenges they pose to young children (and by 
logical extension non-humans) could advance our understanding of the cognitive 
capacities that are necessary for human-like cumulative culture. 
Therefore, in chapter two I investigated age-related changes in 3- to 7-year-old 
children’s ability to use social information by taking into account others’ goals relative 
to their own. In particular, this study considered whether children’s abilities to interpret 
and use social information were influenced by the degree to which others’ goals aligned 
with their own. To do this I employed a novel paradigm which assessed children’s 
understanding of others’ goals relative to their own, their ability to use this knowledge 
to interpret the outcomes of social demonstrations, and their ability to apply this 
understanding in order to use the social information effectively. Crucially, in contrast to 
previous social learning paradigms, this study specifically compared cases in which the 
goals of the demonstrator and the participant were aligned with cases in which their 
goals were not aligned. In this task children observed a demonstrator select a capsule 
from one of two buckets, the demonstrator peeked inside and chose to accept or reject 
the capsule. Children could then choose to copy the demonstrator’s selection or shift 
and choose a capsule from the alternative location. To interpret the outcome of the 
demonstration children had to take into account the demonstrator’s goal and recognise 
that the demonstrator had made an informed choice (based on access to information). 
To make best use of the available information, children needed to recognise the value of 
the information that had been provided in the demonstration in respect to their own goal 
while also taking into account the goal of the demonstrator. Therefore, even if children 
understood the task goals and correctly inferred the outcome of the demonstration, this 
would not necessarily mean that they would be able to use this information 
appropriately. 
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 The results revealed that children were capable of understanding and 
representing the demonstrators’ goals from around 4 years old and could reliably 
interpret the outcome of the demonstrators’ behaviour from around 6 years old. This 
was true whether the demonstrator’s goal conflicted with their own or not. Therefore, 
contrary to expectations, the results indicated that the degree to which others’ goals 
aligned with their own did not influence children’s ability to understand the goals, or 
their ability to interpret the outcome of others’ behaviour. Finding what appeared to be 
an age-related jump from understanding others’ goals to reliably interpreting the 
demonstration outcome, indicated that this ability was dependent on advancing 
cognitive development. The age-related change did indeed correspond with advances in 
cognitive development reported in the literature. Previous research claims that children 
do not demonstrate understanding of how knowledge is formed with consideration of 
the role of access to information until around 6 years (Kloo & Rohwer, 2012). 
Therefore, 6- and 7-year-olds’ more reliable interpretations of the demonstration 
outcome may have been related to a cognitive advancement with regard to 
understanding that the demonstrator had had perceptual access to the contents of the 
capsule and was therefore informed. 
The results also showed evidence of the expected age-related improvement in 
children’s appropriate social information use. Here too, the alignment of the 
demonstrators’ and participants’ goals was not found to influence performance. 
However, even the oldest children’s performance was not particularly high, suggesting 
that the task paradigm was more challenging than anticipated. At first glance the age-
related improvement in appropriate information use could be seen as evidence for 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs. However, the improvements were restricted to cases in 
which the appropriate response was to shift. Thus, this pattern of results suggested that 
even the older children may not have been using explicitly metacognitive SLSs. By 
contrast, the near ceiling performance of a small group of adult participants provided a 
useful comparison for what to expect from a participant who is expected to have the 
capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs. Thus, the distinct difference between the 
performance of the oldest children and the adults supports the interpretation that some 
children were not using explicitly metacognitive strategies. In the absence of the 
capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs, children’s choices may have been driven by 
implicit biases or motivations towards exploration. Indeed, an alternative explanation 
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for this pattern of responses suggests that they might be an artefact of the binary choice 
task. Recent evidence indicates that children often choose to explore even in situations 
in which they might benefit from exploitation (Blanco & Sloutsky, 2020). This may be 
due to a trade-off between explore and exploit motivations (Atkinson et al., 2020), 
which overall, in the context of this task, would favour shift responses. If so, it is 
possible that children may have recognised the value of the social demonstration, but 
the motivation to explore may have overridden the motivation to achieve the goal, 
making it difficult to ascertain the reason for particular decisions.  
The findings of this study make some key contributions to the literature. First, 
for children aged 4 years and older the degree to which others’ goals align with their 
own does not appear to influence children’s ability to understand others’ goals, their 
ability to interpret the outcome of others’ behaviour, or their ability to use social 
information. Second, it appears that taking others’ goals in account at all in appropriate 
social information use is cognitively challenging. Even at 7 years old children’s 
performance did not demonstrate an adult-like ability to account for others’ goals in 
information use. Thus, even if children have the ability to interpret the content of social 
information, they may still struggle to recognise its value to themselves. 
Overall, chapter two provided some evidence to support the hypothesis that 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs are cognitively challenging and develop relatively late in 
childhood. The significant challenge associated with the ability to use social 
information about others’ goals also provides some support for the hypothesis that it 
depends on cognitive developments that could be beyond the capabilities of non-
humans. 
Appropriate Social Information Seeking 
While children’s use of social information can indicate to some degree their 
understanding of it, it is difficult to determine from social information use alone 
whether children have recognised its value and are indeed employing explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs. Looking at how they seek out or select information to attend to 
offers more potential in terms of establishing whether they recognise its value. Indeed, 
in reality, learners are rarely passive recipients of information that is relevant for 
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achieving a specific goal. Rather, learners usually have to actively seek out information 
from a variety of potential others who are in a position to provide useful information. 
Therefore, chapters three and four examined the development of children’s ability to 
seek out information from appropriate social sources.  
Recognising What Information is Required 
In chapter three I investigated another cognitive challenge, this time related to 
the ability to recognise what information is required to achieve a particular goal. Being 
able to recognise what information is needed to solve a particular problem may be key 
to appropriate social information seeking as it might enable learners to identify who 
could provide relevant and useful information. Furthermore, having an understanding of 
what information is needed also suggests that learners would know what to do with the 
information once they have acquired it (Baldwin & Moses, 1996). Investigating 
children’s social information seeking offers the potential to determine the age at which 
children develop the capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs. As well as this, it 
might provide an insight into the alternative learning processes (i.e., implicit SLSs, such 
as model-based biases) children rely on prior to its development. 
The study presented in chapter three looked at age-related changes in 3-to-8-
year-old’s ability to seek out and use social information appropriately, based on an 
understanding of what information was needed to solve a particular problem and who 
could provide that information. To do this I looked at who children chose to seek 
information from, and how they then used that information, as a means to determine 
whether their selections were based on an understanding of the potential value of the 
information the model could provide (in this case, access to relevant information), or on 
superficial, yet salient, demonstrator characteristics such as age or gender. The task was 
designed such that relying on model-based biases (implicit SLSs) would be 
inappropriate. So, if children were seeking out information appropriately, based on a 
reasoned-understanding of the value of the information that others could provide, then 
model-based biases should be overridden in favour of reasoning-based strategies 
(explicitly metacognitive SLSs). To assess this, in each trial children were presented 
with a novel problem in which they had to choose between two coloured keys to unlock 
a box locked with a coloured padlock. Before selecting a key, children had to select one 
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of four potential demonstrators (an adult and a child of each gender) to watch a video of 
them unlocking a box. One target demonstrator faced the same problem (combination of 
padlock and keys) as the child, while three non-target demonstrators faced equivalent 
but different problems. After watching a successful or unsuccessful demonstration 
children selected one of the keys to try and unlock their box. Appropriate information 
seeking required children to reason about the information they needed to solve the 
problem and which of the demonstrators could provide that information (i.e., who had 
the same problem). Manipulating the age and gender of the target and non-target 
demonstrators across trials enabled exploration of model-based biases in children who 
were not seeking social information appropriately. 
As expected, the results revealed an age-related improvement in children’s 
appropriate information seeking and appropriate information use. As predicted, older 
and younger children appeared to approach the task differently. Older children (7 and 8 
years) appeared to have been able to reason about the information that they needed, and 
to have recognised that the target demonstrator faced the same problem as themselves, 
so the information that they could provide was relevant. That older children also knew 
what to do with the information that they got, as reflected in their high rate of 
appropriate information use, suggested that they may have understood the potential 
value of the information prior to selecting a demonstrator. By contrast, younger children 
(3 to 6 years) appeared to rely on imperfect model-based biases for gender congruence 
when they struggled with information seeking. These children tended to select target 
and non-target demonstrators who were the same gender as themselves. So too, their 
less effective use of social information suggested that they had not recognised what 
information was needed, had not used reasoning-based strategies to select the 
demonstrator, and therefore did not know what to do with the information that they 
received.  
Interestingly, despite relatively low rates of appropriate information seeking, the 
appropriate information use of 6-year-olds who selected the target demonstrator was 
comparable to that of 7- and 8-year-olds. This suggested that those 6-year-olds who 
selected the target demonstrator might have been driven by reasoned understanding of 
the relevance of the information. The developmental trajectory of appropriate 
information seeking, and use, pointed to cognitive advances in explicit metacognition 
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being involved in the ability to recognise the value of social information. Such advances 
are related to the ability to reflect on one’s own knowledge and, importantly, the ability 
to recognise gaps in one’s knowledge to identify learning needs. This ability has been 
found to emerge at around 6 years old (Rohwer et al., 2012). 
Overall, the results of chapter three indicated that children’s capacity to use 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs develops relatively late in childhood. The developmental 
trajectory suggested that, in this context, the transition from using implicit SLSs to 
using explicitly metacognitive SLSs occurred between 6 and 7 years old. The findings 
also suggest that appropriate information seeking might have been overlooked as a 
significant challenge involved in fully benefitting from others’ knowledge. Importantly, 
in contrast to the study presented in chapter two, the methods employed in this study 
made it possible to determine with greater certainty whether children were more likely 
to have reasoned the value of social information, or whether they had instead made 
selections based on superficial yet salient characteristics such as age or gender. 
Identifying Who Knows 
Chapter four aimed to address whether children can use explicitly metacognitive 
SLSs in cases in which it is necessary to consider others’ mental states. In particular, 
chapter four looked at the developmental trajectory of 4- to 8-year-old’s ability to 
identify potential informants’ suitability as sources of information based on an 
understanding of the informant’s knowledge, which in this case was privileged 
perceptual access.  
This study used a novel methodology adapted from studies of social 
understanding in non-human primates. Children were first given experience of two 
different frames, a semi-opaque one which permitted perceptual access and an opaque 
one which did not. From a distance the opacity of the frames looked the same – though 
they were distinguishable by the colour of the frame. They were then exposed to 
repeated trials in which they had to choose which of two informants to ask for 
information about a critical event during which the knowledgeable informant was 
behind the semi-opaque frame and the ignorant informant was behind the opaque frame. 
The purpose of these trials was to give children the opportunity to learn by forming an 
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association or inferring a rule based on a superficial, yet salient, visual cue such as the 
side of the table. Following these trials there was a ‘switch’ in the task scenario. 
Switching generated a conflict between the response favoured by simple associations 
and the response favoured by a mentalistic understanding of why another’s behaviour is 
informative (i.e., who had perceptual access and therefore who was knowledgeable). 
The switch occurred once a proficiency criterion (five consecutive correct responses) 
was reached, or after 10 trials. Following the switch, continued use of an association, or 
inferred rule, would result in imperfect responses, leading to lower success. If children 
were reasoning about others’ suitability as a source of knowledge based on their 
perceptual access, they were expected to continue to select the knowledgeable 
informant on switch trials. But, if they were relying on implicit SLSs, they were 
expected to struggle to continue to be successful in switch trials, because using any 
associations, or inferred rules, that predicted success in the pre-switch trials would no 
longer be appropriate. 
The results revealed that of those who met criterion, older children were more 
likely to select the knowledgeable informant in the switch phase trials than younger 
children. This suggested that older children were more likely to have the capacity to 
assess the informants’ suitability as sources of knowledge. This pattern of results 
suggested that some of the younger children who had succeeded in the pre-switch trials 
had done so by forming a simple association, or inferring a rule, based on superficial 
visual cues. Older children appeared to be more likely to have explicitly reasoned 
others’ perceptual access. They appeared to have used their personal experience of the 
properties of the frames to infer others’ perceptual access and thus assess their 
suitability as sources of knowledge. This ability was rare in younger children. It may be 
that younger children did not yet understand that perceptual access grants privileged 
knowledge, or if they did, they may not have the capacity to appreciate that this renders 
an individual a valuable source of information. The age-related differences in children’s 
approach to selecting informants was consistent with the expectation that the ability to 
explicitly reason about others’ knowledge develops relatively late in childhood, 
supporting the view that these capacities are experience-dependent. 
Overall, the findings of chapter four were consistent with those in chapter three. 
They demonstrated that it is possible to differentiate use of implicit and explicitly 
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metacognitive SLSs empirically. Again, the results indicated a relatively late age-related 
transition from the use of implicit to explicitly metacognitive SLSs. 
The Developmental Trajectory of Explicitly Metacognitive SLSs 
Across all three studies presented in this thesis children demonstrated age-
related improvements in their social information use. These improvements appear to 
reflect differences in the cognitive capacities that children were employing. Broadly, 
younger children’s performance indicated that they were likely relying on implicit SLSs 
based on relatively crude and imperfect heuristic biases, associations, or inferred rules. 
Older children on the other hand, performed in a way that is more similar to the 
performance we would expect from adults who are assumed to have the capacity for 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs. Therefore, these results indicate that the capacity for 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs, in line with predictions, develops relatively late in 
childhood (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018; Heyes, 2016c). This late development is also 
consistent with the hypothesis that explicitly metacognitive SLSs are experience-
dependent (Heyes, 2018a). The developmental trend suggests that using explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs is cognitively challenging. 
The age-related changes in social information use, that I have attributed to 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs, appear to coincide with cognitive developments related 
to the ability for explicit metacognition. Children’s metacognitive ability – their ability 
to accurately recognise and report their own state of knowledge or ignorance – advances 
at around 6 years old (S. R. Beck et al., 2012; Kloo et al., 2017; Rohwer et al., 2012; 
Wimmer et al., 1988). This explicit metacognition is proposed to be unique to humans 
(Metcalfe, 2015) and is different to the early metacognitive abilities reported in younger 
children and non-humans (Beran et al., 2015; Goupil et al., 2016; Robinson et al., 
2008). The awareness of states of knowledge and ignorance afforded by explicit 
metacognition might enable reasoning about what information is needed to achieve a 
particular goal, and who has the potential to provide that information (due to their 
access to relevant information – through experience or perceptual access). In other 
words, facilitating recognition of the value of social information. This is further 
supported by the evidence gained from asking children to verbalise the strategies they 
were using during the tasks. In chapters three and four children’s performance on the 
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task was found to be related to their ability to provide more appropriate verbal 
reasoning for their choices. That is, children who performed better (more appropriate 
information seeking and information use) also provided better reasoned responses. This 
is consistent with the interpretation that some children were indeed employing 
reasoning-based explicitly metacognitive SLSs based on an understanding of the value 
of the information. 
If the ability to recognise the value, or potential value, of social information is 
driven by advances in metacognitive ability, then this might also explain why younger 
children appear to be precluded from recognising the value of others’ knowledge. 
Younger children’s apparent reliance on implicit SLSs in the absence of the capacity for 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs suggests that they are unlikely to have understood the 
value of the information. Without this understanding, younger children (and by logical 
extension non-humans) are less likely to use available social information appropriately 
and effectively. 
Having the capacity to recognise the value, to themselves, of social information 
therefore appears to offer a key advantage in social information use that may drive 
human cumulative culture beyond the capabilities of non-humans. As such, the 
characteristic improvement over generations, that we see in adult humans’ cumulative 
culture, could therefore be explained by learners’ understanding of the value of the 
social information that is available from previous generations. If learners understand the 
value of the information and its relevance to their goal, then it may not matter what 
form that information comes in. By this I mean that having the ability to recognise the 
value of social information may make the context in which it is available less important. 
This may help to explain why the scope of cumulative culture in humans stands in such 
stark contrast to the limited and context-specific cases reported in non-humans. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In this section, I will outline the limitations of the findings reported in this thesis 
and the scope for further clarification. Of particular interest is the possibility of 
establishing additional evidence for the implication of specific cognitive developments 
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such as metacognition in children’s social information use and whether explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs are within the capacity of non-humans. 
Age as a Proxy for Cognitive Development 
All three of the studies presented in this thesis used children’s age as a proxy for 
cognitive development. Therefore, it is not possible to say with certainty whether a 
particular cognitive development is responsible for, or implicated in, the emergence of 
the capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs. Although I have outlined previously that 
the findings suggest that advances in metacognitive ability, that occur at around 6 years 
old, appear to facilitate children’s understanding of the relevance and value of social 
information, it is important to acknowledge that other cognitive developments might be 
implicated in explicitly metacognitive SLSs. For example, consider advances in 
executive functions such as inhibitory control or working memory. The development of 
inhibitory control does suggest that children are reliably able to inhibit a prepotent 
response by around 6 years old (Gerstadt et al., 1994). In the context of this thesis, if the 
development of inhibitory control was involved, this may have aided children in their 
ability to overcome responses related to heuristic biases. However, executive functions 
tend to develop gradually (Carlson & Moses, 2001). So, if for instance, there had been a 
more gradual development in appropriate information use in a particular context, it 
might have indicated that children’s performance had improved due to increases in 
general executive function capabilities. However, the step-changes in performance 
found at particular ages appears more consistent with the idea that children are making 
use of a specific cognitive capacity that comes online at that age. 
Given that the developmental trajectories of different cognitive capacities 
overlap it is possible that some of these cognitive developments play a supportive role 
in the development of metacognitive abilities. Indeed, the metacognitive abilities I refer 
to above have been proposed to rely upon prior theory of mind understanding 
(Carruthers, 2009). However, to a certain extent, the specific cognitive development is 
not the most interesting finding. The key point to note is that the results indicated that 
younger and older children appeared to tackle the tasks differently, suggesting that there 
was a fundamental difference in the way they were responding to social information. 
The developmental trajectory of the age-related changes in children’s social information 
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use indicated a relatively late development of the capacity for explicitly metacognitive 
SLSs. Therefore, even if other cognitive abilities are implicated to some degree in 
children’s ability to reflect on the value of social information, that we do not see 
advances until relatively late suggests that this capacity is either experience-dependent, 
or dependent on a relatively mature human cognitive system. 
Using age as a proxy for cognitive development was the intended design of these 
studies. However, more clarity regarding whether particular cognitive developments 
such as metacognition are implicated could be gained through employing additional 
control measures such as directly testing children’s mental state understanding and 
metacognitive abilities. For example, alongside tasks such as those in the preceding 
chapters, participants could also undergo a battery of standardised cognitive tests. If 
performance on such tests is correlated with appropriate responses in the social 
information use tasks, it could bolster the argument for the involvement of that capacity, 
though it would not confirm whether that capacity is a necessary prerequisite. Another 
alternative way to establish the implication of particular cognitive capacities in 
distinctively human cumulative culture would be to restrict access to capacities of 
interest in human adults (Dunstone & Caldwell, 2018). For example, assessing the role 
of explicit metacognition in the kind of flexible social learning that is presumed 
necessary for distinctively human cumulative culture requires the availability of 
metacognitive capacities to be manipulated. However, the capacity for explicit 
metacognition cannot be removed experimentally, therefore, one way to assess its 
involvement could be restricting access to the explicit cognitive processes it depends on. 
In particular, given that executive functions are proposed to rely on similar explicit 
cognitive processes, employing dual task methods that tax executive functions could act 
as a proxy for restricting explicit metacognition (see approach taken by Dunstone et al., 
2021). If explicit cognitive processes, such as explicit metacognition, are involved in the 
kind of social learning required for the emergence of cumulative culture, the expectation 
would be that restricting their availability would reduce the capacity for flexible social 
learning decisions. 
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A Case of Indirect Evidence 
This thesis has repeatedly claimed that evidence of the late development of 
explicitly metacognitive SLSs in children suggests that they are likely to be beyond the 
capabilities of non-humans. This conclusion seems plausible and is consistent with the 
fact that much of the literature on SLSs in non-humans can be retrospectively attributed 
to implicit SLSs (Heyes, 2017; Heyes & Pearce, 2015). However, some researchers may 
argue that the lack of direct evidence that non-humans cannot use explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs is insufficient for making this claim. Indeed, the conclusions drawn 
in this thesis in relation to the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture are naturally 
based to some extent on conjecture. Therefore, to support the proposal that young 
children and non-humans rely on implicit SLSs in circumstances in which the ability to 
employ explicitly metacognitive SLSs would be advantageous, it might be beneficial to 
assess non-humans directly. If non-humans were to perform in a manner consistent with 
the pattern of results we see in younger children then this would offer further credibility 
to the claims made in this thesis, as well as to the proposal that explicitly metacognitive 
SLSs are implicated in distinctively human cumulative culture. However, such a study 
would likely be difficult to design and extremely challenging to implement.  
To date, there have been no plausible solutions offered with regard to assessing 
explicit knowledge, relative to implicit knowledge, in non-humans. Indeed, this is a 
persistent problem in the study of cognition in non-humans (Gómez et al., 2017). In 
particular, these difficulties relate to problems with testing explicit understanding in 
non-verbal species. In the absence of opportunities to explain to subjects the aim and 
structure of a task, or to ask them directly about their reasoning or their understanding 
of a situation, we cannot be certain about what they might have inferred about the 
challenge presented to them, or what they are aiming to achieve. While extensive 
training can help to establish the goals of a task it considerably restricts any 
interpretations of subsequent performance, inasmuch as it can usually be attributed to 
associations, or rule-like strategies, formed during training. Therefore, the certainty with 
which it would be possible to say whether or not subjects have an explicit understanding 
would be extremely limited. Added to this, claims of metacognition in non-humans 
remain contentious (Carruthers, 2008; Carruthers & Ritchie, 2012). For example, 
Carruthers (2008) argued that the purported metacognitive responses in non-humans 
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could be explainable by simpler cognitive processes such as first-order beliefs or 
deriving a general rule from training conditions. The challenges associated with 
assessing explicit knowledge (and metacognition more broadly) present a considerable 
problem for the hypothesis that non-humans do not have the capacity for explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs. That is, without a suitable way to test these capacities in non-
humans this hypothesis is currently unfalsifiable. However, such obstacles to testing this 
hypothesis in non-human populations reinforces the importance of the more indirect 
approach taken in this thesis. As such, looking to determine the age at which children 
develop the capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs, which cognitive mechanisms 
are likely involved in its development, and whether there is evidence of such cognitive 
mechanisms in non-humans, offers an indirect way to assess the likelihood of non-
humans having the capacity for explicitly metacognitive SLSs. 
Concluding Remarks 
This thesis examined age-related changes in children’s social information use in 
response to particular cognitive challenges as a means to understand the cognitive 
processes that might be implicated in distinctively human cumulative culture. Overall, 
the studies that I have presented in this thesis provide support for the proposal that the 
kind of social information use that affords distinctively human cumulative culture is 
facilitated by explicitly metacognitive SLSs. These reasoning-based strategies appear to 
be driven by an ability to understand the value, or potential value, of social information. 
That is, the flexibility afforded by the ability to recognise its value appears to offer the 
significant advantage in social information use that may drive human cumulative culture 
beyond the capabilities of non-humans. Indications that the development of explicitly 
metacognitive SLSs occurs relatively late in childhood offers credence to the assertion 
that this capacity is likely to be experience-dependent and unlikely to be observed in 
non-humans. Specifically, it appears that experience-dependent metacognitive abilities 
and mental state understanding have a relevant influence on social information use. 
Therefore, if the real world contexts in which we see cumulative culture in humans 
involve cognitive challenges such as those investigated in this thesis, this might explain 
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Verbal Script for Chapter 2 
Same Goals Condition 
1. “You are going to play a game with Rabbit.” 
2. “In the game you are going to be a chef, would you like to wear the chef hat?” 
E1 presents 1st set of buckets with carrots inside. 
3. “Look, we have 2 buckets of carrots, in one of the buckets the carrots are orange 
inside, like this one (E1 shows orange carrot), and in the other bucket the carrots 
have worms inside, like this one (E1 shows worm carrot).” 
4. “You are a chef, so you are looking for the carrots that have orange inside to put in 
your pan (E1 gives pan). And Rabbit likes to eat carrots that are orange inside, so 
Rabbit is looking for carrots with orange inside to put in the basket (E1 presents 
basket).” 
5. “What is inside the carrots that you are looking for?” 
“What is inside the carrots that you are not looking for?” 
6. “What is inside the carrots that Rabbit is looking for?” 
”What is inside the carrots that Rabbit is not looking for?” 
7. “You and Rabbit both have 3 tokens; you need to pay a token into the box before 
you can pick a carrot from one of the buckets.” 
8. “It is Rabbit’s turn first, Rabbit is going to pay a token into the box, and Rabbit is 
going to choose a bucket to pick a carrot from. Rabbit is going to have a peek 
inside the carrot and decide to keep it in the basket, or not keep it and give it to 
me.” 
9. “Now it is your turn.” 
E1 guides child through their turn. 
10. “You can pay a token into the box, and you can pick a carrot from one of the 
buckets, now you can have a peek inside and decide if you want to keep it and put it 
in your pan, or not keep it and give it to me.” 
190 
Child is allowed to accept or reject either kind of carrot, E1 does not provide 
feedback on decisions. 
11. “What was inside the carrot that Rabbit picked? Which bucket did they look in?” 
12. “What was inside the carrot that you picked? Which bucket did you look in?” 
Child keeps any carrots they find in their pan; Rabbit’s carrots stay in basket. 
E1 takes buckets out of sight, refills them, changes lid colours, and randomly swaps 
sides. 
13. “Look you have 2 tokens left; would you like to play the game again?” 
Trial 2 follows same pattern as trial 1 (from step 4). Trial 3 follows trial 2 in same 
pattern. Game finishes after 3 trials. 
14. “How were you deciding which buckets to choose?” 
15. “Were you looking for the same kind of carrots as Rabbit, or a different kind of 
carrots?” 
Different Goals Condition 
1. “You are going to play a game with Bird.” 
2. “In the game you are going to be a chef, would you like to wear the chef hat?” 
E1 presents 1st set of buckets with carrots inside. 
3. “Look, we have 2 buckets of carrots, in one of the buckets the carrots are orange 
inside, like this one (E1 shows orange carrot), and in the other bucket the carrots 
have worms inside, like this one (E1 shows worm carrot).” 
4. “You are a chef, so you are looking for the carrots that have orange inside to put in 
your pan (E1 gives pan). And Bird likes to eat worms, so Bird is looking for carrots 
with worms inside to put in the basket (E1 presents basket).” 
5. “What is inside the carrots that you are looking for?” 
”What is inside the carrots that you are not looking for?” 
6. “What is inside the carrots that Bird is looking for?” 
”What is inside the carrots that Bird is not looking for?” 
7. “You and Bird both have 3 tokens; you need to pay a token into the box before you 
can pick a carrot from one of the buckets.” 
8. “It is Bird’s turn first, Bird is going to pay a token into the box, and Bird is going to 
choose a bucket to pick a carrot from. Bird is going to have a peek inside the carrot 
and decide to keep it in the basket, or not keep it and give it to me.” 
191 
9. “Now it is your turn.” 
E1 guides child through their turn. 
10. “You can pay a token into the box, and you can pick a carrot from one of the 
buckets, now you can have a peek inside and decide if you want to keep it and put it 
in your pan, or not keep it and give it to me.” 
Child is allowed to accept or reject either kind of carrot, E1 does not provide 
feedback on decisions. 
11.  “What was inside the carrot that Bird picked? Which bucket did they look in?” 
12. “What was inside the carrot that you picked? Which bucket did you look in?” 
Child keeps any carrots they find in their pan; Bird’s carrots stay in basket. 
E1 takes buckets out of sight, refills them, changes lid colours, and randomly swaps 
sides. 
13. “Look you have 2 tokens left; would you like to play the game again?” 
Trial 2 follows same pattern as trial 1 (from step 4). Trial 3 follows trial 2 in same 
pattern. Game finishes after 3 trials. 
14. “How were you deciding which buckets to choose?” 
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Appendix C: 




Pilot Study for Chapter 4 
To evaluate the suitability of the task methodology, a pilot study was conducted 
with two- to seven-year-old children (N = 41) recruited at the University of Stirling 
Summer Science Festival. A number of variations of the intended task were tested to 
identify the most appropriate informants and age range, and to check the saliency of the 
available associative cues. Due to the need for participants to form an association, or 
infer a rule, prior to testing their capacity to use reasoned selective processes, it was 
necessary for each participant to experience a high number of pre-switch trials. 
However, this posed a problem due to the young age of the intended participants and the 
potential length of time they would need to remain focused and motivated to continue 
with the task. There were also queries surrounding whether the informants should be 
human adults or puppets, though it was expected that it would be easier for participants 
to ascribe perceptual access to human adults. To explore these methodological aspects 
of the task, we piloted versions of the task that employed puppets or adults as 
informants and varied the maximum number of pre-switch trials. As a result of the pilot 
testing, it was decided that the task should use human adults as informants which 
reduced the length of each trial and appeared to hold participants’ attention longer. By 
employing adult informants, the number of pre-switch trials could be set at the higher 
number to provide more opportunity to form an association, or infer a rule, prior to the 
switch. In the pilot study, coloured wooden shapes were used as tokens to indicate 
which box each informant thought the Lego was inside (similarly to non-verbal theory 
of mind tasks; e.g., Call & Tomasello, 1999); children were then asked which box they 
wanted to open to try and find the Lego. We decided in the main experiment to modify 
this aspect of the task by removing the tokens and, rather than asking children to choose 
a box, asking them to choose an informant as this appears to be a more suitable measure 
to ascertain whether children recognise who has access to knowledge. 
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